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Abstract
A Forensic Web Log Analysis Tool: Techniques and Implementation
Ann Fry
Methodologies presently in use to perform forensic analysis of web applications are decidedly
lacking. Although the number of log analysis tools available is exceedingly large, most only employ
simple statistical analysis or rudimentary search capabilities. More precisely these tools were not
designed to be forensically capable. The threat of online assault, the ever growing reliance on the
performance of necessary services conducted online, and the lack of eﬃcient forensic methods in this
area provide a background outlining the need for such a tool. The culmination of study emanating
from this thesis not only presents a forensic log analysis framework, but also outlines an innovative
methodology of analyzing log ﬁles based on a concept that uses regular expressions, and a variety
of solutions to problems associated with existing tools. The implementation is designed to detect
critical web application security ﬂaws gleaned from event data contained within the access log ﬁles
of the underlying Apache Web Service (AWS).
Of utmost importance to a forensic investigator or incident responder is the generation of an event
timeline preceeding the incident under investigation. Regular expressions power the search capability
of our framework by enabling the detection of a variety of injection-based attacks that represent
signiﬁcant timeline interactions. The knowledge of the underlying event structure of each access log
entry is essential to eﬃciently parse log ﬁles and determine timeline interactions. Another feature
added to our tool includes the ability to modify, remove, or add regular expressions. This feature
addresses the need for investigators to adapt the environment to include investigation speciﬁc queries
along with suggested default signatures. The regular expressions are signature deﬁnitions used to
detect attacks toward both applications whose functionality requires a web service and the service
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The Internet, home to almost two billion users and over 156 million websites [8], has evolved from
the simplest text and hyperlink based pages to today’s standards of dynamic mobile productivity
applications [191]. Due to increased demand of the means to access increasingly sophisticated
applications over the Internet, the number of web applications developed recently has exploded for
use across multiple platforms. Interest in web application security has risen dramatically relative
to the number of vulnerable applications. There exists a charitable organization called the Open
Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [59] that is dedicated to improving the security of web
application related software. Web application history evolves from the use of simple scripts to richly
designed user interfaces with both client and server side behaviors, written in increasingly complex
languages. The evolution timeline of web application development is well illustrated in Figure 1
[247]
1.1 Motivations
With the evolution of web application technologies arises a revolutionary proﬁle of attack trends.
The current proﬁle highlights the main issues aﬀecting the state of website security for any potential
attack target. The variety of dependencies upon which web applications rely as well as any corre-
spondance between them comprise the security landscape of a target. These dependencies include
the operating system foundation, back-end services such as databases and the web service itself,
and potentially many other interoperable web applications. It has been determined that attackers
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Figure 1: Web Development Timeline [247]
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motivations are generally consistent [384]. However, one reason their exploit methods remain un-
predictable is due to the large size of the security landscape. It is this same landscape that causes
the tracking of these deviants to continue to be an ever increasingly complex task.
The ability to track the evolution of malicious parties through the association of individual attacks
against a target system are essential to a incident response record of events. This record establishes
that log analysis is an important and essential component to the investigation of an organization’s
security state from both administrative as well as forensic standpoints. Each network device such as a
workstation, server, router, switch, Virtual Private Network (VPN), Virtual Machine (VM), ﬁrewall,
Intrusion Detection System (IDS), or Host Integrity Monitoring System (HIMS) generates logs that
contain records of system, device, and user activities that have taken place within the infrastructure.
As such, analysis can provide explanations and determine trends for events such as login success
or failure, website visits, ﬁles read, modiﬁed or deleted, amount of network bandwidth used, or
identify imminent threats such as attacks, viruses or other network anomalies [262]. During normal
operations, web applications may include a logging function to record event information. These are
used to provide proof of validity that can be required by law or corporate policies. They are also
used to ensure individual accountability in the application sphere by tracking a user’s actions [58].
Even if a web application does not provide this functionality, most underlying service applications
do provide very comprehensive logging capabilities.
Digital forensic science concerns itself with the collection, preservation and documentation of
evidentiary data. It is the analysis of all data present on a computer system which aided the
commission of a criminal oﬀence. The data’s ability to persuade with a high level of conﬁdence that
a particular action has occurred and its suitability of admission classiﬁes it as forensic evidence [43].
The collection of such data after an incident targets a web application requires knowledge of the many
interworking technologies associated with the application. Pairing the extensive logging capabilities
of the web service application with the analysis of the underlying server enables the forensic analyst
to get an improved survey of any incident. It is easily apparent for forensic purposes, that the
analysis of these logged events is a crucial step in the investigation process. Existing log analysis
solutions do not provide forensic functionalities necessary to analyze and classify data as evidence.
These shortcomings comprise the basis of the problem we propose to solve, and are described below.
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1.2 Problem Statement
Presently, with the increasing prevelance of crimes associated with digital devices, applying sci-
entiﬁc processes to obtain evidentiary data has become a necessity. During an investigation where
the prime evidence is contained within web service log events, one of the ﬁrst problems faced by
a digital investigator is the decision of how to organize and analyse log data of a target machine.
The problem with current log analysis technologies is that they do not apply principles necessary
to qualify as forensic analysis solutions. Forensic principles such as eﬃciency, processing large ﬁle
sizes, classiﬁcation of data, comprehensive reporting, modularity, extensibility and the detection of
critical timeline events associated with an incident must be considered in the development of an
appropriate solution.
To eﬀectively perform web application forensics, it is necessary to ensure the validity of events
and provide an agile method of analysis. With regards to eﬃciency, a size-based log rotation imple-
mentation such as logrotate [371] ensures log ﬁles that normally aggregate quickly are individually
organized to be accessed eﬃciently [2]. Some web applications include the necessary components to
provide the capability of log rotation such as Trac [352] or Twiki [309], while others do not. This
is especially important in a live investigation, as this requires an application which is both time
sensitive and capable of providing critical information. Several features of web applications ensure
that an investigator cannot analyze the web application logs independantly from other sources to
acquire all necessary information pertinent to an investigation.
One such feature is the fact that each web application may or may not come with logging capa-
bilities. In the circumstance where an application does not generate events, errors are sent to the
underlying server application log or another proprietary debug tool. Therefore, to aid in the validity
or admissibility of events, a thorough understanding of the logging capabilities of the server itself
should be attained. The logs provide a record of events occuring prior to or within the duration
of an incident. Another feature is consumed with the idea that some web applications are built to
perform logging such as the Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) [157]; the
verbosity and frequency of the events that are logged are application speciﬁc. All application log
ﬁles are cryptic due to the nature of their inception as an invention of necessity to programmers
during development. They were not designed to support incident investigations. Appropriate log
management practices limit the challenges faced by forensic analysts.
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With regards to the problem of web application forensics, most research and development has been
performed by IDSs. Although intrusion detection research is applicable, various methodologies sug-
gested by said research have yet to be directly applied to the area of web application related forensic
analysis. In the following section are highlighted objectives that purport to solve the inadequacies of
present log analysis solutions through the research and development of a tool incorporating forensic
principles.
1.3 Objectives
The following outline of proposed objectives for this research incorporate the development of
forensic principles and their application to a proposed forensic log analysis solution:
• Prepare an eﬀective account of the engineering process that develops a forensic log analysis
tool by studying the state of the art methods presently applied to log analysis by today’s web
application security specialists.
• Determine those principles necessary to the production of an implementation functionally
appropriate for forensic log analysis of web applications. This includes details of the imple-
mentation, design and a description of applicable technologies.
• Elaborate a new technique for the analysis of web server logs for forensic investigation.
• Prototype the proposed technique for the purpose of validation.
1.4 Contributions
An outline of the contributions made by our study is included within the following section:
1. Provided as a solution to the lack of forensic log analysis tools, the implementation developed
in conjunction with the preparation of this document implements functionalities according
to several principles requisite to a web log ﬁle analyzer. The forensic principles left unac-
complished by current log analysis solutions include ensuring enough evidentiary material is
present, fast processing time, the ability to process large ﬁle sizes, the organization of events,
readable reports, a modular and extensible code base for reuse and adaptability and the asso-
ciation of detected critical events with the incident timeline. Ensuring evidentiary material is
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already present on a target machine can prove diﬃcult. To combat this principle our solution
analyzes a resource already available to the investigator; the logging service of the underlying
server application.
2. Our innovative approach that includes the use regular expressions for the performance of foren-
sic web log analysis is the ﬁrst of it’s kind. Our methodology, one currently employed by IDSs;
uses regular expressions to perform forensic analysis of AWS [164, 163] access logs with re-
gards to web applications. The use of regular expressions not only expediates the processing
time of logs signiﬁcantly, but also provides a more comprehensive search method than that
normally found within log analysis solutions. Due to the eﬃciency of regular expressions,
processing of ﬁles that contain copious amounts of data can be accomplished with minimal
computational cost. Usage of a database in conjuction with the parsing capabilities of our tool
enables a more organized and comprehensive retrieval of data for the purposes of reporting and
analysis. Albiet such reporting is not implemented by our tool. The design of our implementa-
tion includes a modular aspect due to the requirement that it remain a plugin to the forensics
framework. Code reuse may enable others to implement those features applicable in a forensic
scenario undiscovered presently. The extensible nature of our tool includes he ability to add,
modify or exclude particular regular expressions. This in turn not only allows for adaptability
but also the application of ﬁne grain control for particular investigation scenarios.
3. Due to the extensive comparative study of diﬀerent log analysis solutions, insights into how
successful exploits aﬀect the timeline preceeding and during an incident are discovered. Sub-
mission of strings that can prove exploitational serve as distinctive markers when observing
events in a timeline. The unauthorized execution of code segments can alter the appropriate
functionality of a target machine in such a way as to compromise the system’s integrity. It
is this full compromise that comprises an incident. At which point a forensic investigation
begins. These signiﬁcant events have consequences, and impact the evolutionary timeline by
altering states of the server. It is important within an investigation to know the states prior
to, during and after the compromise of a system has taken place. For not only does this de-
termine how much damage is done in a particular incident, but oﬀers sources as to the cause,
and with further exploration, can lead an investigator to the perpetrator of the devious acts.
In conclusion, this variation of log ﬁle analysis has many limitations. However, it is believed




Within the second chapter, we provide an overview of the theories and technologies associated with
and aﬀected by the web vulnerabilities targeted in this study. The third chapter expresses an outline
of related work studies that had an impact on our dissertation. In the fourth chapter we discuss
the regular expressions used to describe the attack vectors detectable by our implementation. The
forensic log analysis tool description devoted to chapter ﬁve outlines the design and implementation
of a software environment that prototypes the proposed approach. Finally, some concluding results





As a topic applicable to modern Internet culture, we assume our reader is familiar with at least
one web application. The proliﬁc use of social networking sites, familiarity and ease of use to access
online banking or to go shopping online all expose the general public to the face of web applications
in everyday Internet usage. However what are web applications? How have they evolved? Is their
expansion too rapid to ensure the security of our private information? Upon which technologies have
they been developed? How can we view web application transactions forensically? These are all valid
concerns. This brief overview of theories and technologies associated with the dissertation’s subject
matter, aims to provide the reader with the context necessary to answer these questions. With
respect to each of the individual areas touched by the subject matter, this chapter looks to provide
the reader with suﬃcient understanding of the methodology chosen for our proposed contributions.
The areas discussed are cyber-forensics, web applications and their components, as well as regular
expressions. The complexity of web application forensics increases with the number and variety of
underlying components a single web application depends on. These components include network
structure, operating system ﬁles structure as well as additional service dependencies. One common
example of a service a web application would rely on is a database service. The interactions between
and where vulnerabilities aﬀect web application components are demonstrated in Figure 2.
2.1 Log Analysis
The evolution of digital evidence extraction from electronic devices continues to increase in com-














































Figure 2: Web Application Architecture [329]
of storage devices, partitioning certain areas of memory for a more rigorous examination enables
forensic tools to produce more relevant data to the investigation at hand. This selection process
reduces the amount of data to be analyzed by removing redundancy, and illustrates the importance
of having diﬀerent methods of forensic inquiry for each type of data that requires analysis [333].
Due to developmental processes, most if not all software applications, operating systems, services
and drivers have methods, which enable them to record or log information about events that occur
during normal operation. Aggregations of event data are incredibly important to a forensic inves-
tigator during the time line reconstruction of an incident. Analysis of the information contained
within log ﬁles can be used to accurately reconstruct user activities, and the methodology of accom-
plishing this has been performed on a variety of operating systems including Microsoft (MS) [81]
based environments [349].
Although log ﬁles were not built speciﬁcally for forensic purposes, they are the most likely of all ﬁles
resident on a system to contain the majority of evidentiary information. If they do not contain such
information, they may provide links to other sources of information for an investigator to generate
an accurate representation of the virtual environment at the time of the incident, also known as the
“scene of the crime”. Logs were generated by developers to report on services or applications during
run time. Events contained within these logs can indicate both normal or erroneous operation of
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an application. The purpose of these events are to inform application developers of their presence.
The lack of a particular notiﬁcation could also indicate the occurrence of an error. The results
of this application-speciﬁc log ﬁle include non-standard data types, event formats, rudimentary
event category deﬁnitions, and ﬁle formats whose integrity cannot be veriﬁed. Other problems
currently faced by log analysts include how to manage and analyze large ﬁles, and how to organize
and report their ﬁndings in a format acceptable and understandable to a court of law. Currently,
the best method of practice amongst log analysis professionals or system administrators is their
own empirical research which uncovers event anomalies amid the vast collection of normally logged
events. Log ﬁle analysis is a mandatory process that should be performed during all computer
forensic investigations, however, due to the nature and potential size of various log ﬁles, this task is
one of the most processing intensive.
Using default settings, a machine will not log all of the information that is beneﬁcial to the
forensic investigator. The machine setup and audit policies for all machines on the network must
be ﬁne tuned to the appropriate level for each application, service, and operating system task. This
ensures all potentially admissible events are recorded. In an ideal forensic situation, an excellent
system administrator of the network under investigation, would already have three systems in place
to accomplish the following tasks [2]. The ﬁrst machine would comprise a central stealth repository
for all events to be gathered from across the network. Organizing all of the network events in one
place enables eﬃcient log rotation, backup capabilities, and easier log ﬁle to log ﬁle correlation.
Ensuring that the central repository is setup in a stealth manner provides another level of security
against log ﬁle tampering. The second machine would support the processing of an IDS. The
third machine would perform any preliminary investigation and rudimentary analysis deﬁned by the
system administrator that would be beneﬁcial for understanding the state of their network.
2.2 Web Applications
In this section, we aim to provide an overview of web applications and their security from a forensic
perspective. The basic protocol Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [131] is stateless. Problems
with web applications are partially due to the instantiation of increasingly complex protocols upon
this unstable basis [329]. When designing secure web applications, developers must consider the
inherent insecurity of HTTP. Unfortunately, this is commonly overlooked as developers tend to be
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overly concerned with deadlines rather than security. The categories of web applications, known to
comprise the HTTP architecture, include the HTTP server, proxy, cache, gateway, tunnel, agent, and
robot applications [109]. Applications which extend the functionality of these fundamental building
blocks are also of concern to web application security professionals. In July of 2004, attackers staged
several Internet Explorer (IE) [79] attacks designed to steal banking and credit card information.
This occurred when malicous parties took over several MS Internet Information Services (IIS) web
servers [88] worldwide, where ﬂaws within IE composed of malicious Javascript (JS) [280] were
automatically downloaded whenever a user visited an infected site. Once run, the JS downloaded a
keystroke logger [347] trojan horse [289] from another server in Russia [377]. This attack relied on
leveraging vulnerabilities in multiple web applications in order to complete the attack successfully.
Both the client side browser and the service itself contained vulnerabilities. This shows that an attack
does not just happen against the web application itself, but also on processes and technologies that
formulate the foundation of web applications. Web browsers programmatically function as agents,
caches, gateways and robot applications. They also provide the necessary conﬁguration to enable the
use of tunnels and proxies. A web server’s primary function is to act as an HTTP server. Depending
upon its conﬁguration, a web server instance can also perform any of the additionally described
HTTP architecture web applications. One such conﬁguration could be used to harden a network.
This would be achieved by implementing a gateway device that isolates the servers from the web
and accepts the traﬃc on their behalf [329]. As an example of web service ﬂexibility, the AWS can
implement this functionality by operating as a reverse proxy. Subsequently, we will discuss server
side applications and how vulnerabilities generated client side can be executed server side. As the
number of web applications continues to grow, we will take a look at some of the more commonly
used web applications that were considered within the scope of our research.
2.2.1 Client Side
The browser itself is a key component of the Internet because it represents the visual interface
between the user and the Internet [110]. It enables the user to generate standard HTTP request
messages in addition to the storage and tracking of session data. This session data is then accesssible
to the browser, individual web resources or applications. The browser enables access of data resident
on the platform itself. The browser’s functionalities are not limited to traversal direction and data
submission; distributed web applications employ the browser’s ability to process data [360]. The
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browser’s main purpose is to act as a gateway to the information on the Internet. It can also provide
caching and conﬁguration for using proxies. Each browser has a unique method of rendering the data
it requests. The signiﬁcant variations in the rendering process require web developers to process
and test the behavior of their applications across multiple versions of the same product. Even
slight version variation can cause undesirable functionality or security vulnerabilities. Web browsers
vulnerabilities are also caused by the browsers functionalities necessary to interact with varying
Internet content types and requisite processing capabilities. Although according to the graph at [22]
where browser manufacturers claim their products to be secure against all of these types of attacks,
the server providing the web service itself cannot fully be secured. Attacks may be made via diﬀerent
avenues to the server providing the web service. Even now vulnerabilities within browsers are still
being reported to security mailing lists [278]. Other indications of these vulnerabilities arise when
browser development teams release bug ﬁxes or security updates to their products. For example,
at the time of writing this MS just released the largest batch of updates since the inception of the
ﬁrst “Patch Tuesday” back in 2003. These updates are not only applicable to IE, but also to the
MS Windows 7 [90] operating system and the MS Oﬃce suite [257]. Concerning these types of
vulnerabilities, the developers are taking proprietary measures, not standardized with a governing
body such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [137] that do not completely mitigate all
web related vulnerabilities. One problem with the acceptance of such a standardization is due to the
nature of most Internet advertisements whose revenue generation is based on the number of users
that have viewed a particular ad [46]. As stated, it is this variety of code that enables website owners
to collect revenue for advertisements, or to collect information such as users’ Internet Protocol (IP)
[315] addresses for statisical purposes. The ability to collect this data cannot only be performed
server side. The required functionality of the browser to execute code also opens up the possibility
of malicious code being written into websites to be executed by the browser of an unsuspecting user.
Providing users with security information when Java [186] is run from the browser raises awareness
to the end users in the form of a warning. Unfortunately the browser’s ability to run code such as
JS or Adobe [68] Actionscript [203] is not impeded by similar warnings as these technologies are
associated with similar vulnerabilities. In the following, we will provide a description of the current
browser war opponents and how their evolution has aﬀected web applications. The two opponents
are Mozilla’s [275] Firefox [273], and MS’s IE.
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Internet Explorer
IE is one of the oldest browsers still prevalent today. First developed and released as a MS
Windows 95 [91] upgrade during July of 1995, IE included built-in support for dial-up networking as
well as the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [45] and the IP protocols which are key technologies
used for connecting to the Internet [74]. Proof of this browser’s signiﬁcant stature is based upon its
involvement in both of the major browser wars. Due to prevalence of the MS Windows operating
system in corporate environments, IE is the lead product considered by web developers during the
development of any web application. It also provides a dangerously viable target for malicious parties
who wish to aﬀect a large number of users. The more users a product has, the more likely attackers
are to generate an exploit for that product. Even with the latest version of the browser, which is
currently IE Version 8, updates are being issued to minimize the impact of vulnerabilities. One such
vulnerability example is a Hyper-Text Markup Language (HTML) sanitization bypass weakness. IE
8 includes a method designed to sanitize executable script constructs from HTML. Attackers can
bypass this protection to allow script code to execute on the client. One avenue of attack would be
to insert the script within a “postMessage” call [340]. The attack requires the malicious user to get
the victim to click on a link for this attack to succeed. If submitted to an application running on
an AWS base, the HTTP POST message will be visible within the log ﬁle. It is this type of log ﬁle
event that our tool can detect as long as the logging capabilities of the server maintains the requisite
information.
Firefox
Within the current browser war, the burgeoning browser contender is Mozilla corporation’s open
source project called Firefox. In addition to supporting the Web standards such as HTML [322],
eXtensible Hyper-Text Markup Language (XHTML) [307], Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) [36], Doc-
ument Object Model (DOM)s 1 or 2 [17] and eXtensible Markup Language (XML) [38, 148]; and
common proprietary plug-ins such as Java, Flash [220] and Acrobat Reader [148, 219], Mozilla has
great support for the millions of non-standard web pages that exist on the Internet today. Mozilla’s
“quirks” and “almost standard” modes ensure that even buggy web pages display quickly and cor-
rectly [321]. Complying with the standards of a web technology enables only a certain degree of
control. Web technology standards were not designed to be secure. To add to the already insecure
design, compliance with non-standard controls makes the applications inherently more vulnerable.
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Unknown functionalities that could be hidden within a “buggy” webpage can prove to be malicious.
The capabilities provided by additional plugins or add-ons to the Firefox program are undeniably
useful for a developer, however with these tools, a malicious user can also determine an eﬀective
method of attack. For example, a Firefox add-on developed with the intent to “spider” a website
could retrieve not only identiﬁable information about a target, but also information that indicates a
vulnerability is present. Machine automated user agents that autonomously wander the web issuing
HTTP transactions and fetching content are known as spiders or web robots. These spiders gener-
ally wander the web to build useful archives of web content such as a search engine’s database or
a product catalog for a comparison shopping robot [109]. Another form of spidering that performs
extensive server directory traversal is a web development application called Webscarab; this appli-
cation may be retrieved from [150]. A Firefox plugin could provide functionality for viewing Flash
animations. Unfortunately, additional capabilities such as this one would open up Firefox to any
vulnerabilities currently aﬀecting that functionality. One such example is the case of Actionscript
invoking a malicious Actionscript-based function or invoking a malicious function that executes JS
without the browser or the user’s knowledge [41]. This is one example of a Cross Site Scripting
(XSS) [190] attack. A generalized scenario of a XSS attack is depicted in Figure 3. More details on
this attack and others are presented in Chapter 4. For more information about Firefox add-ons or
plugins please refer to [272] or [274].
Opera
The ability to eﬀectively disseminate information is the Internet’s greatest asset. As more and
more devices are being brought onto the Internet, the choice of interface to that information is
very important. The Opera [18] web browser has assumed a leading role for use in popular “smart”
devices such as mobile phones, Nintendo [97] DS [98] and Wii [99] systems, Personal Digital Assistant
(PDA)s, and is also used in interactive televisions [56]. As browsers are ported to these diﬀerent
devices and since the expansion of any product to a new sphere may introduce new vulnerabilities,
it is imperative that the security of these browsers is enhanced. With the current version of the
Opera browser, which is version 10.62, there exist multiple cross-domain and address bar Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) [265] spooﬁng vulnerabilities that have not been patched [341]. With the
wide variety of browser choice, the capability to correlate both the browser history or browser log
of a victim or conﬁscated attacker machine, with the server log could be of great assistance to any

















































Figure 3: Cross Site Scripting Scenario [360]
server, rendering the client victim machine as only a means of accessing the intended victim.
2.2.2 Server Side
The web server application is setup to listen for and processs information requests. The purpose
of a web server is to translate a URL either into a ﬁleneame and transmit the requested ﬁle to the
origin of the request, or into a program name, then execute that program with speciﬁed parameters if
applicable, and send the results back [249]. The basic transactions that comprise the Internet include
the abilities of sending and receiving data [109]. The browser and server applications provide an
interaction platform for these transactions.
Apache Web Server
The AWS is the target web service chosen for our implementation. It is released as an open
source licensing software project by the Apache Software Foundation. We chose this implementation
because it provides comprehensive documentation, an extensible platform with a large library of
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freely available modules, as well as a completely conﬁgurable logging structure. Figure 4 describes


































Figure 4: Web Architecture: From Apache Viewpoint [329]
With respect to security, the AWS has many conﬁguration options that should be explicitly set
to harden the installation. The default settings ensure the service gets up and running but can
compromise security. Self inﬂicted attacks stem from common conﬁguration mistakes, which enable
attackers to easily compromise a publicly facing system. Due to the vast diﬀerences in nature
for each server instantiation, there is no readily available solution that covers all the necessary
conﬁguration details required to fully secure a server subjected to the public Internet. Programmers
make mistakes, and attacks will continue to occur as no system is ever truly secure. This reveals
the need for forensic responses to these incidents.
The AWS is extended by the addition of modules at compile time. Depending on the mod-
ule, its functionality may enhance or detract from the security of a given server instance. Those
modules used within hardened installations can include mod evasive [394], mod chroot [202], and
mod security [328]. The mod evasive module enables the AWS to take evasive actions in the event
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of a DoS [199], Distributed Denial Of Service (DDoS) [304] or a “brute force” [24] attack. It can
also be used as a detection tool and conﬁgured to talk to ipchains [26], ﬁrewalls or routers [394].
The mod chroot module enables the AWS process and any child processes to view the ﬁle system
such that the apparent root directory is not the real root directory but one of its descendants [177].
This functionality is similar to the system calls chroot() [118] or jail() [234] on a Unix/POSIX
compliant system. A chroot on such a system restricts the functionality available to a running pro-
cess by only allowing access to those ﬁles within the “jail” environment. The AWS’s functionality of
performing as a reverse proxy is made possible due to the mod security module. In the open source
world, mod security is an embeddable web application protection engine, also known as an appli-
cation gateway appliance, that has the cababilities to perform ﬁne grain ﬁltration of HTTP requests
and responses, normalize paths and parameters to ﬁght evasion techniques, perform extensive audit
logging, and ﬁlter Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) [325] data [28]. It works as an
AWS module installed together with mod proxy [146] and other supporting modules on a separate
network device in the reverse proxy mode of operation [329]. The last module considered in this in-
troduction related to log forensics supplied within the Apache module library is mod log forensics
[145] or mod forensics (deprecated version). Enabling the mod log forensics module provides an
administrator with extensive logging. The purpose of the mod log forensics module is to reveal
request events that make the server crash. It generates a special log ﬁle where requests are logged
twice: once at the beginning and once at the end of the request [329]. This enables an investigator
or administrator to ﬁgure out which request occurred before the server crashed. Since upon crashing
the service would be unable to log the second request event entry.
One of the ﬁrst places an intelligent attacker gravitates towards are the log ﬁles of the intended
victim machine. The default location of the two AWS log ﬁles, on a machine running a Unix/POSIX
[193] compliant operating system will be found in /usr/local/apache/logs. Other common loca-
tions place these ﬁles in /var/log and /usr/adm. For the AWS the location can also be administrator
speciﬁed within CustomLog directive [327]. Not only would this be useful to attempt to hide their
intrusion; access to the server’s logs can potentially yield invaluable information to an attacker by
revealing conﬁguration details, usernames, client data, misconﬁgurations and problematic scripts
[382]. If either of the log ﬁles or the directory that they are in are writable by the AWS priviledged
user, an attacker can use them to cause serious damage to a system. One direct method of ac-
complishing this would be to generate a symbolic link from a log ﬁle to an important system ﬁle,
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which would then be overwritten with logging information. Another oﬀshoot of this would be to
glean sensitive data such as usernames, proxy and server conﬁguration information, and use this to
launch other attacks. If anyone other than root, administrator or operator can alter logs, they can
destroy important evidence of attacks [15]. This example proves the log ﬁle directory must remain
secure and ensure permissions grant only an administrative user write capability [382]. Concerning
log ﬁle analysis; although there is an enormous amount of information in the log ﬁles the data is
not useful in raw form. Once analyzed and organized into a proper format, statistical informa-
tion such as an estimation of the number of visitors to the site, what was most often requested,
what was not requested, the amount of time individuals spent at the site, the referral information,
or information that directed them to the site, high traﬃc hours and most importantly what was
broken, what was not viewed, or what was supposed to be inaccessible to the general public can
provide incident response evidence to an investigator. The problem with log ﬁle analysis is not due
to programmatic error, but to the protocol that is fundamental to transactions over the Internet:
the anonymous stateless HTTP protocol [327]. For instance, even origin information recorded in log
ﬁle events can be suspect. To minimize bandwidth usage, Internet Service Provider (ISP)s such as
AOL [221] proxy all requests originating from their base network. This can result in event entries
that contain the proxy as the originating address in representation of what is mirrored at the proxy
location. Requests from the user network are then directed to the proxy, without actually reaching
the original service and therefore not generating events from within that network. Proxies are used
to relay static information that is refreshed and updated at intervals. Any interactive components
or dynamic content such as the results from a Common Gateway Interface (CGI) [332] program,
which web applications are inclined to include, require direction from and are tailored to individ-
ual users, and therefore pass through the proxy to result in event generation. Proxies must be
taken into consideration during the reconstruction of a forensic incident timeline. By default, the
AWS generates two log ﬁles. Viewing the normal operation of the AWS within the access log and
error log ﬁles regularly should enable one to determine if there exists a problem through anomaly
detection. The question posed would become how can we automate this anomaly detection for a
forensic investigation? This dissertation both proposes as well as implements an eﬀective methodol-
ogy to achieve this end. This is explained further in Chapter 5. The error log ﬁle contains events
generated concerning diagnostic information and will record any error messages encountered during
the processing of requests [319]. The access log ﬁle records all client requests made to the server
[330].
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Examples of diagnostic information that is logged to the error log include process startup and
shutdown messages, debugging data from CGI scripts, standard informational messages, critical
event data and errors that occurred during request serving, which would generate status codes be-
tween 400 and 503 [249]. While the error log contains all process related diagnostics, access logs
record all individual requests. The error log events that record requests generating status codes
between 400 and 503 provide a certain measure of redundancy for the AWS’s logging functional-
ity. Events recorded to the error log ﬁle cannot be externally generated or modifed. However,
the loglevel directive within the AWS’s conﬁguration enables an administrator to specify event
granularity. This can ensure both the retention of pertinent information to an investigation, and the
elimination of excess information, which simpliﬁes analysis. These directives are outlined in Table
1.
Table 1: Apache error log loglevel Directives [382]
Directive Description
EMERG
System unusuable - Only process information such as startup and shut-
down
ALERT
Immediate action required - Immediate action is necessary for proper
operation
CRIT
Critical error - Events contain critical condition information
ERROR
Noncritical error - Services status including improper conﬁguration er-
rors
WARN
Warning - Non-threatening service problems, which may require atten-
tion
NOTICE
Normal but Signiﬁcant - Normal events, which may need to be evalu-
ated
INFO
Informational - Includes additional informational events or sug-
gestions, developer aid for conﬂict resolution
DEBUG
Debug level - Logs normal events and data related to debugging
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Directive event information is compounding, as each level will report all events respective to those
preceeding their place in the table. The directive should be set at the lowest level possible to ensure
events get logged, but not so low that it overloads the processing capabilities of the server itself. This
setting used in conjunction with eﬀective log management practices such as log rotation, ensures the
retention of all forensic evidence. The format of events generated for the error log ﬁle is structured
[214]:
[ Day of Week / Month / Day / HH:MM:SS / Year ] [ LogLevel ]
[ Hostname : Location (Originating Ip Address) ] [ Error Message ]
The example below consists of two events, the ﬁrst is an error event caused by the AWS startup
notice. The second event reveals that the service is unable to ﬁnd the \htdocs directory:
[Sun May 17 06:25:04 2009] [notice] Apache/2.2.4 (Ubuntu) DAV/2 SVN/1.4.4
mod_python/3.3.1 Python/2.5.1 PHP/5.2.3-1ubuntu6.4 mod_ssl/2.2.4
OpenSSL/0.9.8e mod_perl/2.0.2 Perl/v5.8.8 configured -- resuming normal
operations
[Sun May 17 06:25:04 2009] [error] [client 127.0.0.1] File does not exist:
/htdocs
The information recorded within the error log holds potential correlation advantages to a forensic
investigation. This is due to the fact that error events generated by requests may contain additional
information than that recorded in the access log. For example to forensically determine whether
an attack based on a speciﬁc module or the AWS version could be possible, correlation of the version
numbers within the error log along with the attack string would be useful to an investigator. The
more verbose the error log directive is set to, the more likely development debug suggestions may
oﬀer additional information to an investigator.
Request logs are often examined in detail to determine individual actions logged for a speciﬁc
request. However, these logs are so extensive that for the determination of client patterns, trends
and preferences they must be viewed in summary. Scripting languages such as Perl [308] or Python
[151] are very useful for summarizing the AWS request logs [25]. Our analysis focuses on the
access log due to the nature of the data maintained by the default conﬁguration that speciﬁes
events captured to this log ﬁle. Every successful or attempted ﬁle access results in a new event added
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to the access log. The standard request logging, provided by the mod log config [158] module,
is designed to capture information about all client requests and also to store errors generated by
the server or other processes similar to CGI scripts that it spawns [25]. Client interactions in the
form of requests contain information such as attack strings or origin IP addresses, which are of high
forensic value to an investigator.
The Common Log Format (CLF) as deﬁned by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is
documented at [381]. It is known as the default log format used by most Unix-based web servers. It
is also the format used by the AWS’s access log. Therefore the event format for the access log
ﬁle is structured as shown below [205, 25]:
[remotehost] [identd (or RFC931)] [authuser] [date] [request URL] [status]
[bytes]
Each ﬁeld of a CLF log event entry is delimited or set apart from surrounding characters by a space
character [25]. The remotehost is the IP address of the client that sent the request or the client’s
fully qualiﬁed hostname if HostNameLookups is enabled [25]. Hostname lookups can be enabled
within the AWS’s conﬁguration when the directive is set as follows:
HostNameLookups on
However this lookup requires extra processing overhead and can cause performance issues. Therefore,
this is suitably performed by many oﬄine analysis programs after log rotation. The second ﬁeld of
the access log event contains the identity of the visitor in that location such as an email address
or other unique identiﬁer. If the identd [228] protocol is used to verify a client’s identity and the
IdentityCheck directive is activated [382], the identity information is formed by the client’s identd
response. The identd protocol performs user identiﬁcation as deﬁned by [228], in which a machine
is queried for the identity of the user who owns a process that initiated a TCP/IP connection. The
checking performed by identd is disabled by default in the AWS. In such cases, this information
may be provided directly by the browser. However, this feature was removed from most browsers
when spammers would collect the email addresses and send them unsolicited email [25]. Due to
these reasons, it is not unusual to have this ﬁeld ﬁlled by a hyphen character as a placeholder. The
authuser ﬁeld contains client provided username credential information. This ﬁeld will only be
populated if the client requests a protected document that requires a user ID and password [382].
Basic AWS authentication is provided through the use of a .htaccess ﬁle. The date ﬁeld provides
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the date and time of the request, enclosed in square brackets with [DD/MMM/YYYY:HH:MM:SS
Timezone] format. A client’s request string is recorded in an event entry enclosed in quotes and
omits the leading http://servername portion of the URL [25]. The ﬁeld entries of the request
string include descriptions of the METHOD, RESOURCE, and PROTOCOL for each request. According to
RFC 2616, the eight methods that are deﬁned for HTTP Version 1.1 include GET, OPTIONS, POST,
HEAD, PUT, DELETE, TRACE and CONNECT [131]. The RESOURCE portion of the request is the actual
document, ﬁle or URL that was requested from the server. The PROTOCOL will usually be deﬁned
as HTTP followed by a version number [327]. The status ﬁeld consists of the three digit status
code returned to the client. The status code indicates the success of a request or if a problem was
encountered during processing. A complete listing of the status codes speciﬁed by the AWS is listed
in Table 2. Status codes can be used as correlation information in conjunction with a veriﬁed attack
request attempt to determine whether the attack was successful. The last piece of information, the
bytes ﬁeld is the total number of bytes that were returned in the body of the response to the client
[327]. This value does not include the amount of bytes included in any headers that are returned
[382]. Deviations from the intended byte counts can indicate malicious requests.
Table 2: access log Request Status Codes[327]
Series Code Translation
100 Series - Informational
100
100 Continue: The client should continue with the request.
101 Switching protocols: The server is willing to comply with the clients
request to upgrade protocols.
200 Series - Successful
200 200 OK: The request was successfully completed and occurred without error.
201 Resource created: The resource was successfully created. A POST com-
mand was issued and satisﬁed successfully without event.
202 Accepted: The request has been accepted for processing, but the pro-
cessing has not been completed.
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Table 2: access log Request Status Codes[327]
Series Code Translation
203 Nonauthoritative information: The information is not the deﬁnitive set
as available from the origin server, but has been gathered from a local
or third-party copy. The server could only partially satisfy the client’s
request.
204 No content: The request was fulﬁlled, but no content needs to be re-
turned.
205 Reset content: The request has been fulﬁlled, and the client should reset
the document view that caused the request to be sent. For example,
reset the contents of an HTML form so that the user can enter new
information into that form.
206 Partial content: The partial GET request has been completed. This will
be in response to a GET request that included a range header, requesting
only a portion of the resource.
300 Series - Redirection
300
300 Multiple choices: The requested resource can be fulﬁlled with any one
of several choices.
301 Moved permanently: The requested resource has been permanently
moved to a new location.
302 Found: The resource is temporarily located somewhere else, but the
client should continue to use the same URL in the future.
303 See other: Usually the same as a 302. The response to the requested
URL can be found at another location and should be retrieved from
there.
304 Not modiﬁed: The document has not been modiﬁed since the speciﬁed
date.
305 Use proxy: The requested resource must be requested through the spec-
iﬁed proxy, which is sent in the Location header.
306 Unused
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Table 2: access log Request Status Codes[327]
Series Code Translation
307 Temporary redirect: The resource has temporarily moved to a new lo-
cation, and the client should repeat the request using that new location.
400 Series - Client error
400
400 Bad request: The request was not understood by the server. (Malformed
request)
401 Unauthorized: The request requires user authentication. This response
is accompanied by a request for the necessary credentials.
402 Payment required: Not yet used.
403 Forbidden: The request was understood, but is being refused.
404 Not found: The requested resource could not be located.
405 Method not allowed: The method used is not one of the methods per-
mitted for the requested resource.
406 Not acceptable: The requested resource is only available in representa-
tions which the client has indicated are not acceptable.
407 Proxy authentication required: Similar to 401, but indicates that a proxy
server requires authentication.
408 Request timeout: The client did not produce a request in the time that
the server was willing to wait.
409 Conﬂict: The request could not be completed because of a conﬂict.
410 Gone: The resource is no longer available, and there is no known for-
warding address.
411 Length required: The server will not accept the request without a
Status-Length header.
412 Precondition Failed: A precondition speciﬁes in the request header eval-
uated is false.
413 Request entity too large: The request was larger than the server was
willing or able to process.
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Table 2: access log Request Status Codes[327]
Series Code Translation
414 Request Uniform Resource Indentiﬁer (URI) [265] too long: The request
URI is longer than the server is willing to interpret. Note that this is
not the same as 413, which refers to the entire request entity, including
headers.
415 Unsupported Media Type: The request is in a format not supported by
the requested resource for the requested method.
416 Request range not satisﬁable: The client request included a Range spec-
iﬁer, which does not specify a valid range for the requested resource.
For example, it requests a byte-range that extends past the size of the
requested ﬁle.
417 Expectation failed: The expectation expressed in the Expect request
header could not be met by the server.
500 Series - Server Error
500
500 Internal server error: The server encountered an unexpected condition
that prevented it from fulﬁlling the request.
501 Not implemented: The server does not support the functionality required
to fulﬁll the request.
502 Bad gateway: While acting as a gateway or proxy, the server received
an invalid request.
503 Service unavailable: The server is currently unavailable.
504 Gateway timeout: When acting as a gateway or proxy, the server did
not receive a timely response from the upstream server.
505 HTTP version not supported: The server does not support the HTTP
protocol that was speciﬁed in the request.
The extensive reconﬁguration ability provided by the AWS for the access log can be com-
pounded by additional module functionality. The LogFormat [159] directive deﬁnes the actual for-
mat of the log ﬁle. All of the available variables that are deﬁned in the modules mod log config
and mod logio [160] are shown in Table 3. The custom log format turned out to be such a good
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idea that even the common format was reimplemented as a custom log ﬁle format as shown [327].
LogFormat %h %l %u %t \ %r\ %>s %b common
Although advantageous to a system administrator, for forensic application developers this conﬁg-
urability is an issue, as the tools that they develop should conform to a variety of user generated
log ﬁle types. The administrator can change the conﬁguration to add additional detail as events are
recorded. One attempt to standardize a modiﬁed CLF log is the Extended Logﬁle Format (ELF)
[198, 25]. The ELF is referred to by the nickname “combined” by the AWS within the LogFormat
directive.
LogFormat %h %l %u %t \ %r\ %>s %b \ %{Referer}i\ \%{User-Agent}i\
combined
The ELF adds two ﬁelds to the CLF as instantiated by the above directive is shown below.
[remotehost] [identd (or RFC931)] [authuser] [date] [request URL] [status]
[bytes] [referer] [agent]
Two example access log entries are shown below.
91.197.197.1 - - [29/Jun/2008:16:43:34 -0400] "GET /w00tw00t.at.ISC.SANS.DFind:)
HTTP/1.1" 400 343 "-" "-"
209.91.158.189 - - [30/Jun/2008:06:36:51 -0400] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 923 "-"
"Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR
2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30)"
First introduced with National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) [287] httpd 1.4,
the ELF was comprised of the standard CLF with two additional ﬁelds referer and UserAgent.
The referer ﬁeld logs the value of the referrer contained within the HTTP header if it exists. The
presence of this ﬁeld in a request indicates that the request was generated by clicking a link in a
page from another site, and the content of this header indicates the URL of this page. The agent
ﬁeld indicates the browser used by the requester.
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Table 3: Access log Variables by mod log config and mod logio
[382, 327]
Variable Deﬁnition
%...a The remote IP address. %h is equivalent to %a if HostnameLookups are
not enabled.
%...A The local IP address, if the AWS is listening to more than one interface.
Useful for IP-based virtual hosting.
%...B Bytes sent, excluding HTTP headers.
%...b Bytes sent, excluding HTTP headers, the value of the Content-Length
header of the server reply. In CLF format that is a ’-’ rather than a ’0’
when no bytes are sent.
%...c The connection status - see %X (AWS 1.3.15 onward, renamed in AWS
2).
%...D The time the server took to process the request (AWS 2 only).
%...{Variable}e An environment variable as deﬁned by the server.
%...f The ﬁlename of the document queried including its complete ﬁle path.
%...h Remote host - this is the remote hostname. An entry here re-
quires the HostnameLookups directive for reverse hostname lookups. If
HostnameLookups has not been enabled, or if a reverse hostname lookup
cannot resolve a client IP address to the hostname, the IP address of the
requestor is logged [25]. In many cases this is not the requester’s IP
address but that of a proxy.
%...H The protocol used to make the request. (Includes version).
%...{header line}i: The contents of one or more header line entries, each speciﬁed within
braces, taken from the request sent to the server.
%...I Provided by mod logio, if present. The total number of bytes received
in the request, including the request line, all headers, and the body (if
there was one). For secure connections, this is the number of bytes prior
to decryption, not the number of bytes in the decrypted request. See
also %O.
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Table 3: Access log Variables by mod log config and mod logio
[382, 327]
Variable Deﬁnition
%...l Remote username, the response to an identity request to the client. (from
identd, if supplied) IdentityCheck directive must be enabled for a value
to be returned.
%...m The request method (AWS 1.3.10 onward).
%...noten The contents of one or more note entries speciﬁed within braces, taken
from another module.
%...{header line}o The contents of one or more header line entries, speciﬁed within braces,
taken from the reply of the client.
%...O Provided by mod logio, if present. The total number of bytes sent in
the response, including the status line, all headers, and the body (if
there was one). For secure connections, this is the number of bytes after
encryption, not the number of bytes in the unencrypted request. See
also %I.
%...p The TCP port number that the client request arrived on, as deﬁned by
the Port or Listen directives.
%...P The process ID (pid) of the child httpd process that serviced the request.
For the AWS 2, see also the extended format.
%{pid—tid}P Either the pid or thread ID (tid) of the AWS child process or thread
that handed the request. %{pid}P is identical to %P. Use an expression
such as ”%P and: %{tid}P” to log both values (For AWS 2.46 onward).
%...q The query string (prepended with a ? if a query string exists, otherwise
an empty string).
%...r The ﬁrst line of the request, containing the HTTP method. Equivalent
to the combination of ”%m%U%q%H”.
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Table 3: Access log Variables by mod log config and mod logio
[382, 327]
Variable Deﬁnition
%s...s The HTTP status code, for example, 200. If the client request caused an
internal redirect, %s will contain the status of the original request, and
%>s the status of the eventual result (the status of the last request). In
general, %>s is much more useful than %s, though there is no reason
both cannot be logged.
%...t Time, in standard “English format” [239]. Without a format, standard
CLF time is: [Day/Month/Year:Hours:Minutes:Seconds Time Zone].
%...{format}t The time, in the form given by format, which should be in strf-time
[117, 264] format. This is potentially localized.
%...T The time taken to process the request, in seconds. Used for spotting
performance problems in CGI scripts.
%...u Unauthorized remote user. A 401 response could mean that the user ID
supplied and logged by the user was bogus; or the user ID is accept-
able, but the password is missing or incorrect. The result here may be
unreliable if the return status (%s) is 401.
%...U The requested URL. %r also contains this value as part of the HTTP
request.
%...v The canonical ServerName [155] of the server serving the request, as
deﬁned by the ServerName directive.
%...V The server name according to the UseCanonicalName [156] setting.
%% A literal % symbol (AWS 2.44 onward).
In each case the “...” indicates an optional condition. If the condition is met, then the speciﬁed
variable is displayed. If the condition is omitted and it cannot be deﬁned through the request
data, then the variable will be replaced with a “-” [327]. Other modules can instantiate additional
variables to extend the number of ﬁelds in an event for the storage of extra data. The mod ssl
[127] module provides variables for logging Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)-related information as well
as some powerful general-purpose logging features [382].
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Lastly, another feature that can be implemented in the AWS is user tracking. As more ISPs
utilize caches or clients utilize proxies while browsing, logs contain less user speciﬁc data. The
AWS can utilize two modules with diﬀerent methods of performing user tracking. Cookie tracking,
implemented by the mod usertrack [162] module is more successful because it remains uninhibited
by the problems proxies face. URL tracking used by mod session [161], where URLs sent to the
client have tracking information embedded into them, is less successful for two reasons. The ﬁrst
reason is that earch engines are capable of ﬁnding and repeating the modiﬁed URLs. The second is
that proxies are unable to cache any portion of the page if the URL is always changing [382]. As
this information can be utilized forensically in a future application, it will be discussed further in
Chapter 6.
2.3 Other Applications
The deﬁnition of a web application is quite broad. In this section, we will explore the diﬀerent
types of web applications and how they are utilized today within the modern Internet architecture.
Basic HTTP architecture web applications including gateways, tunnels, agents, robots, caches and
proxies will be introduced. Then a diﬀerent classiﬁcation of web applications that are built on these
underlying network applications will be described and examples given. The best deﬁnition of this
type of web application is a collection of dynamic scripts, compiled code or both, that reside on a web,
or application server and potentially interact with databases and other sources of dynamic content
[14]. Operating system independancy is indicative of the increased popularity of web applications.
Since applications are built based on open standards, they can run on any type of operating system
that the client uses without diﬃculty.
2.3.1 Gateway
Gateways are special web servers that act as intermediaries to other servers. There are two
types of gateways; the resource gateway and the protocol gateway. Some gateways automatically
convert HTTP traﬃc to other protocols, so HTTP clients can interface with these other applications
without requiring the knowledge of the other protocol locally. This enables transparent access to
that other protocol or application through an HTTP connection. The client may not be aware that
it is communicating with a gateway. The gateway can speak the query language to the database or
generate the dynamic content, acting as a portal where a request comes in and then a response comes
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out. The resource gateway which is the most common, is also called an application server. This
combines the destination server and gateway into a single server. Application servers are server-side
gateways that speak HTTP with the client and connect to an application program on the server
side [109]. As with other web applications, a gateway may or may not implement logging. When
providing access to protocols, and due to diﬀerent pertinent values, the log events generated by the
underlying services, if any, will not necessarily be applicable. If the gateway does provide relevant
information in events, this could be an excellent correlation source.
2.3.2 Tunnels
HTTP tunneling consists of a bidirectional virtual data connection that is encapsulated within
HTTP request and response headers. The tunnels are special proxies that blindly relay raw TCP or
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [313] data between two connections. They enable access to appli-
cations that speak non-HTTP protocols through HTTP applications by allowing other protocols to
piggyback on top of HTTP connections. By embedding the non-HTTP traﬃc inside the connection,
the traﬃc can be sent through ﬁrewalls that only allow web traﬃc [109]. The HTTP speciﬁcation
reserves the method CONNECT for use with a proxy that can dynamically switch to being a tunnel
[131]. Not only useful for users wishing to proxy inbound, tunnels are useful to users placed behind
restrictive ﬁrewalls. If Internet access is allowed through an HTTP proxy, this opens up the possi-
bility for connections in both directions and poses a great security risk for machines running services
other than web services.
A web application attacker may utilize a web tunnel in three ways [360]. One way involves the
attacker sending HTTP GET and CONNECT requests to and via the web server which then functions as
a proxy to connect to other servers on the Internet. This is one method of how untraceable hops are
generated. These requests are visible within the logs of the servers they are made through. However,
for the individual investigator tracing through all the log ﬁles on multiple servers may be impossible.
Some logs might not be accessible due to unimplemented logging or uncooperative server owners.
Another use of a web tunnel would attempt to connect to diﬀerent IP addresses and ports within
the hosting infrastructure itself. This would assist an attacker in mapping out the internal network,
collecting passing information such as usernames, or content information that could be useful for
more devastating attacks. Lastly, attempts to connect to common port numbers on the web server
itself, by specifying the localhost IP address (127.0.0.1) as the target host in the request would yield
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valuable running services information to an attacker for further exploitation. For excellent working
examples of how to accomplish these attacks, refer to the note of [360].
2.3.3 Agents
With regards to the HTTP, agents are client programs that make HTTP requests on the user’s be-
half. The current working standard [121] deﬁnes a user agent as any software that retrieves, renders,
and facilitates end user interaction with web content. These can include semi-intelligent web clients
such as “robots”, “web crawlers”, or “spiders” which make automated HTTP requests. However,
the broad deﬁnition also includes any application that issues web requests such as browsers. The
majority of browser functionality was explained above in Section 2.2.1 except for those programmatic
add-ons or plugins that enable the browser to make automated requests similar to the following de-
scribed programs. “Robots” are machine automated user agents that autonomously wander the web
issuing HTTP transactions, or a speciﬁed series of requests to fetch content with minimal human
supervision [109]. They are used to traverse website heirarchical link structures to fetch content and
process any data they come across. Some example uses of “robots” can include “spiders” that are
used to build archives of web content for a search engine, a comparison shopping robot to check on
prices from diﬀerent websites, or stock-graphing “robots” which scour data to build market trend
charts. When a “robot” recursively follows web links, it is called a crawler or a “spider” because it
“crawls” along the web created by HTML hyperlinks [109]. An appropriate log management tactic
that should be employed by the administrator is to ensure the deﬁnition of a “robots.txt” ﬁle resident
in the public directory of the web server. It is within this ﬁle that rules for legitimate automated use
for the target site are deﬁned. From a forensics perspective it is imperative to employ one of these
ﬁles along with the terms of use for a particular site should a malicious incident arise. Automated
agents can cause a multitude of requests within a small window of time. If malicious, the agent
may be able to traverse secure areas or cause an interruption of service due the submission of too
many requests. The automated appearance of multiple requests may be identiﬁed due to the same
originating source, or by the correlation of event entries by request data. During the reconnaissance




Internetworked devices that store copies of frequently used documents are known as web caches.
When a web request reaches a cache, if a local copy of the document requested is available, it is
served from the local storage instead of sending the request on to the remote server, where the
data originated from. The advantages of caches include a reduction or elimination of data transfer
redundancy, network bottlenecks, demand on the original server, and distance delays. In turn, these
result in the avoidance of costly network charges, a page load time reduction due to the avoidance
of packet level bottlenecks and colocated data as well as a faster reply from the origin server from
lack of overhead. Due to these advantages, caches are able to solve the problem of ﬂash crowds.
Flash crowds are caused by simultaneous speciﬁc external events, which cause spikes in traﬃc ﬂow
[109]. These are dangerous when they present themselves in emergency situations, as they can cause
communication breakdown. An outside world example of this would be an emergency happening on
the campus of a university; the Short Message Service (SMS) emergency text messages that are sent
out can take over the available bandwith of the voice network. An example attack scenario of this
is extensively described in [312]. Inadvertant or deliberate DDoS attacks can also be performed on
web services. Properly implemented caches can assist with these traﬃc loads.
2.3.5 Proxies
Proxies intercept and relay requests between one client, also known as a private proxy, or several
clients known as a shared proxy, and an outside service or services. Private proxies can be run
on a client machine in order to extend browser features, improve performance or host advertising
[109]. During their execution, these web transaction intermediaries act as both a client to the external
service and a server to its clientele. Thereby proxying client requests, and accessing the server on their
behalf. The diﬀerence between a proxy and a gateway is that proxies speak the same protocol on both
sides of the connection, while gateways connect diﬀerent protocols. However as more functionality
is implemented on commercial proxies this distinction is becoming blurred. The functionalities
provided by proxies include enhancing the security of ﬁrewalls, caching, logging, ﬁltering, access
control, translation, and virus scanning [383]. Proxies can monitor and modify traﬃc to implement
many useful web services. One such useful web service that a proxy can implement is a child ﬁlter
that would enable unrestricted educational content, but deny access to sites ﬂagged as inappropriate.
Reverse proxies receive requests and initiate communication with other servers to locate requested
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information. They are used to improve the performance of slow web servers for common content
[109]. The last example that should be noted is the use of proxies as anonymizers. These proxies
provide heightened privacy and anonymity, by actively removing identifying characteristics from
HTTP messages. They provide a next hop connection, so that the originating location can be from
a separate geographic region, or appear to be coming from a spoofed IP address. Having anonymity
on the Internet is a veriﬁable advantage to an attacker as originating IP addresses can be diﬃcult
if not impossible to forensically trace without sophisticated equipment or access to a number of
collection points.
2.3.6 Retail Websites
More application speciﬁc deployments on Internet facing websites can be used for a variety of pur-
poses. Prolﬁc applications that allow consumers to buy products online emerged. Major consumer
stores such as Sears 1, Walmart2, HBC3, HMV4, Blockbuster5 and Futureshop6 all have intricate
web applications that comprise their website functionalities. Strictly online commercial websites
that can oﬀer both products or services, base their business on the security of online applications.
Sites such as Amazon7, Thinkgeek8, Netﬂix9, and Dell10 all oﬀer products or services, and deliver
online purchase capability. Another major online retail website is the auction giant Ebay11. The
variety of technologies that enable the existance of these applications are numerous. The protocols
used to communicate across the world wide web may be standardized, but individual developer’s
programming methods and choice of development technologies can vary widely. Web applications
of this complexity are comprised of new technologies to keep up with the current face of business
requirements. Any new technology will have risks associated with using it, as developers and ad-
ministrators battle unknown vulnerabilities and become more familiar with the functionality that
the technology will provide. The broad spectrum of technologies associated with these applications
melded with the fact that they comprise a source of revenue from these companies provide a solid













2.3.7 Banking and E-Commerce
Online payment systems for most companies will connect to trusted third parties. Two of the
most well respected and recognized companies associated with online payment systems are Verisign12
and Paypal13. Verisign generates and signs valid SSL [119] certiﬁcates for company use with online
applications. Paypal provides a secure online banking environment for clients to associate a payment
with a Paypal account. Real life bank branches have also automated and generated web applications
that enable their customers to do banking online. Institutions such as Royal Bank14, TD Canada
Trust15, and Scotiabank16 all have public facing web applications. Another ﬁnancial institution that
has few branches and almost solely relies upon Internet banking is ING Direct17. One of the ﬁrst
things noticed upon visiting the site is a big notice posting that ING Direct is actively trying to
prevent phishing [232] attacks. Prevention of attacks and incident response for ﬁnancial institutions
is imperative as their business relies on the trust of their clients. Even the indication that an attack
has been successfully executed against one of these institutions causes a loss in revenue.
2.3.8 Online E-Mail, Social Networking, Web Logs, and Interactive In-
formation Sites
Web applications can also provide web facing access to electronic mail. Complex and multifaceted
application collections such as the open source Horde Application Framework [204] are utilized on
a big scale by major institutions. The three major public facing web applications that implement
online access to email include MS Hotmail, now known as Windows Live18, Google mail19, and Yahoo
mail20. When viewing electronic mail forensically, interactions between individuals can indicate both
common groupings and may include pertinent incident information such as intended attack targets.
Correlation between the email service logs and signiﬁcant timeline events may produce additional
corroborating evidence. Should an email web application contain vulnerabilities, this would open up












Social networking proﬁles on sites such as Myspace21 and Facebook22 are both supported by
diverse web applications, driven by multiple technologies. For Myspace, these technologies include
the Representational State Transfer (REST) [133] style of architecture for social media platforms.
Facebook employs a LAMP as its base network level architecture. Other technologies in use by
Facebook include Memcached [120], C++ [358], Java, Python, Erlang [129], Thrift [141], Scribe [9],
Cassandra [154] and Hiphop [70] for PHP [40]. For more information on how these technologies
are used by the Facebook web application, refer to [40]. This demonstrates the complexity of a
modern web application, and with multiple interactions new vulnerabilites develop. The ability to log
data based on individual technologies may oﬀer guidance to developers and evidentiary material to
investigators with respect to the relationships between technologies. Twitter23 is a social networking
and microblogging service, where users send “tweets” which are short messages no longer than 160
characters in length. It has a very large user base with over 175 million users [277]. In April of 2009,
an attack worm uploaded and propagated by a XSS vulnerability aﬀected approximately 100 accounts
and over 10,000 “tweets” that could spread the worm were deleted [49]. Yet again in September
of 2010, a website update reintroduced a ﬂaw that meant JS could be injected into ”tweets” [254].
Examples such as these demonstrate that web application vulnerabilities are a serious concern for
developers. They need to be addressed for all web technologies and their underlying infrastructures.
After incidents such as these, investigators can employ forensic techniques to determine the extent
and construct a timeline of events that led to the execution of this malicious attack.
Currently the concept of citizen journalism for people involved in the information technology
sector is rampant. Employers tend to seek out and label those job candidates who maintain an
online journal with technology related entries known as a web log or blog. Blogs can also be
maintained as personal, political, or other subject speciﬁc diaries. The information contained within
these online diaries can get one hired, but there have been cases where it can also impact negatively
on an individuals situation. An example in London was described here [222]. Two websites that
oﬀer this type of service include Blogger24 and Livejournal25. They have both implemented and
maintain web applications as their interface for their websites. In each case there is a login structure,
and depending on the application, speciﬁc customizations can be made by individual users. When







is determined by user input. The application must respond to badly designed or malicious input in
a secure manner.
Interactive information sites such as online video or radio, search engines or wiki’s are all examples
of complex web applications. Online video sites include Hulu26, Youtube27, as well as the conversion
of common television channels to produce online media. In Canada, three great examples of this
conversion consist of the CTV Television Network 28, the Global Television Network29, and the Space
Network30. A major radio station in Toronto known as CHUM FM 104.531 has a web application
that enables listeners to see the lineup and access previously played media according to date and
time, along with listening to live streaming audio over the Internet. Search engines continually
evolve their web applications to add new functionalities. For example Google, 32 introduced a new
search enhancement called ”Google Instant” which predicts the search query and starts showing
search results as text is typed. Wiki’s are deﬁned as a piece of server software that allows users to
freely create and edit web page content using any browser [106]. Today, founded by Wikimedia, the
largest collaborative wiki is known as Wikipedia which resides here [55]. Its existence as a charitable
organization, is funded primarily through donations. The underlying web application technology
that drives Wikipedia is MediaWiki which is a free software wiki package available here [54].
2.3.9 Corporate Developed Intranet or Vendor Supplied Applications
Many corporations devise their own intranet web applications that can be delivered using HTTP.
This is due to the interoperability with many diﬀerent operating systems, as well as the excellent
logging capabilities on an internal network for the web service. We have already shown that using the
AWS, all requests are logged, and there are user tracking modules that pinpoint within an intranet
all of the interworkings of individual employees. Both the HostnameLookup directive can be enabled
server side and client side, as well as the identd service to provide even greater tracking capabilities.
Both of these are not applicable to the Internet as a whole, but can be useful to a company internally.
Something that may need to be explored in the future is how to deal with cloned or rogue employee









As an end note to this section, although applications may not be public facing, any vulnerabilities
may be leveraged from inside of a network. Two examples of vendor supplied product speciﬁc web
applications that have been reported to contain vulnerabilities include the Hewlett Packard (HP)
[71] Printer Management console [299], which includes a XSS attack vector and the Help application
provided by MS on both Windows XP [94], and Server 2003 [93] platforms [297], which incorrectly
handle escape sequences. These vulnerabilities provide examples of how manufacturers can postpone
patches until the next product release and how latent vulnerabilities can still be used by attackers.
Unless a patch is provided, or an administrator has another method of preventing the attack, the
application remains vulnerable. Within the last section, the purpose of detailing individual websites
was to draw the readers attention to problematic areas. It was also to provide documentation
as to the severity of the current security of currently published applications. XSS along with other
variant attacks performed on web applications can result in severe damages. What makes the attacks
described above especially heinous is that they are performed along with what seems to be a valid
session as opposed to the scenario of a phishing attack, in which the client may be able to discern the
lack of session state. Unless some other functionality that the client is made aware of is incorporated
into the attack, the client may not realize that they have been compromised.
2.4 Regular Expressions
Regular expressions, also referred to as Regex or Regexp, provide a concise and ﬂexible means to
match or match and replace strings of text. The text is comprised of particular characters, words or
patterns. Strings known as patterns are created using the Regex language determined by and built
into other languages and products. Since patterns are descriptions of text, not speciﬁcations, this is
extremely advantageous to a programmer that only knows the traits of the pattern target. Regular
expression patterns allow for a characteristics description of the item sought without specifying the
item explicitly. They also enhance the built in search capability of a language which may not be
able to exclude or distinguish certain matches based on respective criteria. A matcher determines
the results of applying a pattern. Typical use cases for Regexs include textual validation, searching,
modiﬁcation, and replacement. Regular expressions deﬁne a concise and ﬂexible way for comparing
and matching string objects. An object string may be composed of patterns that include particular
letters, words, symbols, or punctuation characters or a combination thereof. A Regex is written in
a formal language that can be interpreted by a Regex processor.
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Here we list some simple examples of Regexs and their represented text:
• car : the appearance of the letter sequence ‘c’, ‘a’, ‘r’ in any context, such as “car”, “cartoon”,
“bicarbonate”, “a car”, “12 car|*&$”, etc;
• (his|her)\s(book) : the word “his” or “her” followed by a white space (e.g., space character),
followed by the word “book”;
• [0-9]+[\w]{2,6} : one or more digits (from 0 to 9) followed by a number of word characters
(e.g., letters), the exact number of characters is between 2 and 6 in this case.
In the Regex string, some characters are designated with special meanings (in addition to their
original ones), which are known as meta-characters. In this section, we detail a range of particular
combinations of symbols as control sequences, such as ”negative lookbehind” (?<!). They will
guide the processor to perform diﬀerent kinds of operations while parsing the provided Regex string.
The related discussion will be further explored in Section 2.4.2. In the next section, we will ﬁrst
introduce the syntax of Regex language.
2.4.1 Syntax
This section provides a comprehensive view of common Regex syntax. The regular expressions we
collected which deﬁned attacks within the log ﬁles were adapted from multiple sources. Since Regexs
depend on the implementation by the language or product developer, there may be variations or
extensions for certain metacharacters or functions. Good resources for language or product speciﬁc
Regex directives include the man pages for grep [172], egrep [172], awk [11] or sed [35], language
deﬁnition ﬁles, or other forms of product documentation such as guides or user manuals.
Characters
Literal textual characters as deﬁned in Regexs are listed within Table 4 in both their natural and
American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) [130], American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) [16] or Unicode [12] code states. It explains the regular expression method of
matching characters and metacharacters, both their symbols and their representations.
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Table 4: Regular Expression: Characters [188]
Character Description Example
. (period) Matches any single character except the line
break characters \r and \n. In most Regex
ﬂavors, ”.” can be conﬁgured to match these
line break characters in addition to the regular
characters it matches.





All characters except the listed special char-
acters match a single instance of themselves.
{ and } are literal characters, unless they are





A backslash escapes meta-characters to sup-
press their special meaning.
\* matches *
\R...\P Matches the characters between \R and \P,






Matches the character with the speciﬁed
ASCII/ANSI value, which depends on the
code page used. Can be used in character
classes.
\xB5 matches μ when
using the Latin-1 [243]
code page.
\n, \r and \t Match a Line Feed (LF) [130] character, Car-
riage Return (CR) [130] character and a tab
character respectively. Can be used in charac-
ter classes.
\r\n matches a Disk
Operating System
(DOS) [84] / Windows
CRLF [130] line break.
\a, \e,
\f and \v
Match a bell character (\x07), escape charac-
ter (\x1B), form feed (\x0C) and vertical tab
(\x0B) respectively. Can be used in character
classes.
\cA through \cZ Match an ASCII character Control +A through
Control+Z, equivalent to \x01 through \x1A.










Character Sets or Bracketed Expressions
The fact that Regexs include set theory functionality using character sets known as bracket expres-
sions [172], shows their foundation in algebraic mathematics. Inside a bracket expression, diﬀerent
rules apply. Rules contained within Table 5 are only valid within bracket expressions. Rules from
other tables may not be valid when contained within brackets [188].
Table 5: Regular Expression: Character Sets [188]
Character Description Example
[ Starts a set.
Any character ex-
cept ^-]\ can be
added without an
escape to the set
All characters except the listed special characters. [abc] matches
a, b or c
\ followed by any
of ^-]\





Speciﬁes a range of characters. (Speciﬁes a hyphen





ter the opening [
Negates the set, causing it to match a single charac-
ter not listed in the set. (Speciﬁes a caret if placed
anywhere except after the opening [ )
[^a-d] matches
x (any character
except a, b, c or
d)
\d, \w and \s Shorthand for sets matching digits, word characters
(letters, digits, and underscores), and whitespace
(spaces, tabs, and line breaks). Can be used inside
and outside bracket expressions.
[\d\s] matches
a character that
is a digit or
whitespace





[\b] Inside a set, \b is a backspace character. [\b\t] matches
a backspace or
tab character
\xhh Shorthand for sets matching hexadecimal character
representations. The two hh characters represent the
ASCII character in hexadecimal.
\x40 matches
an @ sign char-
acter
\c Shorthand for sets matching ASCII control charac-
ters. The second letter is uppercase A through Z to
indicate Control-A through Control-Z.
\cM matches a
carriage return
just like \r or
\x0D
\Oxxx Shorthand for sets matching octal character repre-
sentations. The three xxx characters represent the
ASCII character in octal.
\O matches a CR




Table 6 outlines pattern directives used for selections based on speciﬁc positional ordinances of
certain characters, rather than specifying the character itself. Positional pattern instructions can be
based on positions within an entire subject string as well as speciﬁc to individual words within the
subject string.
Table 6: Regular Expressions: Anchors [188]
Character Description Example
^ (carat) Matches at the start of the string the Regex pattern is
applied to. Most Regex ﬂavors have an option to make
the caret match after line breaks as well.




$ (dollar) Matches at the end of the string the Regex pattern is
applied to. Most Regex ﬂavors have an option to make
the dollar match before line breaks. Also matches before
the very last line break if the string ends with a line
break.




\A Matches at the start of the string the Regex pattern is
applied to. Never matches after line breaks.
\A. matches a in
abc
\Z Matches at the end of the string the Regex pattern is
applied to. Never matches before line breaks, except for
the very last line break if the string ends with a line
break.
.\Z matches f in
abc\ndef
\z Matches at the end of the string the Regex pattern is
applied to. Never matches before line breaks.
.\z matches f in
abc\ndef
\b Matches at the position between a word character
(anything matched by \w) and a non-word character
(anything matched by [^\w] or \W) as well as at the
start and/or end of the string if the ﬁrst and/or last
characters in the string are word characters.
.\b matches c in
abc
\B Matches at the position between two word characters
(i.e the position between \w\w) as well as at the position
between two non-word characters (i.e. \W\W).
\B.\B matches b in
abc
\< Matches at the beginning position of a word. .\< matches a in
abcdef
\> Matches at the end of a word. .\> matches f in
abcdef
\G Matches at the position where the previous match
ended, or the position where the current match attempt




matches b and then




Quantiﬁers determine the number of times an expression should exist in a pattern to result in
a successful match. For the quantiﬁer to be greedy, any optional item is included in the pattern
match ﬁrst where possible. Being greedy also means that the largest number of optional items
possible is matched before the smaller number. A lazy quantiﬁer excludes the optional item from
the match if possible. Being lazy also means that the smallest number of optional items possible is
matched before any larger quantities. Quantiﬁers are especially important when a regular expression
determines the processing of values based on the successful matches due to the method they employ
when matching. It is important to be aware of each directives match order as demonstrated in Table
7.
Table 7: Regular Expressions: Quantiﬁers [188]
Character Description Example
? (question mark) Makes the preceding item optional. Greedy. abc? matches ab or
abc
?? Makes the preceding item optional. This con-
struct is often excluded from documentation be-
cause of its limited use. Lazy.
abc?? matches ab or
abc




abc "def" "ghi" jkl




abc "def" "ghi" jkl
+ (plus) Repeats the previous item once or more. Greedy. ".+" matches
"def" "ghi" in
abc "def" "ghi" jkl
+? (lazy plus) Repeats the previous item once or more. Lazy. ".+?" matches
"def" in
abc "def" "ghi" jkl
{n} where n is an
integer >= 1
Repeats the previous item exactly n times. a{3} matches aaa
{n,m} where
n >= 0 and m >= n
Repeats the previous item between n and m times.
Greedy, so repeating m times is tried before re-




n >= 0 and m >= n
Repeats the previous item between n and m times.
Lazy, so repeating n times is tried before increas-
ing the repetition to m times.
a{2,4}? matches aa,
aaa or aaaa










In Table 8, a description of symbols that deﬁne groups, pipes, and backreferences is given. The log-
ical ”or” command as deﬁned in regular expressions is accomplished by the ”|” directive. Parentheses
in Regexs deﬁne backreferences. Backreferences are similar to variables, and they allow patterns to
refer to previous matches [138]. For example, if \1 is used, it would refer back to the ﬁrst subex-
pression, \2 the second and so on. These are used to ﬁnd speciﬁc instances of subexpressions that
are repetitions in a source ﬁle.
Table 8: Pipes, Grouping or Backreferences [187]
Character Description Examples
| (pipe) Causes the Regex engine to match either the part
on the left side, or the part on the right side. Can




The pipe has the lowest precedence of all opera-





(regex) Round brackets group the Regex between them.
They capture the text matched by the Regex in-
side them that can be reused in a backreference,
and they allow for the application of Regex oper-




(?:regex) Passive groups use parentheses to group the
Regex. Regular expression operators can be ap-






\1 through \9 Substituted with the text matched between the
1st through 9th pair of capturing parentheses. At









Any modiﬁers can be turned on at any point in a regular expression pattern by specifying them
where they should begin. They can also be turned oﬀ arbitrarily by preceeding the modiﬁer with a
minus sign to continue matching afterwards without the modiﬁer. As can be seen in the second last
row of Table 9, one can also specify selection or omission of multiple modiﬁers together to aﬀect a
pattern. Older Regex ﬂavors may apply modiﬁers to the entire Regex itself.
Table 9: Modiﬁers [187]
Character Description Example





(?e) Used to evaluate during a search and replace Regex.
(?s) Turn on ”dot matches newline” for the remainder of
the Regex.
(?g) Turn on global matching. Used for search and re-
place Regexs, with this modiﬁer speciﬁed, it will re-
place all matches not just the ﬁrst instance.
(?m) Caret and dollar match after and before newlines for
the remainder of the Regex.
(?U) Inverts the greedyness of the quantiﬁers so they are
not greedy by default, but become greedy if followed
by a ”?” [195].
(?x) Turn on free-spacing mode to ignore whitespace be-
tween Regex tokens, and allow # comments.
(?i-sm) Turns on the options ”i” and ”m”, and turns oﬀ ”s”
for the remainder of the Regex.
(?i-sm:regex) Matches the Regex inside the span with the options





These deﬁne those sections of the pattern that are to be replaced, and their replacements. Exam-
ples in Table 10 are based on variable references assigned from the following match:
12 2
"A date is 2011-02-14 in ISO format"=~ m/\b((romantic|delicious)
34 4 5 56 7 76 31
|(([0-9]{4})-(1[0-2]|0[1-9])(-(3[0-1]|0[1-9]|[1-2][0-9]))?))\b/;
45
Table 10: String Replacement[187] [167] [252]
Character Description Examples
$n
Matches the nth non-passive group. a) $2 matches
"lmno" in
/^(l0lcatz(lmno))$/
These references are to be used with backrefer-
ences deﬁned by the parentheses (). Backrefer-




Remaining table cells demonstrate values from

















$+ Reference to all contents of the last matched
string.
$+ matches -14
$& Reference to the entire matched string. $& matches
2011-02-14
$ Reference to the entire input string. $ matches
A date is 2011-02-14
in ISO format
2.4.2 Regular Expression Control Sequences
Table 11 includes more advanced regular expression directives such as backtracking, atomic group-
ing, posessive quantiﬁers, lookaround and conditional operations. When Regexs fail to match after
a branch point, backtracking occurs. A branch point is deﬁned where the Regex engine chooses
between two or more options. Similar to a program’s logical fork() [207] operation, a Regex en-
gine performs a backtrack operation when it has reached the end of a logic decision branch and
the pattern fails to match. The backtrack operation forces the engine to return to the origin of
the branch, and to select and try another path. This is done until all logical pathways have been
explored. Independent subexpressions, also referred to as atomic groups, are used to optimize and
restrict resultant matching sets for Regexs. When a string is matched within an atomic group, it
is grabbed independently and remains immutable from the rest of the pattern. Once matched, the
part of the input matched is excluded from analysis by the rest of the regular expression.1 Within
1Once the atomic group is matched, that part of the match is taken out of the string being analyzed. This means
no other part of the outside Regex may match it.
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the group itself, backtracking may occur to obtain a match. The group can also be backtracked over,
but what deﬁnes the atomic group is the fact that the text group matched cannot be backtracked
into [359]. This provides the optimization mentioned previously. When nesting quantiﬁers are used
within a Regex, the engine can try redundant permutations causing unnecessary overhead.
Possessive quantiﬁers are independent and greedy. Their functionality is the combination of each
quantiﬁer’s normal greedy counterpart plus the attributes of an atomic grouping. As demonstrated in
Table 7, greedy quantiﬁers attempt to match all optional pattern components ﬁrst before continuing
the processing of the rest of the Regex. The atomic nature of a possessive quantiﬁer eﬀectively
eliminates backtracking once a match has been found for the greedy quantiﬁer ”atomic group”.
Forward facing lookaheads, and reverse facing lookbehinds are lookaround operations that specify
positions within the subject string being analyzed. These complex anchors do not consume any
particular characters or expand the match. Lookaheads match the subexpression beginning at the
current position, and then testing characters to the right of it. Lookbehinds test the subexpression
ending at the current position, and testing characters to the left of it. Positive lookaround operations
indicate that if a match is found the result is successful. Negative lookaround operations indicate that
if the match is not found, the result is successful. Only those states within the lookaround construct
are available to the regular expression engine. This means that if the subexpression within the
lookaround is not matched, and the Regex engine deems backtracking necessary, the lookaround
result is failure. If the lookaround containing the subexpression was positive this means failure, and
if it was negative the fact that the engine tried to backtrack returns successfully [167].
A regular expression that contains a conditional construct branch possible regular expression
engine run paths. If the predicate2 returns true, then the consequent3 is attempted and must match
for the conditional to be successful. When false is returned by the predicate subexpression, the
alternative4 is then attempted and must match for the conditional construct to be successful. A
conditional construct does not have to contain an alternative portion, speciﬁed by the omission of
the pipe | character and the else portion [167]. In this case, success and failure are both designated
by a valid predicate and the outcome of the consequent portion. Capturing groups or the four
diﬀerent methods of lookaround operations can be used as predicates within conditional constructs.
2the ”if” construct portion
3the ”then” portion
4the ”else” portion of the construct
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For the Regex to enter the conditional construct with a capturing group, the conditional checks a
prior successful match of the ﬁrst capturing group [252]. For the Regex to enter the conditional
construct with a lookaround operation, the lookaround operation must have already matched with
success.
Table 11: Advanced Regular Expression Directives [187, 167, 252]
Character Description Examples
(?>regex) This deﬁnes an atomic group, or independent subex-
pression within a Regex.
x(?>\w+)x is more
eﬃcient than x\w+x
if the second x can-
not be matched.










Possessive quantiﬁers are atomic greedy quantiﬁers. x++ is identical to
(?>x+)
(?=regex) Zero-width positive lookahead. For
one(?=two)three, both two and three have
to match at the position where the match of one
ends.
e(?=r) matches
the second e in
repaper.
(?!regex) Zero-width negative lookahead. e(?!r)matches the
ﬁrst e in repaper.
(?<=regex) Zero-width positive lookbehind. (?<=r)e matches




Zero-width negative lookbehind. Matches at a po-
sition if the pattern inside the lookahead cannot be
matched ending at that position.
(?<!r)e matches




Lookahead and conditional Regex. Note that the
lookahead is zero-width, so the ”then” and ”else”
parts need to match and consume the part of the
text matched by the lookahead as well.
(?(?<=a)b|c)
matches the second
b and the ﬁrst c in
babxcac
(?(1)then|else) Conditional Regex. (a)?(?(1)b|c)
matches ab, the
ﬁrst c and the sec-
ond c in babxcac
2.5 Summary
With the introduction of Web 2.0 technologies, by the second annual O’Reilly Web 2.0 Summit
in 2004, [296] the face of the Internet oﬃcially changed. No longer were users subject to only static
websites, and applications that provided only low level network functions. The new technologies now
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provide access to dynamic and interconnected applications with a high-level of user-directed input.
Web applications are what drives the features of Web 2.0. The forensics overview introduces the
importance of all log ﬁles to an investigator during the conduct of a computer incident investigation.
Details of applications in the categories of client side, server side, network oriented as well as those
increasing in complexity deﬁned by the standard of being directly aﬀected by web vulnerabilities
are presented. Incorporated within the last section is an introduction to regular expressions as well
as an explaination of the syntax of these highly adaptable programmatic tools. To directly answer
the questions posed in the introduction to this chapter we provide these highlights. A deﬁnition
of web applications are the applications that reside on a web server, which have the possibility of
interacting with dynamic content from both other applications as well as end users, and can consist
of static code, dynamic code or both. Web applications have evolved from simple network level
scripts and code that only perform low level operations, to complex, dynamic, interconnected, user
directed organisms that continually evolve. The question of the security of web applications due to
the eﬀect of rapidly emerging technologies is left as an exercise to the reader to answer based on their
best judgement. The technologies that web applications are built upon were described extensively
in the section about vulnerability aﬀected applications. To test the security of a web application
a penetration tester cannot limit themselves to just the application itself, as this is not what a
malicious party would do. Similarly a forensic examiner cannot limit the scope of an investigation
to the web application itself, but must also include the associated underlying technologies associated
with the application. Web applications can be examined forensically through eﬀective management
and analysis of the log ﬁles relevant to the investigations target web application. Combining these
topics together not only provides the relevant background data, but when applied can lead to the




This chapter aims to provide an overview of the current state of the art in log analysis. The
reviewed applications with log analysis functionality are not necessarily applied to forensics directly,
however they may be leveraged during an investigation to provide evidence. The three types of tools
associated with log analysis discussed in this section include tools made speciﬁcally to perform log
analysis, tools that provide intrusion detection or ﬁle integrity monitoring, and tools that are used to
scan web applications for vulnerabilities. Current log analysis tools are integrated with either system
administration monitoring systems or within forensic analysis toolkits. Most analysis functionality
is rudimentary or has to be adapted manually to perform the necessary functionality. This makes
the usability of the application itself and the reliability of the information output paramount. In
a forensic examination, real-time monitoring logs may not be availble. Most evidence is collected
and analyzed after an incident, which can be problematic if the target has not properly managed
resident log ﬁles [2]. Problems arise if a compromise has occured, which concerns the integrity
of the log ﬁles. The integrity cannot be deﬁnitively determined unless it has been provided by
another application or the log ﬁles have been secured via other means prior to the incident. In our
opinion, an excellent log management strategy for eﬀective analysis with regards to Unix compatible
operating systems as mentioned brieﬂy in [360] is outlined in [2]. With regards to web applications,
security considerations cover not only the web application itself, but also underlying technologies
such as the server’s operating system, the web service being used to host the site, the backend
database technology, the programming language, and any additional hooks corresponding to non-
standard networking components or other web applications. Web application vulnerability scanners
are usually provided within penetration testing toolkits such as Backtrack [255], or OpenVAS [184].
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3.1 Application Speciﬁc Log Analysis Tools
Within this section we aim to provide an overview of the current tools that perform or enhance
log analysis techniques. In depth log analysis tools in this category would be classiﬁed as Security
Information Event Management (SIEM) [363] technologies. SIEM is an intersection of Security In-
formation Management (SIM) [363] which is concerned with the discovery of bad behaviour through
data collection and Security Event Management (SEM) [363] which is concerned with real-time ac-
tivities of network devices [262]. Diﬀerentiating these tools from those in 3.3, classiﬁcation may
reside more in SEM type technologies. For the sake of simplicity, default logging processes provided
by the underlying operating system will be overlooked.
3.1.1 Acct and Acctsum
A process accounting service is utilized to keep a detailed audit trail of all the commands executed
on a Unix-based system. Process accounting provides a log of every command executed by users
including associated processing cycles and length, allocated memory, and call time [181]. The acct
[173] package is a collection of several utilities that monitor processes including ac [168] , accton
[174] , lastcomm [169] and sa [171]. The command ac gives user logon statistics. The kernel process
account log generated by accton is found on Unix/POSIX-compliant operating systems and includes
system-wide process accounting events. Similar to the history [166] command, lastcomm displays
previously executed commands. The sa command summarizes and logs the output of the lastcomm
command to a ﬁle called savacct or usracct, depending whether the command was issued on a per
command or a per user basis [180]. The process logger tool acctsum [27] consists of two scripts that
truncate and summarize the kernel process account logs to produce output in HTML [37].
Forensically, having log events of all processes associated with a time stamp is an excellent method
of ﬁnding out exactly what was running at the time of an incident. This is a good source of
correlation information. The generation of this log ﬁle is also above and beyond the normal logging
functions of a system, and would add another layer of defence. During an attack the log ﬁle provides
redundancy as in the event of an incident, in additional to the default logs generated, it too would
need to be modiﬁed to hide the intentions of an attacker. Providing security through obscurity, an
unsophisticated attacker may not know this logging process would be running on a target system.
Pertaining to analysis, acctsum only provides summary statistical information to the user. During
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truncation, there exists the possibility of events pertinent to an investigation remaining unreported,
except as part of the value of the summary statistics. As with many log analysis tools attack
detection, rogue process analysis and anomaly analysis must be accomplished by the investigator.
As both acct and acctsum are very speciﬁc to process accounting log ﬁles, this functionality can
be utilized to integrate the summary information and truncated logs into other tools. Individually,
they provide insuﬃcient functionality for a fully integrated log analysis tool.
3.1.2 Analog
The open source web log ﬁle analyzer Analog [373] can accept AWS or IIS W3C formatted ﬁles as
input. The analysis results produce complex graphs and report styles when used in conjunction with
another tool called Report Magic [261, 373]. Statistical reporting, or the conversion of statistical
information into a graphical representation forms the basic functionality of this tool. Available
reports styles include a general summary, time-based reports, host, domain and organization reports,
ﬁle-based, browser-based as well as user and status-based reports. The validity of information
retained in these reports is only maintained when the necessary server conﬁguration is performed
[372]. A good overview of information for the sole purpose of reporting on the web service alone is
formulated in the results of this tools analysis. The tools design did not specify that it is a business
analytics tool and would require extra conﬁguration on the part of the analyst to provide a concise
account detailing information that would be beneﬁcial to both marketers and forensic investigators.
3.1.3 Anteater
The open source Message Transfer Agent (MTA) [103] log ﬁle analyzer anteater [128] is written
entirely in the C++ programming language. The two types of log ﬁles that can be analyzed by
anteater include those produced by sendmail [343] and postfix [379] agents [128]. The docu-
mentation for this project is not suﬃciently updated to give an entire overview of what this tool
can accomplish. From the information gathered, however, it was determined that the output can be
formated into HTML, or any transposition that can be made utilizing command line syntax. Screen-
shots of diﬀerent scenarios of this utility are shown on the project homepage [128]. These detail
the eight analysis scenarios that anteater can perform, which include local traﬃc and summary
of received bytes per count, the ratio of local to external traﬃc distribution, total byte counts of
mail to external recipients from local accounts, the total number of emails sent to speciﬁc addresses
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and summary, the total number of emails received from specﬁc addresses and summary, largest mail
message size in bytes and emails with the most recipients. This tool provides statistical summary
data of all mail transferred to and from the host.
The anteater tool is another example of a log ﬁle analyzer, that does not perform comprehensive
forensic log analysis, but provides insight into the processing of MTA logs. It is designed with only
MTA log ﬁles in mind, and only those analysis scenarios that would apply to the data contained
within them. Should a web application resident on a system utilize an underlying mail service, the
correlation of events within the web service and the email logs would be of great importance. Inves-
tigations of computer related incidents must provide evidence that places the suspect with access to
and control of a system during the time of the incident [43]. The use of email correspondence may be
a vital avenue of communication between malicious parties, and includes timestamped headers that
record each message that is sent. The ability to produce a timeline of events prior to an investigation
yields better evidentiary representation for an investigation.
3.1.4 AWStats
AWStats [114] is a Perl-based open source reporting and statistical tool that is able to analyze
and detect web robots and a variety of worms [326, 114]. As a web application, the internal methods
of AWStats allow to check for XSS attacks against itself [113]. It is puzzling that this functionality
is provided for the tool itself, yet not built-in to detect XSS attacks for the service being monitored,
nor within the services logs being analyzed. As long as the administrator has setup the extended
log format for the web service or in the case of other services setup the log to include the necessary
information, AWStats can provide this information in the format of a detailed report. Examples
of analysis data include domains or countries of visitors, most viewed pages, authenticated visits,
the detection of robots, operating system detection, referrer search engine detection, and visitor
browser detection [113]. AWStats does not only analyze the AWS log ﬁles in the CLF, and ELF,
but can also analyze MS IIS W3C, other File Transfer Protocol (FTP) [314], mail server, proxy,
streaming media, and a multitude of web server log ﬁles [113]. Technically, it is not even limited
to these predeﬁned log formats at all, as the end user can deﬁne their own log formats for analysis.
However, the information gathered is still limited to the data contained within the logs themselves.
As was stated in the examples above, AWStats has many predeﬁned reports. It also includes the
capability to deﬁne user reports. In addition to the reports options and ﬁlters remaining completely
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reconﬁgurable, the code is also distributed in a modular fashion, thus enabling additional features to
be implemented by way of AWStats plugins [115]. Reports can be generated statically or dynamically
from the command line or CGI interface and can be output in HTML, XHTML, Portable Document
Format (PDF) [7], or sent to standard output to be exported. This tool was elegantly designed
for the purpose of the analysis of web related log ﬁles. It was not designed as an overall log ﬁle
correlation engine or forensic tool. The data collected within the reports of this tool can greatly
assist during an investigation. With additional correlation capabilities, support for other log ﬁles and
process monitoring would provide the characteristics required to perform forensic log analysis. The
extensive statistical reporting generated by this tool to provide additional web analytics, which can
be correlated to events within the forensic timeline. The extensibility of this tool greatly increases
adoption capabilities by forensic investigators.
3.1.5 Breadboard BI Web Analytics
As a plugin, the Breadboard BI Web Analytics [250] module provides yet another statistical
analysis view as a supplement to an overall business analytic open source framework called Pentaho
[250]. It performs summary statistical analysis from web log information after it integrates web
logs into an OnLine Analytical Processing (OLAP) [125] cube model and presents an overview that
provides a comprehensive business perspective. Talend [218], a commercial product also produces
an open source package called Extraction, Transformation and Loading (ETL) [365] that is used to
integrate data into a cube from any source [218]. The aggregation of data from multiple sources
utilizes several standards for diﬀerent interfaces. This is a deﬁnite advantage when used in an
application for the correlation of data sources. Also known as web analytics, the measurement,
collection, analysis, and reporting of internet data for the purposes of understanding and optimizing
web usage can be eﬀectively utilized for marketing purposes in a business setting [19]. Pentaho
integrates three report views for Breadboard BI, described as generalized, analyzed and dashboard.
Although web analytics may give an excellent overview, it will not generate enough evidentiary data,
or provide suﬃcient results to use the reports in an investigation. This tool would form an excellent
basis for a log analysis tool, as when dealing with a large amount of data from diﬀerent sources, the
OLAP cube would enable correlation, a method of organization, and storage of data which would
permit eﬃcient search capabilities.
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3.1.6 Calamaris
Written in Perl 5, calamaris [32] is an open source program used to parse and generate ordinary
or framed HTML output that includes text and graphical reports on proxy service logs. It is limited
to log ﬁles from the proxy service packages Cisco [212] Content Engines [211], Compaq Tasksmart
[200], Inktomi Traﬃc Server [147], Netscape also known as Iplanet [295], Novell Internet Caching
System [66], Web Oops! proxy server [351], Squid [227] or related proxy log ﬁles [32, 311]. The
analysis included in the available reports summarizes usage, freshness, request methods, incoming
UDP and TCP requests, outgoing requests, neighbour caches, top, second and third level domains,
protocols utilized, content types and extensions, host statistics, time ranges, and error codes [32].
calamaris is run from the command line, however not all of its options can be implemented as such,
and directives must be placed in a conﬁguration ﬁle. As a summary statistical tool, this excels at
what it was engineered to do, as part of an overall analysis system, any network utilizing a proxy
service that needs to be monitored would beneﬁt from the analysis provided by this tool. The log
analysis tool calamari has very specﬁc target parameters and would function only as part of an
encompassing log analysis engine.
3.1.7 Chklogs
As an open source log management tool, chklogs [189] performs compression, rotation, log group-
ing with pre or post processing, and threshold or action deﬁnitions for each log ﬁle [189]. It is written
in Perl and associated with a separately designed user interface. It is also released with methods
to deﬁne extensions to itself, and it includes a user resource conﬁguration ﬁle. Any manipulation
performed on the log ﬁles, should they change the log ﬁles in any way, would have a negative impact,
if provided as evidence. The chain of custody must be upheld and any manipulation performed on
that data for the purposes of ﬁnding the information currently must be performed on a digital copy
of the evidence. Presenting the raw data as a point to formulate a conclusion, might not easily be
understood by legal representatives. Only unmodiﬁed data can be used as evidence [339], therefore
it is the investigators duty to accurately represent and provide meaning to the data. Should log
ﬁles be stored compressed, there should be a mechanism of appropriate decompression within a log
analysis tool. The extraction of pertinent data, an indication of the original location of that data,
and the ability of an investigator to provide a description for what a particular event means, would
be advantageous components within a forensic log analysis tool.
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3.1.8 CORE Wisdom
Aside from providing integrity for and centrally managing log ﬁles, CORE Wisdom’s [116] greatest
contribution is the ability to process and generate unique graphical representations of the log data
beyond mere pie charts and rudimentary graphs [116]. As such, this is done to alleviate the problem
of missing important events within log ﬁles, and draw attention to or extract necessary patterns or
trends of events that should cause alarm more easily for the analyst. This is a proprietary program
that runs only on a MS Windows environment, however it can read from any type of log ﬁle [367].
The problem with this program, as with many log analysis systems, is that the analyst has to deﬁne
the rules for importing the log ﬁle itself. The number of log ﬁle types that need to be deﬁned
correspond to the complexity of the target network setup and the logs that need to be analysed.
This tool does not provide any correlation ability. The analysis this tool performs is accomplished
in real-time. If the analyst does not know what visual cues to look for or cannot deﬁne events
that should be ﬂagged as alarms, then representing it in a diﬀerent format does not provide a more
eﬀective analysis methodology. The visual representations oﬀered by this tool may provide the
necessary understanding to enhance evidentiary reports prepared for the analysis of log data.
3.1.9 EventLog Analyzer
Implemented as a web application, ManageEngine’s EventLog Analyzer [262] tool provides cen-
tralized management, real-time analysis and reporting of a variety of log ﬁle types. Compatible log
ﬁle types this tool can provide analysis for include the MS Windows Event log [268], IIS W3C FTP
and HTTP server logs, MS Structured Query Language (SQL) [96] server [86] logs, Dynamic Host
Conﬁguration Protocol (DHCP) [122] logs for Windows [75] or Linux [288], International Business
Machines (IBM) [72] AS 400 logs [67], syslog [179], or Oracle 10 GR2 audit logs [291] [262]. This
tool is also capable of generating archive ﬁles, which can be stored for later analysis. Centralized
management functionality ensures network wide application, security, system or syslog device logs
are collected, normalized, and archived for analysis into a built-in, central MySQL database [262].
EventLog Analyzer can deﬁne automatic alerts, generate historical trends based on system events,
group host information together to show interactions, show failed logins, malicious users and show
applications that are causing performance or security issues. EventLog Analyzer also includes pre-
built reports and the ability to choose the data and format for the generation of custom reports and
templates. Reports are output at speciﬁc intervals and can be exported to HTML, PDF and Comma
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Separated Values (CSV) [344] formats. The analysis can generate both graphs and text-based repre-
sentations as output. The tool retains eleven groups of default report styles as well as any number of
combinations for custom generated reports [262]. Derived from this solution, both the archival of logs
and several default reports ensure compliance with the Federal Information Security Management
Act (FISMA)1 [342], the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)2 [62], the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA)3 [63], the Payment Card Industry - Data Security Standards (PCI-
DSS) [306], and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)4 [229, 262]. The principles of forensic process in
diﬀerent scenarios vary widely. Understanding and implementing compliance with laws in which the
forensic investigator operates would enable an analysis tool to garner widespread adoption for that
geographic area. This log analysis tool performs many qualities essential to a forensic log analysis
tool, but does not include automatic correlation between log ﬁles, or extensibility with regards to
the types of log ﬁles that may be analysed.
3.1.10 Ftpweblog and Wwwstat
ftpweblog [350] was built to extend the capabilities of a program known as wwwstat [350]. The
program wwwstat is used to output website access statistics information to an HTML ﬁle. However,
this program only comes with a default report style, and the methods of generating additional
information or manipulating the reports could only be achieved with great diﬃculty. When wwwstat
is integrated with gwstat [242], this output can generate graphical representations of access log
data. The ftpweblog was designed to integrate wwwstat and gwstat not only to diﬀerent log ﬁle
formats, both HTTP and FTP, but also to extend the conﬁgurability for the generation of reports
[132]. Both ftpweblog and wwwstat are Perl based programs that utilize regular expressions. They
are published as free software. Neither tool provides the necessary functions to operate as a complete
log analysis solution.
3.1.11 Funnel Web R© Analyzer
The freeware multi-platform5 web analysis tool Funnel Web R© Analyzer [216], utilizes information
from W3C formatted web server access log ﬁles to generate reports that document both internal and
1There is no Canadian equivalent for this Act. The government of Canada, United States Government Procurement
website refers back to the American act [284].
2The Canadian equivalent for GLBA is Bill 362 or Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA) [303].
3In Canadian law, contents of this act is also covered in PIPEDA.
4The Canadian equivalent of this is Bill C198. [345]
5MS Windows, Linux, Solaris [293], and Mac OS X [69]
57
external server statistics. It includes ﬁfty default customizable reports that contain both graphs and
textual data that can be published to PDF, HTML, MS Word [83], Rich Text Format (RTF) [73]
or MS Excel [82] ﬁle types. The enterprise version of Funnel Web R© Analyzer, enables additional
features such as real-time streaming analysis, extended feature changes for reports, an innovative
click stream report per visitor, advertising statistics, diagnostic reports, conversion of log ﬁles to
W3C standards, support to analyze larger ﬁles with a ﬂush mode and up to 1000 virtual domains
[216]. Although this program does not use a database, it conﬁgures ﬁles such that they become
easily imported to one. The tool Funnel Web R© Analyzer also performs no correlation and is limited
only to the analysis of web log ﬁles.
3.1.12 Http-analyze
http-analyze [324] is a fast multiplatform web server log ﬁle analyzer that can process data in
only three log ﬁle formats, the CLF, ELF and Distilled Log Format (DLF) [378, 324]. The analysis
performed by this tool includes automatic log ﬁle type detection. The http-analyze tool includes
the option to genenerate one of two diﬀerent standardized HTML reports to include statistical
and access load information summaries. These reports include graphs, tabulated data, and three
dimensional forms [357]. Real-time analysis is only acheived by scripting the rotation of the log
ﬁles, used in conjunction with the automated calling of this tool. The http-analyze tool does not
generate or format the log ﬁle information in any way, (other than reading from compressed ﬁles
where it performs decompression [357]). It does not put the information into a database, nor does it
perform correlation between the web server ﬁles with any other system available information. There
exist many freely available tools that can convert other non-standard web log formats to one of the
three types that http-analyze can analyze.
3.1.13 Logjam
Logjam [64] is a web application whose functionality implements a web traﬃc analyser that pro-
vides in-depth statistical analysis of W3C ELF log ﬁles. It has prerequisites of a MS Windows
server installation that includes Active Server Pages (ASP) and Microsoft Data Access Components
(MDAC) [80, 64]. Preliminary to analysis, log ﬁles are jammed into an SQL database for analysis
[64]. Default reports and a customizable report generator that creates SQL queries based on user
preferences are included with this tool [65]. This application is limited to the web server log ﬁles
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produced on a MS Windows machine, and runs only on a MS Windows machine. It has neither
implemented correlation nor does it function in real-time. Logjam does have the advantage that it
generates speciﬁc website data such as a user clickstream analysis. Reviewed in the reports, this
advantage is very useful in determining a forensic account of user interaction.
3.1.14 Logparser
MS has produced an SQL-like query adapter for many auto-detected log ﬁle types including
System, Security and Application Windows based log formats. Logparser is capable of analyzing
all IIS log ﬁle formats, including IIS logs with W3C ﬁelds, text ﬁle based formats, Domain Name
Service (DNS) [271] logs, generic NCSA log ﬁles, HTTP Error log ﬁles, log ﬁles adhereing to
W3C standards, as well as CSV, Tab Separated Values (TSV) [241] and XML based ﬁle formats.
Logparser is capable of parsing specialized binary ﬁles (such as those from MS Network Monitor
[85] and ETW Trace [78] ﬁles), retrieving system information (MS Event Log, ﬁles and directories,
registry keys, and Active Directory Object (ADO)s [13]), and processing custom data through the
use of user implemented input format plug-ins [183]. As a toolkit, Logparser does not provide a
graphical user interface, but provides functionality through a command line invocation by script
(for use with external ﬁles), or direct manipulation of queries by prompt interface. There exist
two programs that provide this convenience listed as Logparser Lizard 6 and Visual Logparser 7.
The Logparser language includes more than 80 functions in diﬀerent categories with examples that
perform string manipulation, arithmetic operations, and provide access to system details. Each
of these functions can modify or manipulate the content of ﬁelds in some manner. The log ﬁle
conversion capabilities of Logparser aid in the process of adapting log ﬁles to queries for performing
analysis including correlation. For correlation, Logparser has the capability of combining the data
from multiple sources, and then performs queries upon it. Logparser produces output in standardized
formats such as CSV, TSV, XML, Syslog, W3C, IIS, SQL, and non-standard formats, which require
either immediate presentation or include graphical output such as DATAGRID [182], CHART [182]
and NAT [182]. Limitations as documented from one particular website [23] of this tool include the
requirement of running MS Oﬃce to generate graphical output, and the automatic detection for
CSV ﬁles default to string with no method of deﬁning the columns manually. Logparser does not




queries to satisfy any analysis requirements. There are many places of reference that will describe
and implement methods employed to analyse situational instances. For example, Logparser has been
used to monitor user activities, monitor system ﬁle integrity, check for SQL injection attacks, check
for excessive failed logon attempts, determining malicious modiﬁcation, identiﬁcation of brute force
attacks, and reconstructing intrusions.
3.1.15 Lire
Compared to all other open source log analysis software, Lire [152] can provide analysis for the
widest variety of log ﬁle types through the use of conversion tools that convert the log ﬁles to DLF.
These tools are provided with a default installation of Lire, as are thirteen default reports that
can be modiﬁed and customized. Available default report templates include a statistical analysis of
database, dial-up, DNS, DNS-zone[271], email, ﬁrewall, FTP, print, proxy, Spam ﬁlter, Syslog, and
web server log ﬁle groups, which are generated through the use of an XML-driven reporting engine
[152, 153]. This tool does not provide correlation among log ﬁles, and its interface functions as a
log viewer or manager that conﬁgures timely reports on previously recorded logs in batches. Batch
generation does not translate to real-time performance as log ﬁles must be closed, and not open for
writing at the time of their conversion and the instantiation of analysis functions.
3.1.16 Logrep
The collection and presentation of data contained within log ﬁles of over 25 reporting tools in-
cluding Snort [263], Squid [227], Postﬁx [379], the AWS, Sendmail [343], Iptables [26] or Ipchains
[336], Syslog, Xferlog [170], Firewall-1 [366], Wtmp [175], Oracle Listener [100], Pix [364], and MS
Windows NT event logs is achieved by the tool logrep [235, 178]. This information is deliverable via
Secure SHell (SSH) [393], or over HTTP as formatted HTML reports that include multi-dimensional
analysis and graphs. This tool does not provide any correlation capabililities.
3.1.17 Logstalgia
This innovative website traﬃc visualization analyser presents the AWS Access log entries by
listing event requesters on one side of a pong battle board and the pages requested from the web
server on the other [44]. Colored balls represent the requests being made, the same color as the
host making the request and they travel across the screen to hit the requested locations [44]. Failed
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requests pass by the paddle on the server side, and successful ones are hit by the paddle [44]. To
view individual requests, the visualizer may be paused, and on mouse hover over the request to see
the actual data. This is severely limited as a log analysis tool in that it is only used for visualization.
However, it is both entertaining, as well as useful in showing a new method of visualization for an
investigator. The tool can run in real-time or utilize a log ﬁle as input.
3.1.18 Mywebalizer
Highly detailed and easily conﬁgured HTML reports covering web server usage statistics can be
generated during the execution of the open source project called Mywebalizer. The code is written
entirely in the C programming language which enables it to be extremely portable to operating
systems conforming to POSIX standards (Linux, Unix and Solaris). The log ﬁle formats that it
can analyze include CLF server logs, several variations of the NCSA Combined logﬁle format, wu-
ftpd/proftpd xferlog FTP format logs, Squid proxy server native format, and W3C Extended log
formats [29]. Log ﬁles that include Internet Protocol Version 4 (IPV4) [316] and Internet Protocol
Version 6 (IPV6) [112], DNS lookup and geolocation services are supported or provided as built
in functionalities [29]. In addition, this tool provides decompression capabilities so that bzip2 and
gzip compressed logs may be used directly without the need for uncompressing [29] which saves on
space, and provides analysis compatibility for larger log ﬁles. The analysis performed by this tool
summarizes statistical information about the web server as a whole by sites or time based report
styles in both tabular and graphical formats that are highly conﬁgurable from a command line
invocation [30]. This tool does not provide automatic detection of log ﬁle type, nor does it run in
real-time or provide any correlation capabilities. With these functionalities in mind, it could not
provide the necessary characteristics of an encompassing forensic analysis tool.
3.1.19 Open Web Analytics
Written as a web application using PHP, the Open Web Analytics [5] platform is a generic web
analytics framework that can provide analytical data regarding any web application to existing
sites and other web applications [5]. Due to its nature as a web application it can function on
any operating system that contains a browser and it can easily be added to existing popular web
applications using JS, PHP or REST application programming interfaces. Open Web Analytics
provides built in support for Wordpress [123] or MediaWiki [54] applications [6]. The Open Web
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Analytic tool’s main function is to provide real-time tracking, monitoring and reporting of web usage
statistics. Some examples of information it can provide include visitor click streams, geolocation of
visitors, Really Simple Syndication (RSS) [387] subscriptions made to the site, browser information
and web application speciﬁc features, such as indentify Wordpress visitors by username or MediaWiki
visitors by article or email address [4]. It also provides the means to develop additional functionality
through the use of plugins.
3.1.20 Pyﬂag
Pyﬂag [52] is an open source, web based application that performs forensic log analysis through
an extensive Graphical User Interface (GUI). This tool is capable of handling large volumes of log
ﬁles in many diﬀerent ﬁle formats, disks or images, and network traﬃc data such as tcpdump data
[52]. Data can be added to a MySQL database for faster queries but the log types are still speciﬁed
by the end user and due to the fact that this tool’s basic log function is only to view the log ﬁles,
the analyst must perform the required analysis using prior knowledge and experience. No speciﬁc
regular expressions that could be used to ﬁnd attack scenarios are listed within the documentation
for this project, so although this tool allows for regular expression entry and their operation on
the data, there exists no prebuilt analysis capabilities in this tool. The interface for analysis of log
data includes querying, sorting and graphic representation of the log data. Similar to a statistical
analysis log analysis functionality, but with the option to analyse many formats other than just log
ﬁles pertaining to web applications.
3.1.21 Sawmill
The major advantage that the Sawmill [135] architecture features is that it includes plugins for
and automatically detects over 800 distinct log ﬁle types,8 and provides a method for deﬁning
plugins for non standard log ﬁle types. The architecture includes the components log importer, the
Sawmill database, a reporting interface, a web server, a command line interface, a scheduler, and
two languages used to manipulate data and how data is stored for analysis. The Sawmill language
or Salang is used to display pages and to deﬁne log ﬁlters. It is structurally similar to Perl or C,
and contains the elements necessary for the deﬁnition of ﬁlters including regular expressions, and
conditional logic [135]. The other language included within the Sawmill architecture is the Sawmill
8A comprehensive list of the ﬁle type deﬁnitions predeﬁned are listed here: http://www.sawmill.net/cgi-bin/
sawmill7/docs/sawmill.cgi?dp+docs.technical manual.logformats+webvars.username+samples+webvars.password+
sawmill (Note: this data pertains to Version 7, meanwhile, the current Version is 8)
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structured query language. This language is a subset of most SQL commands, and is utilized to
access internal database information within predeﬁned table sets of the Sawmill database [134]. The
separate parts that comprise the Sawmill architecture all perform functions essential to an eﬃcent log
analysis tool. To provide a forensically sound basis, external methods to ensure the original log data
has not been tampered with, would need to be instantiated. This tool provides the access necessary
to perform correlation between log data sources, but does not perform this function inherently.
3.1.22 Squidj and Scansquidlog
Squid [227] is a web proxy cache service that is used to store frequently accessed pages, which
lowers bandwidth usage, enables more eﬃcent access to stored sites, and can optimize network traﬃc
by mapping server hierarchies then appropriately routing content requests [227]. When utilized in a
network, all requests are routed through the proxy service to achieve the above mentioned beneﬁts,
and events are logged. The two main log analysis tools utilised which apply speciﬁcally to Squid
are Squidj [282] and Scansquidlog [33]. These two tools are discussed here because the ability to
correlate their results with data from other system logs such as those generated from the AWS, other
varieties of web servers, or applications could provide convincing corraborating evidence. Squidj is
a refresh pattern analysis tool written in Python that gives an overview of all the objects in the
cache and how they are accessed. It utilizes the two modules9: weblog which enables web log ﬁle
parsing, and conf which parses conﬁguration ﬁles [282]. One forensic example would be to compare
the original bytes sent from a stale ﬁle to the byte count to the number of bytes recorded in the
access log event for that page, or a large change in the number of bytes in a new version of a posted
website ﬁle. Scansquidlog is utilized to search for speciﬁc URL string matches within the squid log
[33]. It not only ﬁnds the URL speciﬁed, but also lists all branches beneath the speciﬁed URL. This
method of extracting the strings is much faster than searching using regular expressions. However,
the method’s disadvantage is that it requires the investigator to individually specify the URLs that
they are looking for. Given that these two tools are written to speciﬁcally analyse squid logs, they
are insuﬃcient for a forensic log analysis tool on their own. They do include statistical analysis,
which when used in conjunction with other data might yield interesting results.
9These can both be found at http://www.pobox.com/∼mnot/
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3.1.23 Swatch, Logsurfer and Tenshi
The reason for these three tools to be grouped together, is due to the fact they provide implemen-
tations that are driven through the use of regular expressions. Each employs a diﬀerent methodology,
analysis and provides their own output.
Swatch [21] is a Perl-based tool originally designed to act as a real-time monitoring process for
Syslog messages. It has been extended to monitor any type of log format [21]. Regarding func-
tionality, what Tripwire [224] and Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment (AIDE) [251] do for
ﬁle integrity monitoring, Swatch does for log ﬁle monitoring [20]. Analysis of the messages entails
that those events being sent to Syslog are attempted to be matched against rules deﬁned by the
user. Should a match occur, an alert or other action then takes place. Conﬁguration for Swatch is
user-deﬁned in a ﬁle called .swatchrc that includes regular expression patterns followed by speciﬁed
actions to take place when the patterns are successfully matched. Two examples as speciﬁed in [31]
include a method of detection for URL buﬀer overﬂow attacks and a method to detect DoS attacks.
When an attacker attempts to perform a buﬀer overﬂow attack through the request of an overtly
long ﬁlename, the AWS logging service will respond and log a “File name too long” event. The
corresponding Swatch conﬁguration entry to detect this phenomenon would appear as follows:
watchfor /File name too long/
mail addresses=gc\@majortom.cx,subject=BufferOverflow_Attempt
One method that detects a DoS attack initalized by Swatch, would be to deﬁne a throttle HH:MM:SS
action after with the watchfor regular expression. This example is demonstrated as follows:
watchfor/http:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch\?v\=dQw4w9WgXcQ/
throttle 00:00:30
This example watches for a speciﬁc URL that has been submitted by a user, and gives a threshold of
30 seconds, should someone repeatedly attempt to submit that same URL as part of a DoS attack.
Swatch is an excellent monitoring tool, however, when determining report styles, the log of the
swatch service does not resemble a report. It does not oﬀer statistical analysis, unless the analyser
takes the data from the monitoring session, and performs analysis on it separately.
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The Tenshi10 [355] tool (formerly known as Wasabi) is a Perl-based log monitor that reports on
regular expression matches of events in one or more log ﬁles [355]. Tenshi is a complete rewrite of
the C program Oak11. The regular expressions deﬁned by Tenshi are assigned to a queue containing
user-speciﬁed actions to be performed within an alert interval [355]. The actions that can be taken
may include notiﬁcation emails or periodic reports. These reports include selected matched event
information. Redundant or non-essential event information can be excluded through the use of
regular expressions in the reporting style deﬁnition located in the Tenshi conﬁguration ﬁle. The
report that is generated by this tool is output as a CSV ﬁle that includes the hostname the log ﬁle
pertains to, the log itself, and the total number of hits or events [356]. As a forensic tool, Tenshi
provides real-time monitoring and time-based reporting. However, the performed analysis is limited
to regular expressions deﬁned by the user and there are no default pre-built expressions.
Extending the functionality of Swatch, Logsurfer [369] performs real-time log ﬁle monitoring and
reporting. One example of this extended functionality includes the ability to group related log
events and output them to individual reports. This tool being written in the C language enables
the capability to monitor large volumes of log data [369]. The Logsurfer tool is highly adaptable in
that it can be conﬁgured to monitor any type of log ﬁle for port scans or the disappearance of log
event entries. One method of detecting port scans would be a generated alert when a large volume
of dropped packets is being logged from a single IP source address. Rules and contexts are the
two functions utilized to perform Logsurfer log processing. The contents of each Logsurfer rule is
structured as follows:
match_regex not_match_regex stop_regex
not_stop_regex timeout [continue] action
The match_regex ﬁeld deﬁnes lines that will match the rule. The not_match_regex ﬁeld is used
to deﬁne those lines that do not match the rule. Interestingly enough, rules can be predeﬁned to
remove themselves from the active rule set using the stop_regex ﬁeld and exclusions to removing
the rule deﬁned in ﬁeld not_stop_regex. To deﬁne a time limit or interval for which this rule
should remain active for, a timeout value is speciﬁed. If no limit should be placed a timeout value
of 0 should be deﬁned. To override the default behavior of Logsurfer that asserts line processing is
complete when a successful match is made, the continue keyword will be speciﬁed. This ensures
10The Tenshi tool is currently maintained at www.inversepath.com.
11The Oak program is included in the package of tools at www.ktools.org.
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that Logsurfer continues to process lines that would match the rule. Unused ﬁelds employ - as a
placeholder. Finally, a rule action is speciﬁed and can be ignore which ignores the line matched,
exec which executes a program speciﬁed, pipe which sends the log event to the command line,
open which deﬁnes a new context, delete which deletes an open context, report which executes a
program, piping to it the context data, and rule which creates a new rule. Contexts enable grouping
functionality even with messages that are interspersed with non-related messages as mentioned earlier
[370]. Logsurfer is released in two diﬀerent formats for Unix and Solaris-based systems. There exists
extensive documentation for Logsurfer that provides many log analysis tips such as being cautious
when processing the log ﬁles, as control characters may be maliciously inserted. As with the other
tools within this category, this tool requires an external program for the generation of speciﬁc reports.
However, being able to group log entries in real-time can have a signiﬁcant advantage over the other
tools in this category. Information included with Logsurfer does not provide predeﬁned regular
expressions. These must be obtained from other sources such as 12 13, or through user deﬁnition.
3.1.24 Visitors
Providing unique web log statistical analysis based on access request events, the visitors [337] tool
takes web logs as input and returns either an HTML formatted report readable by any browser or
textual data that can be piped to any source or remotely retrieved over SSH [337]. Written in the C
langauge, it is highly portable and capable of handling large ﬁle sizes. Analysis for this program can
be extended through the use of regular expressions, and the ability to pass data to the Graphviz [126]
program for the generation of visual representations of statistical information. Extracting data from
Google 14 search URLs can also provide interesting keyword patterns to match. Adding this analysis
to a user trail’s data and correlating with other data sources could provide corroboration. As a freely
distributed program it includes a list of analysis techniques provided by this tool. Explanations and
examples are provided within the manual page included with the source code15. Combining analysis
data and techniques from several diﬀerent web log analysis tools such as visitors may enable a better
user web trail to emerge. Thus, as a forensic log analysis tool, it provides very limited functionality.
The combination of analysis methods provided could enhance an encompassing product.
12EMF’s Logsurfer conﬁguration page describes useful Logsurfer conﬁgurations: http://www.obfuscation.org/emf/
logsurfer.html
13CERT-dfn oﬃcial Logsurfer site: http://www.cert.dfn.de/eng/logsurf/
14www.google.com




Written entirely in Perl, Weblogmon [245] monitors server log ﬁles and reports usage information
regarding current users. Identiﬁcation of users is based on their IP address, their HTTP logged
email username values determined by ident values, or cookie information [245]. It can resolve IP
addresses to domains utilizing the perldns module [246], and can understand the CLF, the ELF,
and the ELF which appends the mod usertrack cookie information [244]. From these formats, it can
auto detect the type the user provided as input, and it adjusts the output report to include pertinent
analysis automatically. This tool is limited to those three types of log ﬁles, and does not perform
any correlation. Relative to other log analysis tools, Weblogmon provides limited documentation
and functionality. It was included in this study as it provides a unique perspective on how to track
or monitor users.
3.2 Log Analysis Development Frameworks
The diﬃculty in providing an encompassing, eﬀective and eﬃcient forensics tool lies partly in
the size of the event log, but other factors also include the simpliﬁcation of those event logs, and
appropriate functionality by network conﬁguration requirements. For example, a most frequent
false positive may generate an alert via the detection of an attack event, but this attack can only
be successful should a speciﬁc application be running on an intended target. The ability to specify
speciﬁc rule sets, signatures, and the conﬁguration of the network becomes an imperative, yet
daunting task to the investigator. With the following log analysis development frameworks, an
investigator or a target company may be able to ﬁne tune, or develop an application speciﬁcally for
the purpose of an investigation prior to or after an incident has occurred.
3.2.1 Apachedb, mod log sql and the Apache::DB Project
The use of databases in the realm of the log ﬁle analysis is an essential design decision, which
tends to speed up performance, alleviate issues regarding organization as well as enable prospective
correlation for any analytical tool. Apachedb [215] is a small PHP script utility that transforms log
data from one of four formats, namely common, combined, mod user track or squid, into a MysqlTM
database for further analysis [185]. It provides functionality to import a pre-generated log ﬁle into the
database, and a method to write directly to the database while the web service is in operation [215].
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Since the inception of the Apache::DB project and mod log sql [231], the apachedb PHP script has
lost its usefulness as these two software packages oﬀer the same functionality of conﬁguring the AWS
to log directly to a database. Functional packages related to logging to a database provided by the
Apache::DB project include Apache Derby [318], Apache Torque [144], Apache Java Data Object
(JDO) [143], Apache Object Relational Bridge (OJB) [139] and Apache DdlUtils [140] [142]. These
Apache packages provide connectivity to the associated technologies mentioned in the respective
package names. Derby is an open source database [318]. As an XML-based object relational mapper
[144], Torque serves as a connection manager to a variety of databases. JDOs are useful when
accessing or manipulating persistent data contained within databases [143]. An OJB exists as an
object or relational mapping tool that allows transparent persistence for JDOs against relational
databases [139]. The Apache DdlUtils package works with Database Deﬁnition File (DDL)s [140],
which are XML ﬁles that contain the deﬁnition of a database schema [140]. As with most log analysis
tools that have been reviewed at this time, these tools are development components, some of which
are not entirely implemented. For their eﬀective utilization for the purposes of rendering forensic log
analysis, they must be employed by a developer or investigator as a part of a personalized toolset.
3.2.2 Cascade Software Packages
The Cascade Software packages [213], developed by Cogent Real Time Systems include the Cascade
Data-Hub, the OPC Data-Hub, Historian and TextLogger. These four programs could provide an
Application Programming Interface (API) to be utilized for the development of a very eﬀective
log analysis system, IDS, or provide real-time intrusion protection services. The Cascade Data-
Hub is a real-time data collection and bridging hub for modular Windows applications, and normal
or embedded Unix applications [213, 50]. It is entirely resident in volatile memory and allows a
developer to share data among any number of programs over TCP or Dynamic Data Exchange
(DDE) [77] connections [50]. This application enables modules to communicate without deadlocks
through the combination of data packaging and intelligent queueing, which ensure that the behaviour
and communication of one program will not adversely aﬀect any others. [50] The API for Cascade
DataHub consists of a C code library that allows for reading, writing, and program registration to
generate exceptions with the DataHub [50]. Object Linking and Embedding for Process Control
(OPC) [149] is a series of standards speciﬁcations regarding the communication between Windows
programs and industrial automation systems, which operates using a client-server model. The OPC
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Data-Hub is similar to the Cascade Data-Hub in that it operates as a data collection repository
and bridging hub, yet it connects all operating systems, as well as OPC servicable devices. As an
event-driven data storage management program that maintains persistent time-sequence data sets
derived from process data, the Historian also oﬀers a query facility suitable for generating export
data or graphical representations [51]. The four built-in queries within Historian include a raw data
view, periodic data view, relative interpolation, and periodic relative interpolation. The program
also provides a method to develop additional request types. Textlogger performs real-time collection
of process data and generates log events within regular ASCII ﬁles. This last tool would enable a
developer to generate log data for processes that does not perform logging inherently. A log analysis
system built with this as a base would be completely extensible, able to conform to individual needs
of certain industrial setups, and would remain adaptable for correlation, reports, and queries.
3.2.3 Crystal Reports
Crystal Reports [380] is a Windows-based commercial software distributed by SAP16 that provides
the ability for a developer to deﬁne and perform desired analysis on multiple sources of data. The
information that are used in these customized reports can come from a variety of sources, such as an
OLAP cube, MySQL database, or ﬂat ﬁles. This software provides a platform to perform business
analytics. It has the capability to be extended towards web server analytics, which is referred to as
web intelligence, but all analysis performed with this in mind must be uniquely speciﬁed. Crystal
Reports enables the development of such applications through the integration of this application with
.NET [76], Java, or Java 2 Enterprise Edition (J2EE) [281] [380]. Internal log analysis functionality
does not exist, as this tool’s primary function is as a reporting tool. It can be programmed to
achieve overall business analytical tools, or perform log analysis speciﬁc functions depending on
the application developed that may utilize these reports as an output format. Crystal Reports was
engineered to function as a development tool. It must have plugins or individual reports developed
around it to become functional as a log analysis tool, or even a business analytics tool. Default report
structures are available to download from the product website, but may not include all functionalities
needed for processing log ﬁles. Capabilities other than report layout, summary statistics or data




Available as an open source tool suite, JasperReports [60] is packaged within a collection of busi-
ness intelligence suite of tools that include Ireport, Jasperserver, Jasperanalysis, JasperETL, and
Jaspersoft. This is a reporting tool not speciﬁcally designed for log analysis. Much similar in func-
tionality to the commercial Crystal Reports software, a developer can specify within JasperReports
how they wish to accomplish log analysis and formulate reports based on data source connections to
a Java application. JasperReports can be connected to the development environment Eclipse [165]
and integrates with the Pentaho [60] suite for business intelligence [60]. Report templates are gen-
erated through XML ﬁles, and can be created with the aid of Ireport. Ireport is the visual designer
that generates the reports. Ireport includes builtin query support for Enterprise JavaBeans Query
Language (EJBQL) [269] from J2EE, Hibernate Query Language (HQL) [323], Multi-Dimensional
eXpressions (MDX) [87], SQL, XPath [47], in addition to custom languages such as Procedural
Language / Structured Query Language (PL/SQL) [292] [226]. Reports can be exported in many
diﬀerent formats including CSV, Excel, HTML, OpenOﬃce Data Format (ODF) [294], PDF, text,
RTF and XML [226]. Correlation may be added but all analysis is customized and developed by the
analyzer.
3.2.5 Simple Event Correlator (SEC)
The Simple Event Correlator (SEC) [376] is an open source, platform-independent event correla-
tion tool that can operate in an oﬄine or an online (real-time) mode. Within this context, event
correlation has occured when a conceptual interpretation of multiple events has generated a new
meaning outside the context of each individual event [225]. A discussion of the beneﬁts of correlation
was outlined earlier in this chapter and previously in Chapter 2, and possible future applications
regarding correlation is given within the Conclusion. This development tool has previously been
integrated into applications that provide network management, system monitoring, intrusion detec-
tion, and those that perform log ﬁle monitoring with analysis. Methods included in this tool deﬁne
the event correlation rule types. Each rule includes an event match condition, an action list and
an optional boolean expression that determines whether the rule should be applied at the speciﬁc
time interval it was matched in. The event match condition is deﬁned by a regular expression,
boolean expression, perl subroutine or by direct substring match [374]. The diﬀerent rule types
deﬁned by this tool include single, single with script, single with suppress, single with threshold,
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single with two thresholds, pair, pair with window, suppress, calendar, jump and options [376]. In
the following, we provide an explanation exerpted from the manual [376] for these rule directives
in order to demonstrate the functionalities of SEC. The single rule matches a speciﬁc event and
then executes an action list. The single with script matches an event, then the execution of the
action list is dependent on the exit value of an external script or program. Single with suppress
matches an event, then ignores subsquent matching events for a speciﬁed duration. A single with
threshold rule is used to generate a match if a given number of events are matched within a speciﬁed
duration, any additional matches found during the duration window are ignored and the calculation
of future matches are made against sliding window durations. When two thresholds are given for
a single event, the ﬁrst threshold speciﬁes the count to successfully match, this activates the ﬁrst
action list. The second threshold is for the continued match, ensuring that the number of matched
events remains above the number speciﬁed in the second threshold, which activates a secondary
action list. For a pair rule, the ﬁrst event is matched and an action list is then executed, any further
events matched are ignored until the second event speciﬁed is matched, and then another action
list is invoked. The pair with window rule matches an event and waits for another event to arrive
within a speciﬁed duration. Two separate action lists are given that specify the boolean outcomes
determined by the success or failure of ﬁnding the second event. A suppress directive indicates an
event should not be matched by future rules. Calendar directives are used to execute action lists at
speciﬁc times. When a jump directive is speciﬁed within a rule, it submits those events matched by
the rule to other rule sets for further processing. Any extraneous variables to be included in a rule
set are speciﬁed using the options directive. Subsequent actions may include the creation or deletion
of contexts, the execution of external shell commands or external programs, and the generation of
new events. Other available actions that may be performed are speciﬁed within the manual page
[376]. This tool includes a large online community that provides application speciﬁc rules [375] for
diﬀerent network environments. As another development tool, this performs only one function that,
in our opinion is essential to an eﬀective forensic tool. Extensive conﬁguration is still required for
this tool to operate for diﬀerent logging environments.
3.3 Intrusion Detection and Integrity Monitoring Tools
Although these two classiﬁcation of tools do not necessarily base their results upon analysis of log
ﬁles, they provide insight into methods, which can be utilized in a forensic analysis tool. An IDS is
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designed to generate alerts based on the presense of malicious actions designed to intrude a system.
An enormous amount of research eﬀort over an extended duration has been devoted to the develop-
ment of state of the art techniques to be employed by intrusion detection, or Intrusion Protection
System (IPS)17. It is logical to leverage the capabilities of these methods when deﬁning attack rules
or signatures, enabling the reporting of IDS to be utilized as a source of cross-correlation. Another
aspect that is critical to a forensics prospective is shown when the capture of evidence provided by
log ﬁles becomes inadmissible due to a lack of integrity. An implementation of components that can
ensure the eﬃcacy, admissibility, corroboration and transparency of evidence require the introduc-
tion of aspects previously implemented by or those that can be veriﬁed using integrity monitoring,
IDSs, and IPSs.
3.3.1 ArcSight Logger and ArcSight ESM
Management of logs requires the ability to parse, normalize, organize, search, generate reports
from and store all of the data in a useful scalable manner. ArcSight Logger [210] includes a useful
analysis portal that allows access to dashboards, the generation of pre-built and user-deﬁned reports,
the ability to perform eﬃcient searches utilizing regular expressions, simple strings or predeﬁned
ﬁeld values [208], and settings for real-time alerts, or event forwarding. Prebuilt reports come with
scheduling interfaces, access controls, a variety of export formats, and other ﬂexible features [346].
Arcsight utilizes “connectors” to provide the capability to collect, categorize, and normalize over
300 distinct log types parsed into the Common Event [256] format [210]. Further extensibility is
provided by the use of ArcSight’s ﬂexconnectors, which can be used to collect custom or in-house
data sources [210]. ArcSight Logger is made available in the form of an integrated system appliance,
or is distributed as a standalone software. The logger tool only provides the capability to eﬀectively
manage the logs. More analysis is performed by correlating the information organized by Arcsight’s
Enterprise Security Management (ESM), as the logger can forward security events to this tool, as
well this tool gathers data from a variety of diﬀerent sources such as network devices and connected
workstations. Due to the proprietary nature of both ESM and the Logger, it has been diﬃcult to ﬁnd
appropriate documentation to determine if the software includes pre-deﬁned attack deﬁnitions and
their method of correlating these facts to other source events as necessary to conﬁrm attack detection.
It has been claimed that this correlation to provide evidentiary information can be accomplished by
17See http://www.snort.org for the most widely used open implementation of an IDS or IPS and [259] for an example
which overviews methods in intrusion detection research dating before 1993
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this leading industry tool [210, 209].
3.3.2 Guard26
The Guard26 [361] implementation is a real-time log parser that represents a ﬁrst attempt at a
Linux IDS envisioned by its developer. During run-time it compares a database of regular expressions
that deﬁne suspicious log ﬁle strings against Syslog ﬁle entries and reports any matches as alerts
[361]. Classiﬁcation of these alerts include informational, warning, and alert detected. Output is
both written to standard out and a log ﬁle is generated. Analysis by Guard26 is limited to Syslog
ﬁle types, and only those suspicious log ﬁle strings found within its database. This concept to
provide a real-time IDS utilizing this method has excellent potential, if implemented with real-time
correlation. Another idea could consist of real-time correlation of the alerts generated by this tool
with the web server log events.
3.3.3 Osiris and Samhain
HIMSs periodically scan one or more host systems for modiﬁcations to ﬁles or their attributes and
record variations or unmodiﬁed entries to result logs. They do this to maintain an audit trail of all
of the changes to a system from a particular baseline. Osiris [196] and Samhain [385] as HIMS are
structured very diﬀerently. They cannot be directly compared as they are used in diﬀerent scenarios,
yet they maintain the shared title of the two most widely used HIMS.
Osiris maintains an event log of changes to the ﬁle system including ﬁles and their attributes, user
and group lists, resident kernel extensions or modules, network ports, other non-module speciﬁc
kernel elements, and administrator services [389, 390, 196]. For maximum operating eﬃciency that
ensures both ease of use and the maintenance of the integrity of events, Osiris is deployed in a
securely distributed fashion employing security devices such as digital certiﬁcates and the use of the
SSL to protect the integrity and privacy of all communications between its components [390]. During
its operation, Osiris does not base its logic upon the use of signatures, but takes periodic scans of
the system storing the results in a centrally located and managed Berkeley [290] database. All of
the scan data and log messages are neither signed nor encrypted during storage, which requires the
administrator to ensure a hardened and secure system for the management console [389]. Inherently
advantageous to Osiris are its abilities to deploy and manage from either a Windows or Unix-like
environment, and to provide additional functionality through the development of modules. With
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respect to noise, regular expressions implement ﬁltering capabilities on Osiris. Filtering consists of
preventing matched events from being logged. A drawback to this tool presents itself when a regular
expression is applied that prevents signiﬁcant events from being logged [389].
Similarly, Samhain albeit limited to use only on Linux systems, expands in two ways to other
areas of integrity monitoring. The ﬁrst way is the ability to monitor the kernel itself on Freebsd
[320] and Linux systems, and the second way is that the management consoles can be accessed
and modiﬁcations made through a locally hosted web application console [389]. In relation to
kernel monitoring, Samhain has the capability of monitoring the interrupt handler, the system call
table, parts of the virtual ﬁle system layer and a portion of each system call handler [389]. These
capabilities enable Samhain to eﬀectively detect rootkit and other malicious kernel modiﬁcations.
The tool Samhain was originally developed as a host-based IDS that would monitor many disparate
aspects of an environment and utilizes integrity monitoring as a means of and in addition to other
means of detecting an intrusion. It includes methods to provide ﬁle integrity checking, log ﬁle
monitoring, rootkit and rogue Set User IDentiﬁcation (SUID) [34] executables detection, mount
point modiﬁcations, port monitoring and hidden processes [385]. During operation Samhain can
be run as a standalone system, or it can be centrally managed on a variety of operating systems
including those that are Linux or Unix based, and can be run under Cygwin [217] on Windows. The
Windows and Cygwin conﬁguration for running Samhain is not optimal. The reason for this is that
security cannot be ensured between threading, since during development this tool was not designed
for use on a Windows system. It therefore, may overlook areas where intrusions may be detected
more quickly such as the registry [92], or the Windows kernel space.
Methods to prevent tampering and detection of running Samhain or Osiris may include one or
more of the following actions: signing both databases and conﬁguration ﬁles with Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) [258] signatures, stealthy operation of the program by hiding its execution from
the process list, and obfuscation of the executable and conﬁguration ﬁle locations within alternate
data streams, steganographically within non-related ﬁles or within ﬁle padding [385, 389]. With the
output logged from these HIMSs, this provides an investigator an entire audit trail of the system
starting from its speciﬁed baseline. Both systems include an extensive log event collection deﬁnition,
which aid in both parsing and analysis of the events logged by either system. The log ﬁles that they
generate are not only a point of correlation and cross-correlation, but they verify the integrity of
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other logs. Other than IDSs, these logs were included in development design and are not only used
by developers for debugging. This means that they include deﬁnitive meanings for certain events
that these tools inherently comprehend. Alone they do not provide the analysis of log ﬁles, however
the addition of events coming from a HIMS would provide the necessary corroboration as well as a
more thorough detail of events for the investigation of an incident within a forensics perspective.
3.3.4 OSSec
OSSec [298] is an open source, host-based IDS that aside from log analysis performs active re-
sponse, monitoring of ﬁle integrity and policy changes, real-time alerting, and rootkit detection.
This multiplatform tool runs on Linux, OS X, Solaris, HP-UX [201], Advanced Interactive eXecu-
tive (AIX) [206] and Windows. Log inspection is performed by the logcollector and analysisd
processes. They perform collection and parsing, decoding, ﬁltering, and classiﬁcation analysis on
the speciﬁed log ﬁles. The log ﬁle formats that are supported include process or history log, Syslog,
NCSA, and W3C ELF for HTTP, FTP and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [238], MS event
log format (Application, Security, System) and IIS web server default log format [298]. This tool
assists with Payment Card Industry (PCI) [305] compliance, in that it enables the real-time mon-
itoring of log ﬁles, but cannot perform correlation between diﬀerent sources. Due to the nature in
which the process history information is stored, a plugin that performs correlation between process
history and log event entries could be developed in the future.
3.3.5 Snort
As a functionality requirement, an IPS must provide the interception of all network communica-
tion, which ensures the capability to halt or block, and manipulate or sanitize incoming malicious
traﬃc. The multiple modes attributed to Snort [263] include one that provides the functionality of
a network IPS, one that functions as a network IDS, and the last is a sniﬀer device that provides
streamed or logged data [39]. Snort provides the capability of investigating the network at the packet
level. It uses rules or signatures to deﬁne troublesome events, and perform actions on these events in
addition to the generation of packet log ﬁles. The program itself does not include a GUI, and can be
linked to one to provide a more overall viewpoint. The output of Snort includes a very basic report-
ing style that can be manipulated externally, but this manipulation requires a separate program to
reveal a legible report [263]. Snort has the capability to provide lower network level events to a log
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ﬁle, MySQL database, or standard output which could provide an excellent event cross correlation
source. This program is also capable of reading previously generated network packet dumps and
performing analysis on them. It requires a comprehensive rule set adapted to individual networking
conﬁgurations to function with the greatest eﬃciency and the least number of false positives as with
any IDS or IPS. Pertaining to forensics however, Snort does not provide the inherent functionality
of correlation, appropriate reporting and visual interface required of a forensics tool as it was not
designed to fulﬁll this purpose. In conclusion, this open source project does provide an excellent
example of signature, protocol and anomaly-based packet event detection methods, which should be
adapted into an eﬀective forensic system.
3.3.6 Splunk
Search engines provide the necessary means of navigation through the vast series of electronic
tubes that comprise the Internet. Similar in functionality to a search engine, Splunk [354] indexes
data from any type of log source and system speciﬁc dataset. Splunk employs conﬁguration ﬁles,
registry entries and loaded modules or drivers to provide a structured and integrated search method.
Splunk provides real-time access, analysis, integrity, change monitoring, reporting and can operate
autonomously [354]. Splunk is implemented by an outward facing web interface for interaction with
its internal engine. It does not utilize an external database instance, and instead relies on buckets
and indexing for ﬂat ﬁle database construction with automatic log type detection and event parsing
[353]. As a forensics tool, Splunk provides the ability to verify the integrity of the data, provide
statistical analysis and reporting, and the ability to provide evidentiary correlation between data
sources, conﬁgurations, and system information all in real-time. Splunk handles all log data in an
eﬃcent manner, and yet still requires a lot of conﬁguration on the part of the user.
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3.4 Conclusion
The three categories of industry leading tools examined within this comparison represent appli-
cation speciﬁc, development framework, and intrusion detection or host integrity monitoring log
solutions. The conclusions regarding state of the art forensic log solutions outline potential prob-
lems as well as requirements that when instantiated would constitute an eﬀective analysis solution.
One issue made apparent was that many tools provide summaries of information that might remove
or cause speciﬁc events of evidentiary value to a forensic investigator to be passed over. The main
summary of the comparison within this chapter is showcased in Table 3.4. The functional and
non-functional requirements outlined previously, consist of log management, integrity veriﬁcation,
timeline generation, legible reporting, extensibility, scalability, and appropriate documentation. Ap-
propriate methods of log management include log ﬁle rotation, a central stealth repository for the log
ﬁles and obfuscation of the analysis tools themselves. The importance of integrity in a forensic log
analysis tool is of utmost priority when dealing with evidentiary material. Integrity is maintained
through proper chain of custody procedures, compliance with applicable standards to the incident
scenario, and the instantiation of a variety of correlation techniques to provide corroboration. The
three types of event correlation include normal correlation between multiple events within a sin-
gle log ﬁle, cross-correlation of events from separate log sources, and cross-correlation of events to
external source data structures. The forensic reconstruction of an incident requires the generation
of a timeline of signiﬁcant events prior to and occurring within the speciﬁed duration. Signiﬁcant
events include records of command execution (found within process accounting), log on and log oﬀ
statistics, and events that signify attacks. It is a forensic investigators duty to provide meaning to
the raw data presented as evidence. To ensure understanding of the investigators interpretation, a
forensic log analysis tool should incorporate legible reporting. This legible reporting should incor-
porate graphical representations of ﬁndings and generate at least two styles of documents. The ﬁrst
document style should be clear, concise, comprehensive and incorporate terms applicable in a legal
setting for court oﬃcials, and the other document should provide a generalized format of the same
data contained within the ﬁrst for a wider audience. Due to the tendency of log ﬁles to contain large
amounts of data, the scalability of an analysis solution is important. Methods to deal with large
log ﬁle size include the use of database technologies and the choice of programming language which
should provide both operating system independence and eﬃciency. Extensibility highlights the im-
portance of modularity, as modules provide the capability of specifying diﬀerent events according to
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the incident under investigation. To maximize acceptance and potential of a forensic analysis tool
with respect to the end user, as with any software engineering project, comprehensive documenta-
tion is essential. An initial list of over 100 tools covering the vast spectrum of current log analysis
implementations was discovered and investigated during the course of our research. Due to space
requirements, other tools we were made aware of during our investigation were not included in the
comparison. They are noteworthy here since they pertain directly to forensics and web application
security. Forensic toolkits such as FTK [3], Encase [197], and Sleuthkit [42] are the three main
forensic toolkits used by incident responders. All three lack in log analysis functionality beyond
standard viewing and search capabilities. Web application vulnerability scanners such as Paros [61],
Nikto [362], and Webscarab [150] can be used to generate attack signatures within the log ﬁles, but
do not perform log analysis themselves.
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Psacct N N Y - Y [i] CL - Y Y N Y [b]
Acctsum N N N - Y [i] CL Y [H] Y N [c] N [t] N
Analog N N N - Y [ii] CL Y [H,e] Y N [c] N N
Anteater N N N - Y [iii] CL Y [H,e] N N N N
Awstats N N N - Y [iv] B Y [S,P,H] N Y [f] N N
Breadboard Bi Web An-
alytics
N N N [v,h] - Y [iv] B Y [P,H,X,R] Y Y N N
Calamaris N N Y - Y [i] CL Y [H] Y N [c] N N
Chklogs N N [a] N - Y [i] CL N N N [c] Y [rt] N
CORE Wisdom N N [j] N - N [v] EUI Y [g] Y Y N N
Eventlog Analyzer Y Y [SF] N - Y [iv] B Y [H,P,C] Y Y N N
Ftpweblog & Wwwstat N N N - Y [i] CL Y [H] Y N [c] N N
Funnel WebR© Analyzer Y N N - Y [ii] CL Y [P,H,E,R,W] Y [$] Y [$] N N
HTTP-Analyze N Y [SF] N - Y [iii] CL Y [H] N N [c] Y [rt] N































































































































logjam Y N Y - N [v] B Y [H] N N N N
Logparser Y N [a] N - N [v] N[EXT] Y [*] Y N N N
Lire Y N N - Y 1 CL Y[H,X] Y N N Y
Logrep Y N N - Y [ii] CL Y [H] Y Y N [xs] N
Logstalgia N N N - Y [ii] EUI[g] N Y Y [c] N N
Logsurfer N Y Y - Y [i] CL Y Y Y N Y
Swatch N Y Y - Y [i] CL N Y Y N Y
Tenshii N N [a] Y - Y [i] CL Y [C] Y Y N Y
Mywebalizer N N Y - Y [ii] CL Y [H] Y N Y N
Open Web Analytics N N N - Y [ii] B Y [H] Y Y N N
Pyﬂag Y N [a] Y - Y [ii] B Y [H] Y N N N
Sawmill Y N [a] Y - Y [ii] B Y [H] Y Y Y [xs] N
Squidj N N Y - Y [i] CL Y [S] Y N [c] N Y
Scansquidlog N N Y - Y [i] CL Y [S] Y N [c] N N
Visitors N N Y - Y [ii] CL Y [H] Y N N N
Weblogmon N N Y - Y [iii] CL N [F] Y Y N [xs] Y






























































































































ApacheDB Y N [a] N - Y [ii] D D Y D N D
Mod log SQL Y N Y - Y [ii] D D Y D N D
Cascade Software Y N [a] N - Y [ii] D Q Y Y N Y
Crystal Reports Y N [a] N - N [v] EUI Q Y Y D D
JasperReports N N [a] N - Y [iii] EUI Q Y Y D D









and ESM Y Y [a] Y - N [A] B Y [r,g] Y Y Y Y
Guard26 N N Y - Y [i] CL N N Y N Y [b]
Osiris Y N [j] Y - Y [ii] CL/B N Y Y N Y [b]
Samhain Y N [j] Y - N [vii] CL N Y Y N Y [b]
OSSEC N N [a,j] Y - Y [ii] CL N Y Y N [xs] Y [b]
Snort N N Y - Y [ii] CL Y [uf] Y Y N Y
Splunk N N [a,j] Y - Y [ii] CL/B Y Y Y D Y
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i OS X, Unix, Linux, FreeBSD
ii Any operating system, Windows & OS X (pre-built bi-
naries), Unix, Linux, FreeBSD
iii Interpreted language OS independent
iv Web application, requires a server, any OS browser is
used
v Windows only
a Does grouping or enables correlation development
b Not Syslog, own process log
c Can be scripted
e Statistics
f Dynamic and static
g Enhanced graphics
h Data mining
j Provides mechanisms for verifying integrity
t Truncation
r Utilizes a proprietary language mixing XML and SQL
to script report generation
$ Commercial version
D Analyst must code for functionality of individual
projects
Q Developer generated queries to create reports









uf Unformatted raw output
rt Rotation
xs Extracting selections of logs
EUI Executable user interface
SF Correlation within the same ﬁle





* CSV, TSV, XML, Syslog, W3C, IIS,SQL, DATAGRID
CHART and NAT
† Attempting to determine the admissibility of current log
analysis tools via forensic precedence within case law is a
diﬃcult procedure. A search of Canadian and American
case law within the Lexis-Nexis [253] and Canlii [136] legal
databases yielded only references to forensic toolkits such
as Encase [197] or Forensic ToolKit (FTK) [3] which re-
tain rudimentary log analysis functionality. Also, in court
proceedings where logs were used as deﬁnitive evidence,




Attack Detection Using Regular
Expressions
This chapter is devoted to descriptions of the attacks that our forensic log analysis program can
detect. For each type of attack we will provide the regular expression used for its detection along
with a description of the category it belongs to. What follows is an introduction to the exploitation
of web applications describing the most commonly desired outcomes for an attacker. As such, our
methodology is limited to those web applications that use the AWS as a basis, since the target log ﬁle
that can be analysed is the AWS access log in CLF or ELF. Regular expression extensions for other
log ﬁle format contents can render similar patterns for the discovery of attacks. Next, an overview
of our methodolgy utilizing Regexs is explored. The Regex knowledge base that we employed is then
approached, examined, and demonstrated in detail providing a description by attack or outcome as
speciﬁed. Outlining the group description is an introduction, attack scenario, and attack examples
with the regular expressions that detect them from our tool. One attack string example is given to
demonstrate the functionality of the regular expression. This sample string may be of use multiple
times for separate regular expressions if the string would trigger during an attack scenario. Most
injection attacks are application speciﬁc, such that on the client-side it may aﬀect a speciﬁc browser
and version or web application that runs client-side, whereas on the server-side, it may be aﬀecting
service versions or web applications that run as services.
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4.1 Exploiting Web Applications
Web application vulnerabilities can exist in both server-side and client-side applications. The
methods of attack vary according to the desired results of the attacker. Once an application is
vulnerable to a speciﬁc method of attack, it provides an attacker a variety of exploitational outcomes.
Desired exploits could include code execution, DoS, information disclosure, defacement, session
hijacking, loss of trust, or data manipulation. Code execution could happen on the server-side,
exposing not only server processes, but also any data resident on the server. When code execution
happens on the client-side, user-level data can be accessed such as browser history or other ﬁles
contents and code that attempts to gain elevated priviledges may then be executed. Information
disclosure severity can range from the access of trivial data to the disclosure of conﬁdential or
proprietary property. Examples of information disclosure include traversal or the mapping of the
directory tree structure on the server, viewing deprecated development versions of applications,
or revealing conﬁdential data such as log ﬁles, proprietary company or government secrets. The
information disclosed can be stolen, copied, or possibly modiﬁed of that data. Causes of information
disclosure include misplaced conﬁguration ﬁles, tapping of secure sessions, and a wide variety of
scripting attacks.
4.2 Methodology
In order to analyze AWS access log ﬁles and detect potential attack events, we rely on regular
expressions to describe web application attack scenarios. The type of web application vulnerabilities
detected are related to input validation. The applicable regular expressions were gathered and
compiled from two main sources, which are the “OWASP Top Ten attacks from 2007” [267] and the
PHP:Hypertext Preprocessor Intrusion Detection System (PHPIDS) default ﬁlter ﬁle [192]. In total,
80 regular expressions are compiled to deﬁne matches in AWS access log ﬁles for particular web
application attack scenarios. Describing the attacks as regular expressions enables the extendability
and maintainability of our approach if new attacks are discovered or the described attack scenarios
are revised. In order to put this approach into practice, we implemented a tool that forensically
detects attacks against web applications. Our tool’s features and functionalities are described in
detail within Chapter 5. In the next section, we provide a set of examples of detected attack
scenarios with their corresponding regular expression.
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4.3 Injection Attacks
One variety of attack that exploits this vulnerability are known as injection attacks. Injection
attacks leverage the modiﬁcation or provision of data supplied to an application which may be
designed maliciously to execute speciﬁc system commands or code fragments [300]. In this section,
we will introduce HTTP header injections and provide an explanation of SQL injections and give
the regular expression examples that our tool is capable of detecting for this type of attack. Current
browsers do not limit the variety of code they accept, execute or render for end users. To round out
this section, we present the examples of the other code and protocol related injections that can be
detected using our tool.
4.3.1 Protocol-Related Injection
Two applicable protocol related injection attacks that we consider to be inﬂuential to the devel-
opment of our tool are HTTP header injection and Light-weight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
[233] URL injection. The following paragraphs explain a future additional correlation source and
give an example of how to detect using our forensic tool an injection attack attempt.
Manipulation of HTTP headers at the simplest level can enable an attacker to masquerade as
originating from a diﬀerent source, or to request a speciﬁc version of the intended target should a
web application dispense data based on browser validation [338]. More complicated attacks can also
be performed, such as those ﬁrst outlined in [236] and [237], whereby an attacker could split HTTP
responses, perform session ﬁxation based upon access to or modiﬁcation of the user cookie portion
of the header, perform a Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attack by modifying the address of
the header or a XSS attack upon an unsuspecting victim. Unfortunately the AWS only records a
portion of the header information when logging events to the access log. Thinking forensically
about detecting this type of attack, one future application could be made by logging the HTTP
headers on the server and correlating those contents to AWS log events for multiple simultaneous
requests.
Internal facing instantiations of the LDAP on an attackers target network may be accessible
through the browser by injection if request input has not been appropriately validated. LDAP
enables users to access a variety of information located within storage directories. In most deploy-
ments, each resource has a dedicated directory and corresponding data pertaining to its individual
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Figure 5: LDAP Injection Scenarios [360]
Regular Expression to Detect LDAP Injections
Figure 5 demonstrates scenarios in which an attacker employs LDAP injections to procure given
results, and methods of probing an application in preparation to the exploit. The following example
detects requests made that attempt to exploit potential LDAP vectors within an event.
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This would detect a URL of the form ldap://host:port/DN?attributes?scope?filter?extensions
speciﬁed from “RFC 4516” [260] to utilize LDAP from a browsing perspective. This vector may be
exploited for the purposes of information disclosure in the form of detailing the network structure,
accessing ﬁles, describing directory structure which may leak personnel data, or performing directory
traversal. A more detailed description of this type of attack is presented in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.2 SQL Injection
Proper utilization of a data store is beneﬁcial for both eﬃciency and organziation in the devel-
opment of any application and web applications are no exception. An SQL injection attack targets
vulnerable data access code [266]. A web application that transposes user supplied data into an SQL
query is susceptible if this data has not been sanitized due to every SQL implementations lack of
distinction between the control and data planes [57, 48]. Thus, an attacker would send SQL input,
executed for example by inserting a meta-character that alters an intended query or inserts a new
query into the application [266, 57]. Eﬀective attacks instantiated by attackers are performed in
order to modify the database, disclose or destroy critical information, tamper existing data, exe-
cute external operating system commands, along with a variety of other outcomes. The following
examples are a sample of the regular expressions we deploy in our tool to detect SQL injection
attempts.
The demonstration of scenarios in which an attacker utilizes SQL injections are conveyed in Figure
6. It also outlines preliminary detection of SQL vulnerability interactions performed before an actual
attack request.
Detect Conditional SQL Injections

















































































































































































































































Possible Detected Attack String:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ’’ having 1=1--
Description:
A conditional SQL injection relies on the insertion of an SQL statement that includes speciﬁc
keywords such as like and having. In Regex41, the group (?:having\s+[\d\w\-"]+\s*[(=<>~])
attempts to match the keyword having in combination with a variable amount of whitespace, possi-
bly a number which is followed by an equal sign =. = follows. This results in the sub-string having
1= to match. The above attack statement is equivalent a scenario where a username ’ having
1=1-- is fed to the statement:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ’x’ and password = ’y’
This attack causes the database to return an error message similar to the following [360]:
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers error ’80040e14’
[Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL Server]Column ’users.ID’ is
invalid in the select list because it is not contained in an aggregate
function and there is no GROUP BY clause.
As shown the error discloses the relevant table name users and its ﬁrst column name ID. Lever-
aging an attack such as this as further input into future attack attempts as indicated in [360], an
attacker can determine the entire tabular structure. The column names from the users table may
correspond to valid usernames this attack. If so, an attack of this type will disclose information vital
to a subsequent attack capable of modifying data within the table.
4.3.3 Operating System Command Injection
Through the use of a target systems dependancies such as speciﬁc languages or services, an attacker
may instigate the execution of operating system level commands. Upon successful injection, speciﬁed
commands will run with the same permissions as the user object running the injection entry point
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[14]. Using previous knowledge of a target operating system enables an attacker to specify access
to a path directly through injection. This ﬁrst sample regular expression enables our tool to detect
the path traversal to complete an attack that speciﬁcally targets an operating system executable or
directory.
The following methods of attack that are described demonstrate the capability of our forensic log
tool to detect two forms of operating system command injections. Both of these examples perform
directory traversals. Operating system command injection scenarios, and probing methods of their
detection are described within Figure 7.
Detects Speciﬁc Directory and Path Traversal




Possible Detected Attack String:
http://www.example.com/doc/..%5c../Windows/System32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:\
Description:
The Regular Expression Regex11 detects speciﬁc path traversal attacks which target a number of
both critical and non-critical system directories. As an example, this URL request is used to traverse
directories for the purposes of command execution. Upon successful submission to the server, an
attacker procures the full listing of ﬁles located in the root directory C:\. It launches the cmd.exe
command shell and executes the command dir c:\ in the shell. The %5c represents the ASCII
escape code for the backslash character \. Due to the many permutations of this attack, another
similar example might include a well-known directory typically vulnerable to the traversal attack;
the scripts directory of IIS.
Directory Traversal
Directory traversal is performed through the injection of an operating system command. Since it is


















































































































Figure 7: Operating System Command Injection Scenarios [360]
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than access to system commands, it was placed under this individual category. Simple traversal
enables an attacker to map out the structure of the intended target with respect to applications.
It may expose those applications that are installed or running, as well as structural information,
conﬁgurations, and data ﬁles. The preceeding example detected system-speciﬁc directories, whereas
the following regular expression example can detect more generalized directory traversal attacks.
Detects Basic Directory Traversal
Regular Expression String (Regex10):
(?:(?:\/|\\)?\.+(\/|\\)(?:\.+)?)|(?:\w+\.exe\??\s)|(?:;\s*\w+\s*\/
[\w*-]+\/)|(?:\d\.\dx\|)|(?:%(?:c0\.|af\.|5c\.))|(?:\/(?:%2e){2})
Possible Detected Attack String:
../../../../../Windows/system.ini
Description:
Regex10 is used to detect directory traversal attacks. Examples of other matched sub-strings
are, /../.. and /../. Within this regular expression, the above attack string is captured by the
grouping (?:(?:\/|\\)?\.+(\/|\\)(?:\.+)?). The Table 13 below describes the process of the
regular expression match for this grouping:
Table 13: Regular Expression Matching for Regex10
Step Regex Input Description
1 (?:\/|\\)? Optional pattern, no match is found
2 \.+ .. Matching the two dots
3 (\/|\\) / Matching the “/” symbol
4 (?:\.+)? .. Matching two dots
The directory traversal exploit utilizes the HTTP protocol for delivery and it enables the access
of restricted directories and the execution of external commands outside of a target web server’s
root directory. The only tools required by an attacker in order to perform this exploit is a method
of sending HTTP requests, such as a web browser, and the relative knowledge to determine the
location of pertinant ﬁles and directories on the system applicable to the desired attack outcome.
The following URL demonstrates one version of this exploit:
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http://www.example.com/example.asp?display=userpage.html
Using this URL to access the web application, the browser requests the dynamic page named
example.asp from the server. This request also sends the parameter display, which has the value
set to userpage.html. Upon recieving this request, the server’s dynamic page, the example.asp
page retrieves the indicated ﬁle userpage.html from the server’s ﬁle system. The retrieved page is
then rendered and sent back to the requester’s browser for display. For this case, a malicious user
assumes that example.asp can retrieve any ﬁle from the target ﬁle system and attempts to send a
crafted URL such as this one:
http://www.example.com/example.asp?display=../../../../../Windows/system.ini
During the execution of a successful exploit, requesting the above URL causes the dynamic page
to retrieve the ﬁle system.ini from the ﬁle system and render it back for the user. However, to a
vulnerable application running as a priveledged user, an attacker is not limited to speciﬁc directories
and could succeed in traversing multiple directory tree levels in order to ﬁnd any desired ﬁle. For
example a target might include the /Windows, /System or /SYSTEM32 folders on the server.
4.3.4 Local or Remote File Inclusion
An exploit that uses or prevents the use of a library ﬁle or separate executable ﬁle from the
execution of code can be performed against certain web applications. One example of this could
include a scenario in which an intruder forces the web server to execute malicious code contained
within a ﬁle by ﬁrst injecting directive information to the application, which executes code by
command injection to include the previously uploaded or remotely hosted code [10]. Being very
prevalent on the Internet, the PHP language is inherently vulnerable to this type of attack as it is
capable of pulling in a local ﬁle and running it from a remote command [335]. As a proof of concept,
we provide in the following two examples of attack detection. The ﬁrst one shows the inclusion
of the passwd ﬁle on a Unix based system through the PHP attack vector. The second example
shows an attempted exploit through the firefoxurl attack vector. The Figure 7 describes local and
remote ﬁle inclusion vulnerabilities. It also depicts typical actions made by an attacker to determine
eﬀective exploitational avenues.







































































































































































Figure 8: Local or Remote File Inclusion Scenarios [360]
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Regular Expression String (Regex12):
(?:etc\/\W*passwd)




Generally, most inclusion attempts will not include a data ﬁle such as the passwd ﬁle. Instead,
code execution that includes local ﬁles causes inﬁntely more nefarious and devastating eﬀects upon
an intended target. This attack string will be caught by Regex12, due to the fact that it contains
the pattern etc/passwd This attack is diﬃcult to detect due to the naming of a target ﬁle can be
one of many default ﬁles, or a name that an attacker has contrived itself. An additional regular
expression could be developed that checks for ﬁle inclusion where the path traversed terminates in
the /lib section on a Unix system or the default *.dll folder on a Windows system. The inclusion
attempt is often used in conjunction with a path traversal technique where one ﬁle uploaded by
the ﬁrst exploit and the second utilizes knowledge of that ﬁle and the location of executable code
to achieve a malicious goal. The URL path traversal exhibits an attacker’s ability to access more
sensitive areas of the ﬁle system such as retrieving the contents of the passwd ﬁle on a Unix system.
Detects firefoxurl:// Injections, Cache Poisoning and Local File Inclusion or Execution
Regular Expression String (Regex28):
(?:firefoxurl:\w+\|)|(?:(?:file|res|telnet|nntp|news|mailto|
chrome)\s*:\s*[%&#xu\/]+)|(wyciwyg|firefoxurl\s*:\s*\/\s*\/)
Possible Detected Attack String:
<iframe src=’firefoxurl://example.com" -chrome "javascript:alert(0)’></iframe>
Description:
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The (wyciwyg|firefoxurl\s*:\s*\/\s*\/) section from Regex28 speciﬁes the grouping that
captures the attack string. It is deﬁned by searching for the appearance of the keyword
firefoxurl:// and allows some spaces between symbols.
The firefoxurl:// vulnerability is made capable through an input validation ﬂaw between IE
and Mozilla Firefox. This security hole impacts users who have both browsers installed on their
machine. Internet Explorer enables a user to specify arbitrary arguments to the process responsible
for handling URL protocols. Upon installation on the Windows operating system, the program
registers a URL protocol handler called FirefoxURL. The deﬁnitive entry location in the registry
table is shown here:
[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\FirefoxURL\shell\open\command\@]
A sample key entry is included as follows:
C:\\PROGRA~1\\MOZILL~2\\FIREFOX.EXE -url "%1" -requestPending
When IE accepts a firefoxurl:// styled link, it uses the above command to invoke Firefox, and
renders the request using the associated URL of the following format:
FirefoxURL://address" -argument "script starts here
In our attack example, the firefoxurl is actually included in the iframe tag. More information
about this type of attack could be found at [276, 248].
4.4 Cross Site Request Forgery
As outlined by the experts from the OWASP within the “Top 10 Application Security Risks of
2011” document [301], coming in at number ﬁve, are CSRF attacks. The attack itself exploits the
target websites trust of a particular authenticated user. An attacker inserts and executes malicious
requests from the perspective of a trusted authenticated user [329]. In more complex versions of
this attack, the actions performed are completed in an automated fashion on the behalf of the
validated user [302]. On the server side, the request from the victim appears legitimate. Therefore
the vulnerable application responds with the requested data in a manner appropriate to a normally
authenticated user. To check for this vulnerability on a web application, an investigator must
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validate if the parameters to any of the requests may be predetermined [360]. The following example
demonstrates our forensic log tool to detect CSRF attempts based on URL, name or referrer payloads
and cross domain requests mads in an attempt to retrieve JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [124]
data.
Figure 9 demonstrates scenarios where an attacker would employ CSRFs that attain given results.








































































































Figure 9: Cross Site Request Forgery Scenarios [360]
4.4.1 Detects URL-, Name-, JSON, and Referrer-Contained Payloads




Possible Detected Attack String:
<META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0;url=javascript:alert(’XSS’);">
Description:
This attack attempt borrowed from [334, 391], is detected by the grouping (?:;\W*url\s*=) in
Regex4. To provide an explanation of why this occurs, this group will match any string which
contains a “;” followed by an indeterminate number of non-word characters, along with the keyword
url=. It is important to note here that the match will still succeed if there exists an arbitrary number
of whitespaces before the equal sign.
<Meta> is a tag used in both HTML/XHTML and usually resides in the head section of the page
[307, 322]. The only operational dierence in usage of the tag between the languages is that the tag
needs to be closed in XHTML, but not in HTML even though it provides similar functionality in both
languages. In speciﬁc cases, this vulnerability may arise due to the fact that the tag is not closed.
The <Meta> tag provides the deﬁnition of metadata regarding the current HTML document. Its
content is not present on a rendering of the particular web page, but remains accessible for parsing.
Typically this tag, speciﬁes the page description including keywords, author of the document, and
last modiﬁed time. This tag can be used to tell the browser when to display or reload a particular
page or to deﬁne keywords for a search engine.
Among Meta tag attributes relevant to this attack is the http-equiv attribute, the keyword
refresh, and the content attribute. The http-equiv attribute provides an HTTP header for
the information in the content attribute. The keyword refresh indicates that the current page
should be reloaded periodically. Finally, the content attribute could have a value “x” specifying
the refreshing interval in seconds.
During an attack, should the content value be set to content="5;url=http://example.com/",
the current page will be automatically redirected to the speciﬁed location. Furthermore, if the
content attribute is set to 0;url=javascript:alert(’XSS’);, the script is executed in the browser
upon rendering.
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This particular <Meta> tag vulnerability applies to the browsers Firefox and Chrome. According
to Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory (MFSA) 2009-22 [95], Mozilla has apparantly attempted
to patch this vulnerability in Firefox. Currently the vulnerability allows refresh header to redirect
to JS URIs. A way to bypass this redirection protection in Firefox is given in [285]. As such the
payload of a successful attack script is encrypted using base64 [230] code as follows:
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=data:text/html;base64,
PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydChkb2N1bWVudC5jb29raWUpPC9zY3JpcHQ+">
When decoded into plaintext, the script appears as the following:
<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
As with other injection techniques any bits of script code can potentially become embedded in
the <Meta> tag for a variety of exploitational purposes.
4.5 Cross Site Scripting
Every application that is vulnerable to XSS is vulnerable to CSRF inherently, since once any code
block can be executed, any other maliciously inserted web page may be automatically loaded [190].
XSS attacks are not limited to just HTML and JS. They encompasses a very broad deﬁnition of web
application vulnerabilities since they represent an invaluable tool within a individuals aresenal that
procures a diverse spectrum of outcomes. Thus, our current implementation of the log analysis tool
does not encompass all of the techniques that can be employed to procure every possible XSS exploit.
With the power and utility of the scripting language used, the numerous possible outcomes vary
greatly and are dependant on the type of XSS that application is susceptible to. This attack occurs
at any point when an attacker forces a web site to render malicious code to be executed in a user’s
web browser [190]. The intended victim is the end user; it does not attack the server directly but uses
the site only as the conduit for the attack [190]. The next six subsections include samples of attacks
and examples implemented in the tool that outline XML-based vulnerabilities, JS concatenation-
based vulnerabilities, base encoding obfuscated XSS, two HTML-based vulnerabilities, and a Visual
Basic Scripting edition (VBScript)-based [89] attack proving that other scripting languages can be
used to mount XSS attacks.
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XSS scenarios described in Figure 10 outline probing methods, and potential results of XSS
attacks.
4.5.1 XML - Javascript DOM, Properties or Methods










Matching of this attack string is presented in Table 14, some failed matching attempts in previous
regular expression steps have been omitted from this table for brevity.
Table 14: Regular Expression Matching for Regex15
Step Regex Input Description
1 [^*:\s\w,.\/?+-] ( after a few try, “(” is matched.
2 \s* - No space, successful match
3 (?<![a-z]\s) - peek behind, no letter or space found,
successful
match
4 (?<![a-z\/_@>\-\|]) - peek behind, no speciﬁed symbol
found, successful
match
5 (\s*return\s*)? - no given pattern found, successful
match
6 (?:create(?:element createElement keyword found
7 [^\w%"] ( since “(” is found in step 1, use
[^\w%"]










































































































































Figure 10: Cross Site Scripting Scenarios [360]
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In this attack, the DOM method createElement() creates a <script> tag in the webpage, and
imports scripts in the source ﬁle located at http://www.attacker.com/att.js. According to W3C
[388], the XML DOM deﬁnes a standard way for accessing and manipulating XML documents. It
presents an XML document as a tree-structure. According to the structure, web page elements can
be added to the XML document as tree nodes, thus indicated by the name of the createElement()
method. There exist a multitude of other methods that can be used to dynamically generate a
web page, some of which cause this type of vulnerability. An interested reader can glean additional
details from [107].
4.5.2 Javascript Concatenation Patterns









One method of obfuscating injected JS code is to inject the variable in pieces as a part of multiple
concatenation strings. As in this case, the malicious URL is composed of three diﬀerent strings. The
rendering engine joins these to read one string variable, and upon loading of the site, renders the
malicious URL javascript:alert(1) along with the rest of the valid data on the page. The regular
expression grouping that matches this string is (?:"\s*\+\s*"). Other methods of obfuscation are
detailed in the next example using base encoding techniques.
4.5.3 Detects JavaScript Obfuscated by Base Encoding










This attack string is shown to be a match to Regex25
1. Note that the payload of this at-
tack has been encoded in order to obfuscate desired code. In plain text, this script translates
to javascript:alert(’XSS’).
4.5.4 Detects HTML Breaking Injection
Regular Expression String (Regex1):
(?:"[^"]*[^-]?>)|(?:[^\w\s]\s*\/>)|(?:>")





This regular expression matches entries that include any string comprised of any combination of
speciﬁed symbols with additional whitespace. Applications vulnerable to XSS attacks might return
this input string directly to the user browser, as an example, it might be in the form of an error
message. If any of these strings contains one or more injected scripts originating from an attacker,
they will be executed by the client browser. Sometimes, HTML tolerates extra whitespaces in the
1http://demo.php-ids.org/
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tag as they are automatically truncated. It is for this reason that any number of whitespaces are
considered in the expression string.
This input contains the script <script>alert("xss");</script>, which causes the users browser
to display a message box with the word “xss” on it. It is detected by the ﬁrst non-capturing group
(?:"[^"]*[^-]?>) of this Regex. The step-by-step matching process for this regular expression is
presented in Table 152:
Table 15: Regular Expression Matching For Regex1
Step Regex Input Description
1 " " Starting from the ﬁrst symbol " in the input string
2 [^"]* xss Matching subsequent symbols
3 [^-]? " Matching subsequent symbol
4 > ) Matching failed at )
5 " " Starting again from the second symbol "
6 [^"]*[^-]? );</script Matching subsequent symbols
7 > > Matching the last symbol, succeed
Analogously, instead of the alert() function, other malicious code can be injected as the payload
for error messages. These scripts are capable of requesting vital information such as a session id from
the user’s browser. Generally, the more sensitive information is the most sought after by attackers
to increasingly escalate the depth of an attack persuant to the desired outcome of the malicious
intervention.
4.5.5 Attribute Breaking Injections




Possible Detected Attack String:
var a="</script><script> alert(’XSS !’);</script><script>";
Description:
2Since the attack string matching process works exact the same for each expression in our knowledgebase, here we
will not repeat this step-by-step illustration for other expressions.
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This regular expression detects attribute breaking attacks under the condition that certain user
request data with source URL contains the above string. For instance, consider this situation where
an attacker directs a victim to a webpage embedded with a segment of code:
...
<script>




Once this page is displayed by the victim’s browser, it executes the embedded malicious script.
As was the case with Regex1, an attacker attains full access to the web application under the guise
of the authorized user.
4.5.6 VBScript Injection
Regular Expression String (Regex69):
(?:(?:msgbox|eval)\s*\+|(?:language\s*=\*vbscript))
Possible Detected Attack String:
<img src=1 language=vbscript onerror=msgbox+1>
Description:
This attack is captured by the ﬁrst regular expression grouping speciﬁed by
(?:msgbox|eval)\s*\+. It ﬁrst looks for the keyword msgbox then detects a random number of
whitespace characters, followed by the “+” sign. As a result, the ﬁnal captured string appears as
msgbox+.
VBScript is a Microsoft scripting language used as the default scripting language for ASP. Client-
-side VBScript only works in IE [107]. When a VBScript is inserted into an HTML document, the
browser reads the HTML and executes the VBScript either immediately, or upon reciept of another
queued event or user action.
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The MsgBox function in the example displays a message box with the choice of two buttons, then
waits for the user to click a button, and returns a value that indicates which button the user clicked.
As this is just an innocuous example, other more malicious VBScript code could be injected instead
by an attacker if the concerned web application is vulnerable to this attack vector.
In this attack, the VBScript is injected in the img tag, using the src attribute, but could very
well be injected in other similarly oriented tags. Additional details may be perused at [348, 107].
4.6 Denial of Service
A DoS attack is classiﬁed by the outcome of a malicious action. Not all DoS attacks are generated
through web application vulnerabilities, as this problem describes potential issues from an overall
viewpoint of a networked system. When a successful DoS attack has commenced, the victim machine
is forced to suspend service to legitimate users examples of which could be the result of the service
being inundated with messages, the service being speciﬁcally shutdown or made unreachable through
other avenues of attack [270]. Within this section two examples are provided as two varied methods
of attack through web application vulnerabilities, one consisting of a SQL attack string, and the
other consisting of an XSS attack string that both force a DoS against a target web application.
4.6.1 Detects MySQL Charset Switch and MSSQL DoS
Regular Expression String (Regex52):
(?:alter\s*\w+.*character\s+set\s+\w+)|(";\s*waitfor\s+time\s+")|
(?:";.*:\s*goto)
Possible Detected Attack String:
ALTER TABLE ’users’ CHANGE ’password’ ’password’ VARCHAR(255)
CHARACTER SET gbk COLLATE gbk_chinese_ci NOT NULL
Description:
According to Regex52, the attack detection process is described in Table 16:
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Table 16: Regular Expression Matching for Regex52
Step Regex Input Description
1 alter\s* ALTER Symbol sequence “ALTER”
2 \w+ TABLE Keyword “TABLE”
3 .* ‘users‘ Matching any character
4 .* CHANGE Matching any character
5 .* ‘password‘ Matching any character
6 .* ‘password‘ Matching any character
7 .* VARCHAR(255) Matching any character
8 character\s+ CHARACTER Keyword “CHARACTER ”detected
9 set\s+ SET Keyword “SET ” detected
10 \w+ gbk Keyword “gbk” detected
Altering the character set of a table or an individual column enables an attacker to evade certain
functionality used by the database process to validate user input. For example, one PHP function
vulnerable to multi-byte encoding is addslashes. A prerequisite for this attack speciﬁes that the
database must use a multi-byte charset, such as GBK Chinese [1] or BIG 5 [283]. The vulnerability
is instantiated due to the fact that after modiﬁcation of the charset, the PHP escaping facility is
not aware of this modiﬁcation. In fact, the validation function, which for our example was the
mysql real escape string(), still works on the basis of the default charset, which is by default
the latin1.
Within the GBK character set, the character 0xbf27 is not a valid multi-byte character, but
0xbf5c is. Interpreted as single-byte characters, 0xbf27 is 0xbf (>) followed by 0x27 (’), and 0xbf5c
is 0xbf (>) followed by 0x5c (\).
In real attack scenarios since it assumes that if an attacker attempts to set up an SQL injection
against a MySQL database, which has single quotes escaped with a backslash, the regular avenues
of attack fail. Unlike the scenario in which the database uses addslashes(), where the attacker
would replace the injected character with 0xbf27. This ensures that addslashes() modiﬁes the
injected data to become 0xbf5c27, a valid multi-byte character followed by a single quote. Verily,
the injection of a single quote is successful due to escaping mechanisms remaining maintained. This
is applicable due to the fact that 0xbf5c is interpreted as a single character, not two.
4.6.2 Detects Cross-Site Scripting Denial of Service





Possible Detected Attack String:
xyz onerror=alert(1);
Description:
The sub-string onerror=alert in this attack scenario is caught by the following regular expression
grouping as indicated in Table 17:
(?:(?:^|\W)on\w+\s*=[\w\W]*(?:on\w+|alert|eval|print|confirm|prompt))
Table 17: Regular Expression Matching for Regex65
Step Regex Input Description
1 (?:^|\W) space Space character
2 on\w+\s* onerror Keyword onerror
3 =[\w\W]* = Symbol =
4 alert alert Keyword alert
This attack example explained in [53] shows that the code is injected between two script tags and
ﬁres an alert when executed. The onerror event is triggered when an error occurs during the loading
of a document or an image. A typical use case of this event is: onerror="SomeJavaScriptCode" In
the following example, an alert box will be displayed if an error occurs when loading an image:
<img src="image.gif" onerror="alert(’The image could not be loaded.’)">
4.7 Electronic Mail Spam
Spam has evolved from a message that originated from the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC)
[111] computer company as an annoucement of a version of their product over the ancient Advanced
Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) [331] system in 1978 [368] to mass advertisements
of deceptive, fraudulent or illegal material such as child pornography [310]. One method that changes
the origin of unsolicited bulk electronic messages may be the product of an attacker’s malicious action
against a web application. Canada’s Bill C-28 [286] speciﬁes conditions upon which an electronic
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message is classiﬁed into this category, and more importantly prohibits the initiation of such a
communication. The following sample from our tool includes a regular expression that detects mail
header injections against vulnerable web applications.
4.7.1 Detect Common Mail Header Injection






The attack example that can be detected by our regular expression is presented in detail at [240].
This reference also provides an excellent conceptual description of email header injection. Of the
multitude of methods employed to send anonymous emails, exploitational outcomes that abuse
such services provide the ability of mass electronic messaging or to spoof the identity and origin
of the person utilizing the service. Implementations that provide anonymous mailing services are
usually accessed through a web mail form, which executes the mail() function to generate electronic
messages whose headers specify their origin as IP of the server providing the service. In this way
the web application’s mailing form acts as an SMTP proxy. It is common to specify a mail form
that enables a potential user to control the contents of the subject, message, and the sender’s email
address ﬁelds. This can be implemented in the following way:
Function usage: mail([RECIPIENT],[SUBJECT],[MESSAGE],[EXTRAHEADERS],
[EXTRAPARAMS]); (mail())
Generally, extra parameters to the mail function are not supplied by the user, and the attack
does not focus on these parameters, so these are excluded. However another avenue of attack may
be present should the user be able to specify this ﬁeld. Most webmasters hardcode the recipient’s
email address into the contact form of their web application. This is done in an attempt to eliminate
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this method of script exploitation. Unfortunately, this does not resolve the issue and a successful
method of attack may be attempted when the function is instantiated as such:
<?php mail("rickastley@nevrgunna.xxx","A KABOOM","There was supposed to be
an earth shattering KABOOM!\n \n That creature has stolen the space
modulator!!","From: marvinthemartian@mars.xxx\n"); ?>




There was supposed to be an earth shattering KABOOM!
That creature has stolen the space modulator!!
Additional ﬁelds that can be speciﬁed in the mail headers are outlined in RFC 822 [104], of which
examples include the Carbon Copy (CC) and the Blind Carbon Copy (BCC) ﬁelds. As speciﬁed in
RFC 822, you must add a line feed for every header. The LF character has a hexadecimal value of













This shows that the mail headers were injected successfully, despite the fact that the only header
value to be speciﬁed by the user from the HTML form is From:. This results in an email that is
sent to three people of our choosing:
rickastley@nevrgunna.xxx, somebloke@grrrr.xxx, and someotherbloke@oooops.xxx.
In this example, both CC and BCC headers have been used to perform the injection. It would
also have been possible to perform the injection by overloading the destination To header. In this
case, the last value is added (as in the CC and BCC ﬁelds) to the hardcoded email address of the
webmaster.
It is worth noting that the above Regex63 does not detect this attack vector according to
[01][\db-ce-f]. This is because it captures any hexadecimal value start with digit 0 or 1, except
ones end with a or d. The regular expression renders the value 0x0A to be safe as when specifying
header information in an email, the end of each section terminates upon recognition of the LF
character.
4.8 Conclusion
The subject of forensic log analysis includes many disparate parts. From the viewpoint of an
intruder, the best way to break in is generally the front door. The front door to most servers is
loosely deﬁned as the port assigned to serve a web page as access to this resource is designed and
maintained to be readily available for the purposes of communication. The matches that are detected
in a log ﬁle provided for analysis outline a source of potential areas that should be investigated
further. Attackers may probe other areas of the server for potential avenues of attack. With the
discovery of potential attacks in this manner, perhaps similar eﬀorts may procure additional results
when comparing other data stores. Within this chapter, we aimed to provide examples of attacks,
regular expressions designed to detect those attacks, and descriptions of how these matches are made
by our forensic log analysis program. The next chapter we provide a description of our tool that we
implemented in order to detect attack using regular expressions.
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Chapter 5
Forensic Log Analysis Tool
This chapter details the design and implementation of our forensic log analysis and attack detection
application. Attack detection is important in forensic perspective in order to procure an accurate
time line. According to such a time line a successful attack can signal either the inception of active
participation on behalf of a malicious force or a signiﬁcant moment within a compounding scenario
where an attempt has been made order to procure one of many ever escalating goals. This chapter
includes an introduction to our tool with testaments to the tool’s purpose and scope. We also include
a description outlining considerations of the design and applicable project constraints. Then, we
provide an outline of our method of implementation and a segment on the usability of our tool. The
contributions of our tool provide advantages to a forensic investigator. In conclusion, an additional
goal was discovered during the research of our tool. This goal shows that our implementation
provides an initial design that forms the basis for additional modules. It is hoped that in the future
a more encompassing application proving valuable to a forensic investigator can be implemented
utilizing our methodology.
5.1 Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this project is to engineer a tool capable of forensically analyzing log ﬁles. During
the development of this tool, the discovery of the key components vital to a forensic log analysis tool
came to light. Beneﬁcial to a forensic investigator are the ability to derive meanings from multiple
events, the generation of a comprehensive timeline of events, the modiﬁcation of existing or the
ability to instantiate additional methods of deﬁning relevant events, and the formatting of output
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representing this data in a manner that is easily read and understood, among others. Extending
this tool to enable the import of a variety of log ﬁle types to our application would increase the
scope and require further investigation into methods of relational mapping between varying types.
Initially, a correlation option remains an invaluable and necessary component to the original design
of the tool in order to generate meanings from seemingly innocuous but related events. The broad
scope of an encompassing forensic tool forces us as designers to focus speciﬁcally on one particular
avenue of log ﬁle and type of attack. Our tool is limited to those vectors of attack found within
AWS access log ﬁles, yet still reveals developmental details that can be expanded upon in future
applications.
5.2 Design and Implementation
During the design phase several underlying principles were maintained. The ﬁrst of which required
that the tool must be easily adopted by end users. Thus, the user interface must maintain an
intuitive design that follows usability principles. During an investigation, both expert witnesses or
forensic investigators, who may be end users of our forensic tool, work within time constraints for
each individual case. Therefore to perform the analysis the program must maintain a high-level of
eﬃciency. Due to the limited scope, our tool is designed in a way that makes it both modular, which
enables code reuse, and extensible in the sense that it maintains the ability to remould, repurpose
or add match deﬁnitions in the future. Being written in Java, enables our tool to reach the widest
user audience. This advantage of portability enables our tool to run on multiple platforms. Other
forensic considerations we propose ensure applicability, integrity, and comprehensive reporting.
The implementation of our log analysis tool comply with the aforementioned design constraints.
Indeed, the GUI design conforms to general guidelines [317] in order to associate familiarity with
other applications. Eﬃciency is calculated as a measure of both organization and computational cost
of the operations peformed within the application. Our method of organization includes employing
an SQL database to store the regular expressions collection. This enables eﬀective retrival of Regexs
and the option to catalogue information about each one as they are added to the application.
In order deploy the database, the ﬁrst step must consist of parsing log ﬁle events. The use of the
database facilitates eﬀective selection and recall of data for correlation. The use of Regexs in our tool
facilitates two of the design principles stated previously. In fact, they provide a low computational
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cost solution to ﬁnd matches and the ability for the tool to remain conﬁgurable to those end users
ﬂuent in representing similar expressions. The Regex component comprises the central core of
our program. It is the part of code that directly interacts with suspicious events recorded within
analyzed log ﬁles. The eﬀectiveness of attack detection within our application completely relies
on the Regex knowledge base that is deployed. Finally, the choice of developing our application
in the Java programming language ensures our tools modularity and its ability to run on multiple
platforms. The application consists of the following ﬁve separate components whose purposes are
log ﬁle processing, Regex processing, connecting to the database, attack detection, and ﬁnally the






























Figure 11: Program Flowchart
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5.3 User Documentation
Web application security is a burgeoning subject of research within both the business and academic
sectors concerned with cyber security. The development of methods to procure forensic trails which
include signiﬁcant events delves into every major network realm. The ability of our application
to perform forensic log analysis on the AWS log ﬁles in the detection of web application attacks
furthers the understanding and signiﬁcance of these types of events, and how they relate to the attack
scenarios or incident’s timeline development. The functionality of the components that comprise our
tool integrate in a synergistic manner to eﬀectively and eﬃciently accomplish the requirements of its
design. These functionalities include a user interface, interaction with a backend database, and the
ability to parse, process and extract meaningful event data from target log ﬁles. Other than the base
foundation for this application, our tool incorporates functionality which enables extensions of itself
and encourages the development of fresh or the enhancement of existing attack deﬁnitions. This
section is meant to incite understanding and incorporate a users perspective of how to eﬀectively
employ our application as a forensics log analysis tool. To explore how an end user navigates
our application, we direct attention to four areas, which include environmental requirements for
operation in Section 5.3.1, steps that prepare the tool to perform the analysis of a particular log
ﬁle in Section 5.3.2, an outline for the deﬁnition of matching criteria in Section 5.3.3, and how to
complete an execution for match detection in Section 5.3.4.
5.3.1 Operating Environment
Outlined below are the necessary prerequisites that must be provided in order to facilitate an
environment appropriate to the functioning of our tool. We used the Java programming language in
order to develop our forensic log analysis tool. Our implementation requires access to a database to
retrieve regular expressions. During the testing and debugging phase, and now for demonstrational
purposes, a MySQL 5.1 implementation is in use. This does not restrict end users from choosing
their own SQL server instantiation, as our code functions independently from the genre of SQL
server provided to it. That being said, our implementation requires that some type of SQL service
be provided on the local machine our application is executed on. It is this service that is used to
hold the Regex match deﬁntions and the input log ﬁles.
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Before launching our program, it is necessary that the SQL implementation is preconﬁgured to
include a user account with the identiﬁer of “root” and password equal to “root”. Our application
uses this account for interactions with the MySQL database. During operation, a schema entitled
‘log analysis’ is created to enable the storage of new tables, populate these tables with data and
conduct operations on that data. Other preconﬁguration necessary for our program to function
correctly is the existence of several tables within the schema log analysis. The three table types
include one that provides storage for Regexs, one that details case information, and the last type
stores the log ﬁle event data.
The regexpr table is used for the storage of both predeﬁned and user deﬁned Regexs that corre-
spond to a number of attack types. There could be one or more Regexs that represents the same
method of attack. These Regexs can be categorized into two subsets, “Access” and “Error”, which
are applied to scan access log ﬁles and error log ﬁles, respectively. Event entry formats vary
from one type of log ﬁle to the next. AWS access and error log ﬁles can sometimes utilize the same
set of Regexs for particular attack scenarios. Those Regexs that cannot be applied to both ﬁle types
are ﬂagged within the database and ﬁltered where the log ﬁle type is speciﬁed.
The cases table is used to store metadata information regarding target log ﬁles provided by the
user as input. Every entry in this table represents a log ﬁle under investigation, and links and
records the table name containing the stored content of this ﬁle. This removes unnecessary ﬁle I/O
operations for those cases that analyze very large ﬁles that require repeated analysis.
The last type of table included within the schema are those labeled with the name of the imported
log ﬁles. Each table of this kind is generated upon importation of the corresponding log ﬁle into
the database. This data is stored until deletion is speciﬁed by the user. Each entry in this table
corresponds and maintains the data of an event within the log ﬁle.
5.3.2 Analysis Preparation
Methods in accordance with the preliminary stages of the execution of this tool are described
herein. Here we include a brief description of application launch, and describe how to import either
AWS access or error log ﬁles into the database. After initialization, the main interface of our tool
presents a menu bar containing the “Options” menu. The “Options” menu presents two possible
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choices: “New Case” menu item and “Existing Case” menu item. In order to add a new case to the
database, the end user has to click on “Options - >New Case”. This starts a wizard dialog that
guides the end user through the diﬀerent steps of the pre-analysis process. As a ﬁrst step, the user
has to select the type of ﬁle to be subjected to the analysis, which could be either an access log
ﬁle or an error log ﬁle. Each of these type of ﬁles triggers a speciﬁc processing path. Then, using
the “Open File” dialog, the user selects the actual ﬁle to be imported into the database for analysis.
After the ﬁle is selected, the ﬁlename and directory location are output to the “Log ﬁle:” and “DIR:”
ﬁelds for conﬁrmation (Fig. 12). Importation of the selected log ﬁle proceeds by clicking the button
labelled “Next” to conﬁrm the selection.
Figure 12: Log Selection
Following the log ﬁle type declaration, program ﬂow incites the user to click on the “Open” button
which enables selection of the target log ﬁle. The window that provides access to the ﬁle system is
is depicted in Figure 12.
In the next dialog shown in Fig. 13, the selected log ﬁle is imported into the database upon the
click of the “Create new entry” button and its contents is displayed in the table on the right hand
side of the window. Users can view the progress of the import operation as completion notiﬁcation
is made through the use of a progress bar at the bottom of the dialog. Once imported, the user can
proceed to the next window in order to scan this ﬁle upon a click of the “Finish” button. At this
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step, the user is given the option to import another ﬁle or modify the current target ﬁle by clicking
the “Back” button.
Figure 13: Log File Import
Upon clicking on the “Finish” button, the main interface is reloaded. At this point the user
has the option to continue to scan imported log ﬁles or to include additional Regexs by choosing
“Options → Existing Case”. Related operability issues are discussed within the next two in the
following sections.
5.3.3 Match Deﬁnition
In this section, we guide the end user in the process of modifying the Regexs. Enriching and
extending our knowledge base to identify new attacks assists end users in speciﬁc search terms and
providing a faster method to perform repetative searches. The user interface of the modiﬁcation
dialog we showcase in Figure 14.
On the left hand side of this window resides a view of the Case table. This table contains metadata
for all imported log ﬁles. Each row entry details the log ﬁle type (“case type”) and ﬁle name (“table
name”) for imported log ﬁles. For each imported ﬁle, the ﬁlename is extracted and used to name
the corresponding table within the SQL schema. It is this table that stores the entire content from
the log ﬁle. For each log ﬁle case, an index number as indicated in the “case number” column is
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assigned. The user can not specify this value as it provides sequential numbers to those log ﬁles
which are imported to tables. This panel also provides the capability for the user to delete unneeded
imported log ﬁles from database using the “ Delete Row(Case)” button.
Figure 14: Regular Expression Selection, Scanning, and Results
In the center of the window, the content of the regular expression table, namely regexpr, is
rendered. Each corresponding row entry includes an identiﬁer, the type of attack string matched,
the type of log ﬁle the Regex applies to and the Regex itself. The ﬁrst column, “RegEx Number”
represents an automatically assigned unique index generated for each Regex. The second column
enables the end user to classify the type of attack that the corresponding Regex can match as
illustrated in Figure 15. Certain types of attack have multiple avenues or payloads, and thus are
interpreted into diﬀerent Regexs. The unique name and number assists with classiﬁcation and
identiﬁcation. The third column speciﬁes the type of log ﬁle the Regex can be paired with for
analysis purposes. Possible column values include “ACCESS”, “ERROR” or “ACCESS/ERROR”.
The last selection “ACCESS/ERROR” is chosen if the expression is applicable for use in the analysis
of either log ﬁle type. The fourth column stores the Regex employed to scan imported log ﬁles in
order to perform attack detection analysis. Each of them was composed by extracting a set of features
of an attack, which are log ﬁle events. The Figure. 16 provides a summary view of the available
Regexs. Columns ﬁve and six contain values which specify respectively two optional conditions to
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be upheld during the analysis. The ﬁrst contains a boolean value that, when set to “True”, ignores
letter case. The second, when set to “True”, speciﬁes ignorance of whitespaces within a matching
event. Finally, the last column in this table provides a designated space for the user to add comments
or descriptions for a speciﬁc Regex contained within the table.
Figure 15: The Regular Expression Table I
Two buttons on this panel, “ Add row(RegEx)” and “ Delete row(RegEx)”, are used to add or
remove Regex entries from the database, respectively. When clicking on the “ Add row(RegEx)”
button, the expression in the ﬁrst editable row of this table is added to the analysis list. In order
to retain the data entered, the user must conﬁrm that all ﬁelds in this row, other than the index
key, are speciﬁed before pressing this button. Otherwise the program determines it is an incomplete
record and the data is not written to the table.
When the user clicks the “ Delete row(RegEx)” button, the data corresponding to the selected
row is purged from the database.
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Figure 16: The Regular Expression Table II
5.3.4 Attack Detection
Our tool provides scanning capabilities against one or many types of attacks as shown in Figure
14. After the log ﬁle from the Case table is chosen, the “Scan ” option enables our tool to scan the
log ﬁle against the attack type represented by the selected Regexs. The “Scan All ” option can
be used to scan against all types of attacks available in the database to detect matches within the
target log ﬁle. Scan results are displayed in the results table. Our tool does neither load the results
into the database nor format them for a report style output. The results table includes entry data
detailing matches. The “File line Num” column gives the line number of the target ﬁle in which the
Regex matched an event. The Match ﬁeld which takes a boolean value1, describes whether the log
entry in the current line matches any attack feature deﬁned by its Regex.
For convenience and manual observation, our tool outputs the original HTTP requests in the
“Request String” column. The last column speciﬁes the attack type.
1We only display log entries that match at least one type of attack. In other words, only records have the “True”
value in the Match ﬁeld will be shown in the results table.
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5.4 Non-Functional Requirements
Within this section we outline non-functional requirements that must be speciﬁed to provide suﬃ-
cient data for relevance to an investigation when utilizing our tool for forensic analysis purposes. It is
imperative the investigator knows those applications running on the server to enable the veriﬁcation
of the analysis results given by our tool and to enable search terms for other relevant information.
Most importantly, in order to acquire an AWS access log or error log for analysis, the target ma-
chine must provide a running instance of the AWS. This will reveal other data sources or correlation
information that may be resident on a machine under investigation. Our log tool does not provide
deﬁnitive evidence of the success or failure of an attack attempt. This capability provides the in-
terested audience an area for further investigation, for our implemention at this time, success must
be determined through the use of additional analysis. According to forensic procedure, to ensure
evidentiary value the integrity of the data must be preserved. Our program does not instantiate any
ﬁle integrity processing capabilities so this must be ensured through another means. Each log ﬁle
analyzed must be provided in raw and uncompressed format for input. Due to the volatile nature of
log ﬁles, once an attacker has retained elevated priviledges, our program does not provide imaging or
integrity veriﬁcation for any changes that happen prior to analysis. Other than reading through the
log ﬁle for the purposes of importation and searching, our Regexs do not modify the ﬁles contents.
5.5 Results
As was previously stated within the design and speciﬁcations, eﬃciency and the ability to process
large ﬁle sizes are two top priorities of forensic investigators. To present an accurate description
of regular expression eﬃcency, our tool was tested with log ﬁles of varying sizes. Parsing and
importing the log ﬁle is the most time intensive task of our forensic log analysis tool. For example, a
1.1 Gigabyte (Gb) log ﬁle was imported in 124624 milliseconds (ms) on an Intel Centrino Dual Core
with 3 Gb of RAM and 6 Gb swap space. The processing time for testing a single regular expression
against the same 1.1 Gb log ﬁle was 630 ms. Comparatively, a 209.2 kilobyte (kb) sized log ﬁle took
13200 ms to import and 40 ms for the same regular expression test.
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5.6 Conclusion
In accordance with our design and speciﬁcations, we now present a tool that can assist in estab-
lishing an incident timeline. Signiﬁcant events within the incident timeline are important areas to
address during an investigation. Along with other forensic data, each originating attack matched
with a regular expression from our tool can prove malicious intent. The events generated in the
log ﬁle that match are anomalies crafted speciﬁcally for and only present in special circumstances.
With the preceeding outline of our tool’s purpose and scope, design and constraints, implementation
method and usability considerations, we aim to provide suﬃcient information for future implemen-





Present methods used to forensically analyse computer systems include tools such as Encase or the
FTK. Although they feature prominently in case proceedings such as [102] or [223] they are both
decidedly lacking in capabilities necessary to perform eﬀective log analysis. There exists a need
to engineer a forensic implementation capable of providing investigators the means to accomplish
analysis whose results are eﬃcient, and assist with reputable evidence generation. With regard
to web application forensics, signiﬁcant events recorded in the access log may be extracted that
aide in the development of an incident timeline relevant to an investigation. Issues speciﬁc to the
analysis of log ﬁles include the large size of target log ﬁles can be diﬃcult for applications to handle
eﬃciently, diﬀerent web applications may or may not provide a means to log signiﬁcant events, and
as with most other log ﬁle types events that are recorded, those recorded by web applications and
related services are cryptic in nature. It is the aim of this study to provide an implementation that
forensically analyzes web applications which provides solutions to the aforementioned issues.
6.2 Solution
The program developed in accordance with our research ﬁndings which accompanies this doc-
ument provides a legitimate web application forensic log analysis tool. Dealing with the massive
scale of events typically recorded by applications, and compounding the number of events through
comparison requires an innovative approach. Large ﬁle size and repeated access to similar data is
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made more eﬃcent through the parsing and importing of such information into a database. For
the source of our event ﬁles, some web applications provide their own logging mechanisms, however
the web service itself by default provides a logging mechanism which records signiﬁcant information
relevant to an investigation. Speciﬁcally our solution looks to the AWS access log ﬁle, as it is
this ﬁle that records every request made to the web application’s underlying web service itself. The
implementation of this tool through the use of regular expressions ensures the accuracy, eﬃciency
and relevance of the results provided to an investigator.
6.3 Contributions
One contribution of our study includes the development of a framework template which can be
expanded, easily adapted and provide the basis for future forensic log analysis implementations.
This study also details a comprehensive log tool comparision that leverages the current methods of
performing log analysis in realms outside of forensic investigations. Our most important contribu-
tion details the collection of Regexs that detect attack injections against target web applications.
These are organized into a variety of categories and descriptions are included which provide match
deﬁnitions, attack examples and attack deﬁnitions. Research and development of the necessary el-
ements a forensic log analysis tool are deﬁned by contribute to the forensic capabilities of future
applications.
6.4 Future Applications
During the course of our research several extensions that could be valuable to the development of an
encompassing forensic log analysis tool are discovered. One such extension could be added to match
same origin requests in order to timeline entire attack scenarios or group multiple related events.
Other correlation sources determined by our research which may produce interesting event data
include the output of modules such as mod session or mod usertrack which could include cookies
or dynamic URL contents. As another extension to this type of correlation, within a network
under forensic investigation, a proposed idea would be to provide not only event correlation for
individual log ﬁle types, but cross-correlation between log ﬁle types for interpretation of events
from diﬀerent sources. This relates to the idea of performing event correlation on individual data
sources ﬁrst, and then attempting to designate the inferences made to generate new interpretations.
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Other enhancement modiﬁcations include better report generation, development of new regular
expressions to detect other attack scenarios, the ability to relate web application log events to the
resulting access log events and the parsing or importation of diﬀerent log ﬁle formats into similar
modules. Invaluable to a forensic investigator would be the ability to monitor and analyze a variety
of other log ﬁles for similar events including server cache log ﬁles or indirectly non-vulnerable web
application speciﬁc log ﬁles residing on the target host. The ability to correlate log ﬁles collected
from web servers to both other log ﬁles from that machine as well as log ﬁles from other servers on
the same network can provide a more detailed and accurate timeline of events when attacks cross a
network. Future applications should explore the extension or application of the deﬁnitions employed
to ﬁnd anomalies in network traﬃc to similar log event anomalies with regards to intrusion detection,
protection systems and host integrity monitoring solutions.
6.5 Limitations
Our tool includes limitations that are set forth in this section. The ﬁrst limitation we note is
regarding the secure collection of data. This we deem beyond the scope of our parameters for the
log tool we have developed and thus have not provided this functionality. Our application provides
no assurances to the secure collection of the data that is being analyzed nor does it provide a method
to detect tampering of the log ﬁle itself before, during or after processing. The application is also
limited to only those attacks that may be performed on web applications, and restricted to those
that may be recorded within the AWS access log ﬁle. It applies only to those web servers that are
serving web applications and attacks maybe attempted yet not successful due to the fact the server
does not run the vulnerable web application applying to the particular attack that is detected.
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Appendix A
Regular Expressions for SQL
Injection
A.1 Detects MySQL Comments, Conditions, and ch(a)r In-
jections
Regular Expression String (Regex40):
(?:"\s*(?:#|--|{))|(?:\/\*!\s?\d+)|(?:ch(?:a)?r\s*\(\s*\d)|
(?:(?:(n?and|x?or|not)\s+|\|\||\&\&)\s*\w+\()
Possible Detected Attack String:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ’admin’--’ AND password = ’foo’
Description:
The ﬁrst group (?:"\s*(?:#|--|{)), matches upon recognition of one of these three distinct
patterns, "#, "--, or "{. This deﬁnition also allows for any number of spaces between quote sign
and the other symbols that succeed it.
The above attack example outlined in [360] is provided to illustrate an attack, which bypasses a
login. The attack is based upon the principle that many applications which implement a forms-based
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login function use a database to store user credentials. For validation these applications perform a
simple SQL query for each login attempt. The example command given below instructs the processor
of the database to retrieve any record with username rick and password secret. Upon encountering
such a record, the record is returned and the login process proceeds. If however, such a record does
not exist in the database, the login process fails.
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ’rick’ AND password = ’secret’
An attack that can easily bypass this simple veriﬁcation process is the scenario where the username
admin’-- is provided as input to the web application. The rendered SQL statement then becomes:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ’admin’--’ AND password = ’foo’
Since the -- denotes a comment in an SQL statement, whatever remains after the symbol sequence
-- will be regarded as such. The actual statement is then interpreted in such a way that bypasses
the password veriﬁcation altogether as long as there is a valid username which matches the input
admin. Other alternative avenues of attack that produce similar eﬀects also outlined within [360]
such as:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ’admin’
A.2 Classic SQL Injection Type 1






Possible Detected Attack String:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ’’ OR 1=1--
Description:
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Table 18: Regular Expression Matching for Regex42
Step Regex Input Description
1 ^["\\]* \-- No matched symbols found.
2 [^"]+" SELECT...username = ’ Matched sub-string
3 [\d"]+ ’ Single quote ’
4 \s* space Space “ ”
5 (?:x?or) or Keyword “or”
6 \s* space Space “ ”
7 [\w"[+&!@(),.-] 1 A digit 1
Table 18 shows how Regex42 matches this attack event. Considering the same login example as
in Regex40. Suppose that the attacker aims to discern the username of the administrator. In most
applications, the ﬁrst account in the database represents an administrative user. This is due to the
fact that normally this account is created manually and then it is employed for the generation of all
other accounts via application functionality. If the query returns the details for more than one user,
in general, applications process the ﬁrst user whose details are returned. An attacker can exploit
this type of behavior to log in as the ﬁrst user in the database by supplying the username followed
by ’ OR 1=1--. The outcome of such a successful attack returns the details of all application users
as represented within the users table due to the logical construct 1=1, which will always evaluate
to true.
A.3 Classic SQL Injection Type 2






Possible Detected Attack String:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ’\’’; DROP TABLE users; --’;
Description:
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The detection of this example is matched by (?:"\s*[^\w\s?]+\s*[^\w\s]+\s*") of this regular
expression. The strings ’\’’; and --’ within the event matches as shown in the following Table 19.
Table 19: Regular Expression Matching for Regex43
Step Regex Input Description
1 " ’ Single quote ’
2 \s*[^\w\s?]+ \ \ symbol
3 \s*[^\w\s]+ ’ ’ symbol
4 \s*" ’ Single quote ’
5 \s*[^\w\s?]+ - - symbol
6 \s*[^\w\s]+ - - symbol
7 \s*" ’ Single quote ’
The attack scenario as shown above clears all data within the table users. The severity of the
consequences of such an attack range from the removal of all authentication mechanisms so that
they default to open access, to a similar attack targetting a diﬀerent table that could cause loss
of valuable proprietary data contained within the database. Another regular expression Regex48
presented in A.8 also matches the DROP term, however this example we include here for clarity.
The reader is reminded that several attack scenarios may be detected through diﬀerent regular
expressions contained within our collection.
A.4 SQL Authentication Bypass Types 1, 2, 3


















Possible Detected Attack String:
UPDATE users SET password=’newsecret’ WHERE user = ’admin’ or 1=1
Description:
During regular expression matching, the ﬁrst pattern that the grouping
(?:where\s[\s\w\.,-]+\s=) attempts to match is the keyword where. A successful match requires
this pattern to be succeeded by a space character then one or more of the following symbols as shown
in this list [\s\w\.,-]. Finally, the = symbol preceded by a space character concludes the successful
capture match. As a result, the symbol sequence WHERE user = is captured from the given attack
string example.
This attack, appears similar in nature to the case of Regex42 shown in A.2. The diﬀerence is that
this attacker intends to modify user credentials in the users table, instead of retrieving their values.
Since this attack does not discern any speciﬁc user, the successful attack resets the value of every
entry in the password column, which in turn resets the password for all of the application’s users.
Table 20 exhibits the matching process for the Regex45. The table after it, Table 21, explains
how the Regex46 matches the same attack string event in a diﬀerent way.
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Table 20: Regular Expression Matching for Regex45
Step Regex Input Description
1 "\s* ’ Single quote ’
2 [^?\w\s=.,;)(]+ -- -- symbol
3 \s* space Space character
4 [(@"]*\s* ’ Symbol sequence “’ ”
5 \w+ AND Keyword “AND”
6 \W+ space Non-word character: space “”
7 \w p A letter p
Table 21: Regular Expression Matching for Regex46
Step Regex Input Description
1 " ’ Single quote ’
2 \|? - No symbol matched
3 [\w-]{3,} admin Keyword “admin” detected
4 [^\w\s.,]+ ’-- symbol sequence “’--”
5 " ’ Single quote ’
A.5 Concatenated SQL Injection and SQLLFI





Possible Detected Attack String:
’ UNION SELECT username,password,uid FROM users--
Description:
With regards to Regex47, the ﬁrst group looks for the start-of-a-line character speciﬁed by ^, this
is succeeded by an indeterminate amount of whitespace, and then by any symbol in the list ;>".
After this the keyword union preceeded by an indeterminate amount of whitespace.
This attack makes use of the UNION operator which is used in SQL to combine the results of
two or more SELECT statements into a single result set. When a web application contains a SQL
injection vulnerability that occurs in a SELECT statement, an attacker can often employ the UNION
132
operator to perform a second separate query, and combine the results of both queries. If the results
of the query are returned to your browser, then this technique can be used to easily extract arbitrary
data from within the database.
An applicable example describes a bookstore application, which uses the following statement to
look for book information speciﬁed by the user to search for books by the associated publisher:
SELECT author,title,year FROM books WHERE publisher = ’Wiley’
A skillful malicious attacker instead provides a crafted publisher name similar to the above attack
string. Upon reciept of this input, the application attaches the selection operation to the original
request. In this case, all usernames and passwords from the users table will be returned in addition
to the book information. It is also possible for this second query to extract data from a diﬀerent
database table and combine it with results from the ﬁrst operation to return any data within the
entire SQL schema.
When the results of two queries are combined using the UNION operator, the two result sets
must have the same structure. This entails that they must contain the same number of columns of
compatible data types, and each column is speciﬁed in the same order. In order to inject a second
query that will return interesting results, the attacker must know the name of the database table
and the names of the columns that contain the target data[360].
The SQL local ﬁle inclusion match that is performed by this regular expression is denoted by all
of the groupings where the keywords load, rename and load file are explicitly matched. For a
further explanation of local ﬁle inclusion, we refer the interested reader to Section 4.3.4.
A.6 Chained SQL Injection Type 1






Possible Detected Attack String:
’; insert into users values( 666, ’attacker’, ’foobar’, 0xffff )--
Description:
In this case, the engine ﬁrst uses (?:;|#|--) to match the symbol “;”, followed by a space,
then the pattern matches the keyword insert using (?:update|insert). The remaining part (
\s*\w{2,}) then speciﬁes a match of the string “ into” .
Recall the previous example in Regex42 where the attacker obtained all usernames and passwords
from the users table. Here an attacker attempts to add a new user record using the insert
operation. In particular, this vulnerability occurs where the database service is oﬀered by a MS-SQL
implementation. This is due to the fact that the MS-SQL service inherently allows multiple disparate
SQL queries, separated by the semicolon character, to be batched together and run as if processing
a single query. Moreover, the MS-SQL implementation does not require the two statements to be in
any way related, therefore permitting an even wider attack range for this type of injection. [360]
A.7 Chained SQL Injection Type 2




Possible Detected Attack String:
’ or 1 in (select @@version)--
Description:
The detection process of the above attack string is matched in accordance with the Regex grouping
(?:coalesce\s*\(|@@\w+\s*[^\w\s]). First, the two @@ symbols immediately followed by the
keyword version successfully satisfy the grouping.
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As mentioned in [360], this attack technique can be used to extract arbitrary data from an Open
DataBase Connectivity (ODBC) database. This is made possible through the generation of error
messages that contain the value of the string object when an ODBC database attempts to cast an
item of string data to a numeric data type, but the cast is unsuccessful. If error messages are being
returned to the browser, they could provide a conduit for data to leak back to an attacker disclosing
arbitrary stored data and vital system information. With this scenario it is possible to inject into the
WHERE clause of a SELECT statement in order to perform a secondary query that triggers a resulting
failed string conversion. The example presented above provides such an instantiation that returns
this version information about the database and operating system:
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers error ’80040e07’
[Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL Server]Syntax error converting
the nvarchar value ’Microsoft SQL Server 2000 - 8.00.194 (Intel X86)
Aug 6 2000 00:57:48 Copyright (c) 1988-2000 Microsoft Corporation
Enterprise Edition on Windows NT 5.0 (Build 2195: Service Pack 2) ’
to a column of data type int.
Further exploitation of this vulnerability could retrieve other arbitrarily stored data. Perhaps a
likely target would consist of passwords from a speciﬁed users table. In the following example, the
password “0wned” of the user “admin” is speciﬁed and returned within an error message as shown
below.
’ or 1 in (select password from users where username=’admin’)--
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers error ’80040e07’
[Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL Server]Syntax error converting
the varchar value ’0wned’ to a column of data type int.
A.8 SQL benchmark, sleep Injection with Conditional Queries
Regular Expression String (Regex50):
(?:(select|;)\s+(?:benchmark|if|sleep)\s?\(\s?\(?\s?\w+)
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Possible Detected Attack String:
select if(user() like ’root@%’, benchmark(50000,sha1(’test’)), ’false’)
Description:
As shown in Table 22, the Regex50 captures the attack string select if(user.
Table 22: Regular Expression Matching for Regex50
Step Regex Input Description
1 (select|;) select Keyword select
2 \s+ space Space character “ ”
3 (?:benchmark|if|sleep) if Keyword “if” detected
4 \s?\( ( Symbol ( detected
5 \s?\(?\s? - No symbol detected
6 \w+ user Keyword “user” detected
In MySQL, the benchmark function’s use is to perform a speciﬁed action repeatedly. Instructing
the database to perform a processor-intensive action, such as a hash function, a large number of times
will result in a measurable time delay. In some cases, where the web server seemingly does not return
any valuable information to the attacker through ordinary means, an attacker may attempt to use
methods of causing time delays. The time delay of the web server can be interpreted as one particular
indication or response. If such a delay command is executed, and the delay is instantiated, then the
attacker infers the boolean value of a particular condition. Even if the content of the application’s
response is identical in the two cases, the presence or absence of the time delay enables the attacker
to extract a single bit of information from the database. By performing numerous such queries, the
attacker can systematically retrieve arbitrarily complex data from the database, one bit at a time.
A.9 MySQL UDF or Data/Structure Manipulation
Regular Expression String (Regex51):
(?:create\s+function\s+\w+\s+returns)|(?:;\s*(?:select|create|
rename|truncate|load|alter|delete|update|insert|desc)\s*[\[(]?\w{2,})
Possible Detected Attack String:
\’; DESC users; --
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Description:
As shown in Table 23, the Regex51 speciﬁes that an attack string containing “; desc users” is
detectable.
Table 23: Regular Expression Matching for Regex51
Step Regex Input Description
1 ;\s* ; Symbol sequence “; ”
2 desc desc Keyword “desc”
3 \s* space Space character detected
4 [\[(]? - No symbol detected
5 \w{2,} users Table name “users” detected
The SQL plus desc command returns the value of the column names and their respective data
types. An injection of this type leaks valuable data most sought after during an attacker’s recon-
naisance phase of the attack scenario against a particular target.
The (?:create\s+function\s+\w+\s+returns) grouping of this regular expression matches an
attack injection that creates or calls a user deﬁned function. User deﬁned functions are capable of
providing access to underlying operating system commands and can be instantiated when the target
system is running a MySQL database service. [176]
A.10 MySQL and PostgreSQL Stored Procedure Calls




Possible Detected Attack String:
exec(@variable)
Description:
The attack detection process for the above string is described in Table 24.
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Table 24: Regular Expression Matching for Regex53
Step Regex Input Description
1 exec exec Keyword exec
2 \s* - No character matched
3 \( ( Matching ( symbol
4 \s* - No character matched
5 @ @ Matching @ symbol
The exec operation is supported by all MS-SQL implementations to enable the dynamic execution
of statements. One example of dynamic execution passes a string representation of a particular
statement to the function. A side eﬀect of this feature allows a malicious user to employ string
manipulation techniques as any part of the statement in order to bypass ﬁlters designed to block
certain expressions. Consider the following example:
declare @q varchar(8000)
select @q = 0x73656c656374202a2066726f6d207573657273
exec(@q)
The statement string is created from a hex-encoded numeric data. After decryption this evaluates
to “select * from users”. This command is then passed to the exec function and bypass many
kinds of input ﬁlter. One such ﬁlter could block single quotation marks, yet the service still remains
vulnerable due to attacks such as the one described beforehand. In an Oracle database, a similar
statement deﬁned by the keywords EXECUTE IMMEDIATE also executes queries that are input as
encoded strings.
A.11 Postgres pg sleep, waitforDelays and DB Service Shut-
downs







According to the regular expression grouping (?:;\s*shutdown\s*(?:;|--|#|\/\*|{)), the en-
tire given attack string matches. During processing, the regular expression ﬁrst matches events
that include the “;” symbol, the keyword shutdown and the comment symbol -- in this order of
submission. Attacks that target the data itself include information leakage, sensitive information
disclosure, manipulation or deletion. When the goal of an attacker is not data oriented, a denial
of service attack causes potentially more damage should the main source of income for a potential
target be procured from the availability of the service. A web application that relies on a database
backend can immediately be crippled by the input of only 12 characters. The command that turns
oﬀ an MS-SQL database is shutdown.
A.12 Match AGAINST, MERGE, EXECUTE IMMEDIATE
and HAVING
Regular Expression String (Regex56):
(?:merge.*using\s*\()|(execute\s*immediate\s*")|
(?:\W+\d*\s+having\s+\d)|(?:match\s*[\w(),+-]+\s*against\s*\()
Possible Detected Attack String:
’ group by users.ID, users.username, users.password,
users.privs having 1=1--
Description:
As can be observed from the grouping (?:\W+\d*\s*having\s*[^\s]), this regular expression
detects a sequence containing at least one non-word character followed by the keyword having and
an amount of whitespace, and then at least one character. In this example, the substring “ having
1” is captured.
This attack example is provided in [360] as an illustration of how to enumerate table and column
names, without authorization from the web application. The resulting message discloses the name of
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the column after the speciﬁed column given in the query. Enumeration of all columns from a target
table is possible when multiple queries are formed where the results from each query are input to
each subsequent query.
A.13 MySQL Comment or Space-Obfuscated Attack
Regular Expression String (Regex57):
(?:select\s*\*\s*from)|((?:select|create|rename|truncate|load|alter|
delete|update|insert|desc)\s*\(\s*space\s*\()
Possible Detected Attack String:
SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ’
Description:
The regular expression grouping denoted by (?:select\s*\*\s*from) detects the substring
SELECT * FROM from the attack input. As one of the simplest SQL statements provided as input,
this attack queries the indicated username from the users table. Based on the return values of this
input, an attacker can determine the validity of each username. This accomplished, other attack
techniques could employ the resultant data or futher exploitation through an additional query when
an attacker employs the union operation.
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Appendix B
Regular Expressions for Operating
System Command Injection
B.1 MSSQL Code Execution and Reconnaisance






Possible Detected Attack String:
’; exec master..xp_cmdshell ’ipconfig > test.txt’ --
Description:
The substring exec master. signiﬁes an attack of this type and is detected by the following
grouping (?:exec\s+master\.) of the regular expression Regex55. This attack makes use of the
exec operation to enable the execution of an operating system command. In this injection, the
malicious user is attempting to invoke a command shell on a MS Windows system, then utilizing
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elevated priviledges of the service, the shell calls the networking conﬁguration command and outputs
this to a text ﬁle. During the reconnaisance phase of an attack scenario, a malicious force attempts
to procure sensitive data about the target system. The network conﬁguration of a target system is
an invaluable source of data that when mapped may reveal other attack avenues.
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Appendix C
Regular Expressions for Cross Site
Request Forgery
C.1 Data: URL Injections, VBS Injections and Common
URI Schemes








There are two grouping’s speciﬁed in Regex27 responsible for reporting the successful event
whose details match the speciﬁed attack string. Each of these two groupings (?:data:.*,) and
(?:\w+\s*=\W*(?!https?)\w+:) return successfully when the following substrings match
data:text/html;charset=utf-8, and href="data:. Our example attacker’s method of injection
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is to place the script code within the link tag’s (<a>) href property. As a method to avoid detection
the <script> tag is encoded as %3cscript%3e. An injection of the JS function history.back()




Regular Expressions for XSS
D.1 Detects Basic XSS probings







Detected Attack String 1:
<SCRIPT>document.write("<SCRI");</SCRIPT>PT
SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT>
Detected Attack String 2:
<A HREF="javascript:document.location=’http://www.google.com/’">XSS</A>
Description:
Both of the above input strings classify as attacks when the regular expression grouping
(?:document\.\w) processes from them the keyword document. followed by any word character.
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The ﬁrst detected attack string is injected and lays dormant until the browser renders the injected
material, in this case the page loads the speciﬁed script ﬁle xss.js. This script ﬁle is hosted remotely
from the web application, and using JS instructs the page to write the string This is remote text
via xss.js located at ha.ckers.org and then prints out the values of all cookies available to
the webpage [386]. The second detected attack string describes a potentially malicious redirection
link deﬁnition.
D.2 JavaScript Cookie Stealing and Redirection
Regular Expression String (Regex26):
(?:[^:\s\w]+\s*[^\w\/](href|protocol|host|hostname|pathname|hash|port|
cookie)[^\w])
Possible Detected Attack String:
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/css" href="style.css"?>
Description:
During processing of the regular expression Regex26, the substring " href= identiﬁes this partic-
ular string as an attack. This pattern denotes any character other than whitespace characters, to
match the double quote symbol within the attack string. The pattern then looks for any number
of whitespaces, including none, followed by any character not a whitespace which in our example
equates to a space " " character. Finally, the keyword href matches to denote a positive result.
The intended use for the stylesheet tag was to provide a conduit for including style preferences for
the layout of XML documents speciﬁed in CSS. CSS deﬁne modiﬁcations to the style and layout of
particular pages, which specify their use [108]. However, in this attack the malicious user exploits
the behaviour of this tag to inject a CSS ﬁle that contains script.
D.3 Hash Redirection XSS, Set or Get Usage, Property Over-
loading




Possible Detected Attack String:
"><script>eval(location.hash.substr(1))</script><!--
Description:
The grouping (?:\W\s*hash\s*[^\w\s-]) of Regex5 matches this attack string in the following
manner. This grouping deﬁnes a match based on the succession that includes a non-word character,
followed by arbitrary number of whitespace characters, followed by the keyword “hash, then followed
by another arbitrary number of whitespace characaters, and any character that does not fall into
the categories of being a word character, whitespace character, or a “-”. In our attack string the
sequence .hash. matches.
The attack string exempliﬁes a redirection attack, which uses the JS location.hash() function.
This intended use of this function is to redirect the browser to speciﬁc HTML assigned anchor
points on a page. The location object contains the current main URL content and the hash()
object provides functions that modify or retrieve the anchor string. Within the URL, the hash sign
(#) denotes the beginning of the anchor name. To give an example, this current URL describes a
scenario where the location.hash value is equivalent to the string section2.
http://www.example.com/index.html#section2
The anchor function provides attackers with an URL speciﬁed means of executing code. Enabling
direct execution for XSS attacks even when the allowance for input includes only a small number of
characters, or special characters and symbols exluded as input for the application, may restrict an
attacker to input directly into the URL itself.




The script portion location.hash.substr(1) evaluates the anchor data provided after the #
sign. Should this portion be contain malicious scripts, these are executed by the browser.
This attack exhibits two distinct advantages. The ﬁrst advantage is that the attack itself leaves
very small little data with which to concoct a footprint that distinguishes its malicious nature from
regular requests. This is due to the fact that the script segment, which occurs after the # sign, is
not transmitted to the server. It is executed on the client side. The second advantage to this variety
of injection is that it allows the attacker to bypass any limitation speciﬁed for the user provided
string. Plenty of web applications restrict the total number of characters that a user can input for
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